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ABSTRACT
This study evaluates recent speech-act theory, par
ticularly as formulated by J. L. Austin and John Searle, as
an instrument for the teaching of the reading and writing
of the formal essay in college freshman English classes.
The study assumes that the formal essay can be regarded as
the performance of a series of speech acts of the various
kinds distinguished by Austin and Searle and that the
reader's and writer's knowledge of these distinctions will
result in greater effectiveness in the use of language.
The study opens with several chapters in which
speech-act theory is examined to discover elements that
might be relevant for the study of

the formal essay.

following four points are explored thoroughly:

The

(1) virtu

ally every utterance in a meaningful speech situation is a
performance of a locutionary or propositional act, an
illocutionary act, and usually a perlocutionary act;

(2)

propositional acts and illocutionary acts are rule-governed
and conventional whereas perlocutionary acts (effects on an
audience) are not;

(3) conventional force indicators convey

the illocutionary intent of the speaker; and (4) the rules,
conventions, and indicating devices are accessible, at
least intuitively, to most native speakers of the language.

In the next few sections of the study four essays by
professional writers are analyzed as the performance of a
complex series of compound illocutionary acts.

The locu

tionary and perlocutionary acts performed in these essays
are mentioned only briefly.

The lengthiest treatment is

given to Howard Mumford Jones's "The Iron String."

In this

essay are discovered the illocutionary acts of stating,
opining, arguing, exemplifying, accounting for, comparing,
deprecating,

commending, evaluating, and urging.

Each of

these acts is defined by the conventional rules which con
stitute it, and some attempt is made to discover the indi
cating devices that signal the act.

Then three other

essays found in traditional anthologies used in freshman
English classes are analyzed:

Joseph Wood Krutch's "We

Were Not Skeptical Enough,” Sylvia Angus’s "It's Pretty,
but Is It Art?", and Irving Kristol's "Censorship and Por
nography."

The analysis of these essays shows that the

method developed in the study of "The Iron String" works
in the study of other essays; the analysis also adds to the
list of illocutionary acts isolated and the rules formu
lated, and it contributes to the understanding of the force
indicators which authors use in addressing different audi
ences.

Some attempt is also made to determine the felicity

of the illocutionary acts isolated in the essays.

"Felic

ity" is Austin's term for success in the performance of an
illocutionary act.

As Austin points out, the felicity of

v

an illocutionary act depends in large part on the extent to
which the reader can interpret the author's indicators, the
willingness of the author to use indicators to signal force,
and the authority of the author who performs a particular
act.
Finally, five student essays are analyzed as the
performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary
acts.

Four of these fail to some degree because they do

not perform the act required by the assignment, perform it
in a garbled manner, or do not signal their acts in a clear
way.

The students are successful only when they understand

the extent to which they obligate themselves in performing
certain acts and therefore perform only acts which they can
felicitously perform.
This study indicates that this approach to the
teaching of the formal essay is a promising one which de
serves to be tested with further classroom experimentation
in which students are taught to read essays as the perform
ance of illocutionary acts and to write with the conscious
intent to perform certain acts.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

When J. L. Austin delivered the William James Lec
tures at Harvard in 1955 (published in 1962 as How to Do
Things with Words) , he introduced a new set of concepts and
terms which have now been adopted by some literary critics,
rhetoricians, and linguists.

In these lectures, Austin

examined the meaning, the force, and the effect of utter
ances in the everyday speech of ordinary men.

He concluded

that a speech a c t , or the utterance of a series of vocables
by a human speaker who consciously intends to express a
certain meaning with a certain force in order to produce a
certain effect, may be analyzed into two and sometimes three
separate acts.

He called one act, which carries the mean

ing, the locutionary act; another, which conveys force, the
illocutionary act; and the third, which is the effect of the
preceding two acts, the perlocutionary act.

In other words,

Austin proposed that when a speaker says, "Please close the
door," he expresses the idea that a person is to close a
door and performs a locutionary act, he conveys the force of
requesting and performs an illocutionary act, and he may
persuade and perform a perlocutionary act.

1

2

Since Austin's death in I960, his speech-act theory
has been modified and expanded by others, particularly John

1
Searle.

In articles and in his book on the philosophy of

language, Speech A c t s , Searle has built on Austin's defi
nition of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocution
ary acts.

He has modified Austin's ideas in some respects,

and he has provided concrete examples and detailed explana
tions of the concepts on which the speech-act theory rests.
As an explication of Austin's ideas, Searle's work is valu
able in any study which attempts to explore the use of the
concepts developed by Austin.
Austin's speech-act theory, originally interesting
only in philosophers' circles, is now beginning to be ap
preciated by scholars in other fields.

Some literary

critics have defined various literary genres in terms of
their illocutionary force, and they have shown that a the
ory intended originally to explain one-sentence utterances
can be used in the explication of written discourse many
paragraphs in length.

Students interested in oral and

written composition have also looked to Austin's speech-act
theory for new ways to view their disciplines.

Though the

full implications of speech-act theory have not yet been
explored, significant beginnings have been made in a number
of fields.
In the study described in this dissertation,

I have

considered the implications of Austin's speech-act theory

3

for the teaching of the formal essay.

My thesis is that an

effective essay hy a professional writer should reflect the
successful performance of the appropriate speech acts, that
students can be taught to analyze these acts in the profes
sional writer's essay, and that they can, in turn, profit
from viewing their own writing as the performance of speech
acts.

I have, therefore, read essays by professional

writers as the performance of successful speech acts.
Then,

I have evaluated the success of student essays using

as a criterion the extent to which they perform successful
speech acts.

Finally,

I have formulated guidelines for

teaching the reading and writing of the formal essay using
speech-act concepts.

The results of this investigation

constitute the main divisions of this dissertation.
In the rest of ray introduction I shall take a gen
eral preliminary view of the theory and summarize what use
has already been made of it in the study and teaching of
literature and composition.
I
To understand Austin's work, one must see it in the
context of twentieth-century philosophy.

According to

Anthony Quinton, writing for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
"The latest phase of British philosophy can be said, with
more precision than is usual in the history of thought, to
have begun in the year 1903.

It was the year of the first

4

major work of Bertrand Russell (born 1872), his Principles
of Mathematics, and of the two most influential writings of
G. E. Moore (1873-1958), his Principia Ethica and his essay
2
"Refutation of Idealism."
The period ushered in by these
works is characterized by its emphasis on the study of lan
guage as the chief work of the philosopher.

In the first

decades of this period, philosophers such as Russell and
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(1922) attempted to construct a philosophical language as
precise as the mathematical language of calculus.

Then,

in

the next two decades, the logical positivists such as A. J.
Ayer reduced the statements interesting to philosophers to
the "verifiable" proposition.

According to Ayer, as well as

the other positivists, verifiable propositions are either
"analytic" or "synthetic."
follows:

Ayer defined the two types as

"A proposition is analytic when its validity de

pends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains,
and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts
3
of experience."
Any utterance which does not fall in one
of these two groups is either nonsense or simply an expres
sion of an emotion.

In either case, the utterance is unim

portant in serious philosophical discussion.

These philos

ophers believed that the language of the everyday world is
in many ways deficient and that the business of the philos
opher is to develop an artificial language that will be a
more nearly adequate vehicle for his ideas.

5

In the 19 5 0 ’s Cambridge philosophers under the lead
ership of Wittgenstein and an Oxford group led by Austin
and Gilbert Ryle continued the emphasis on language which
Quinton notes as a characteristic of this period, but they
repudiated the previous generation's attitude toward ordi
nary language,

Wittgenstein, who,

in the Tractatus, had

advocated a mathematical language for philosophy, decided,
according to V. C. Chappell,

"that

’ordinary language is

all right,’ and that philosophical difficulties, which are
indeed linguistic in origin, arise not because our language
is faulty but because philosophers misdescribe and miscon4
strue it."
Ryle's landmark essay, "Ordinary Language,"
first published in 1953 in The Philosophical Review, called
for a consideration of the vernacular as a corrective mea
sure which the philosopher's jargon requires.

As Ryle ex

pressed it, "'Back to ordinary language' can be (but often
is not) the slogan of those who have awoken from the formaliser’s dream.

This slogan, so used, should be repudiated

only by those who hope to replace philosophising by reckon5
ing."
The Oxford and the Cambridge philosophers who agreed
with Ryle came to be known as the ordinary language philos
ophers .
Among twentieth-century philosophers, Austin is,
first of all, an ordinary language philosopher.

In his

early essays and lectures, he turns again and again to the
way an expression is used in ordinary English for his basic

6

information on the expression.

For example,

in ’’Truth,"

an essay published in 1950, he begins with the question,
"What is it that we say is true or is false?

Or, how does
6
the phrase 'is true' occur in English sentences?"
In
Sense and Sensibilia, lecture notes published in 1962,
Austin's chief attack on Ayer's "two languages" grows from
Ayer's failure to regard ordinary language with respect.
In the first chapter he affirms, "The fact is, as I shall
try to make clear, that our ordinary words are much subtler
in their uses, and mark many more distinctions, than phi7
losophers have realized."
In the essay, "A Plea for Ex
cuses," Austin sums up his attitude toward ordinary lan
guage:
word:

"Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last
in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and

improved upon and superseded.
8
first w o r d ."

Only remember,

it is the

Austin's other characteristic which is important in
this study because it led to the theory of the illocution
ary act is his concern for the dimensions of language which
the language philosophers of the first half of the century
considered irrelevant in the study of philosophy.

In a 1956

B. B. C. broadcast, a transcript of which was later printed
in Philosophical Papers as "Performative Utterances," Austin
describes the philosophical milieu in which he developed
his theory.

He says,

We have not got to go very far back in the history of
philosophy to find philosophers assuming more or less

7
as a matter of course that the sole business, the sole
interesting business, of any utterance— that is, of any
thing we say— is to be true or at least false.
Of
course they had always known that there are other kinds
of things which we say— things like imperatives, the ex
pressions of wishes, and exclamations— some of which had
even been classified by grammarians, though it wasn't
perhaps too easy to tell always which was which.
But
still philosophers have assumed that the only things
that they are interested in are utterances which report
facts or which describe situations truly or falsely.9
Austin cites two periods in the development of this ap
proach.

In the first period, "people began to say:

'Well,

if these things are true or false it ought to be possible
to decide which they are, and if we can't decide which they

10
are they aren't any good but are, in short, nonsense."’
In the second period, philosophers began to question whether
or not the statements classified as nonsense had been in
tended as statements at all.

For example, as a philosopher

beginning his work in this period, Austin asks, "Mightn't
they [the statements classified as nonsense]

perhaps be in

tended not to report facts but to influence people in this
way or that, or to let off steam in this way or that?

Or

perhaps at any rate some elements in these utterances per
formed such functions, or, for example, drew attention in
some way (without actually reporting it) to some important
feature of the circumstances in which the utterance was be
ll
ing made."
Austin is interested in the second type of
utterance— that which is not intended to report facts or,
if it does report facts, also has an additional dimension.
Working with ordinary language, Austin set out to

8
explore this dimension of utterances which cannot be ac
counted for by their factual content.

Significantly, he

worked with the utterance of the sentence or proposition,
not with the sentence or proposition itself, and then with
the "total speech act," as he calls it.

Summing up his

conclusions in Lecture XII in How to Do Things with ffords,
Austin makes the following point first:

"The total speech

act in the total speech situation is the only actual phe
nomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elu12
cidating."
In considering the "total speech act," not
the sentence or proposition, Austin moved from a distinc
tion between two kinds of utterances— the performative and
the constative— to the notion that every utterance will be
a locutionary and an illocutionary act and may also be a
perlocutionary act.

Then he established the nucleus of a

theory of rules and conventions which govern the illocu
tionary act.
Austin's discussion of the performative in the first
seven chapters or lectures in How to Do Things with Words
begins with a consideration of certain utterances which
seem to have meaning but which do not seem to be true or
false.

The most obvious of these is a ceremonial utterance

such as "I do" in the wedding ceremony or "I name this ship
the Queen Elizabeth" in christening a ship.

The grammat

ical form of these utterances is the simplest form of the
logical positivist's verifiable proposition, but the

9
utterance is not intended to make a statement and is not
subject to the need for verification.

Instead, such an

utterance as "I do" "performs” an action.

The actual utter

ing of the words is a vital part of the marriage ceremony or
the christening of the ship.
of utterance a "performative."
other hand,

Hence, Austin calls this type
The "constative," on the

is the utterance which makes a statement and is

subject to the need for verification.

Its chief function

is not to perform an action but to report or describe.

A

constative with the same form as the performatives which
Austin uses for examples is the following:
In this utterance,

"I see the dog."

the speaker describes his own action,

but, by his utterance, Austin concludes at this point, he
does not perform an action since he does not perform the
act of "seeing" by stating that he is seeing.
In these first lectures Austin explores the idea that
the performative is capable of being happy or unhappy and
the constative of being true or false.

The "doctrine of the

Infelicities" defines the conditions under which an utter
ance is happy.

These conditions, which will be discussed

fully in Chapter III, are the circumstances surrounding the
utterance, the intention of the speaker, and the commitment
of the speaker to carry out or stand behind the commitment
which he makes in the performative utterance.

The consta

tive, on the other hand, Austin tries to show, can only be
judged by the extent to which it can be

verified.

10

By Lecture VIII, however, Austin has abandoned the
distinction between performative and constative as a help
ful way of dividing utterances into two completely separate
classes.

After experimenting with various grammatical

tests, he concludes that none of them will be consistently
useful in his attempt to distinguish constatives from per
formatives.

More important, he realizes that every utter

ance is an action.
for example,

The simplest verifiable proposition—

’’The rose is red"— becomes an act of stating

when it is uttered by a speaker.

As such,

it is subject to

the conditions which must be satisfied if a performative is
to be happy.

On the other hand, Austin discovers that per

formative utterances not only have a happiness-unhappiness
dimension but also are capable of being true or false.

In

fact, the happiness of a performative depends in part on its
being true.

For example, a performative such as "I apolo

gize" is only happy when it is true that the speaker is
apologizing.

Austin concedes that "considerations of the

happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or
some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and
13
falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)."
In other words, when Austin considers the "total speech
act," he cannot divide utterances into two discrete classes,
one consisting of performatives and the other of constatives.
Austin, therefore, replaces the attempt to separate
utterances into two groups with the attempt to distinguish

11

different acts within the ’’total speech act.”

Most signi

ficant utterances, he decides, involve two acts:
tionary act and an illocutionary act.

a locu

Some utterances also

perform a third act— the perlocutionary act.

The locution

ary act is the direct descendant of the constative.

It is

simply "uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense
14
and reference.”
Austin's favorite example of a sentence
which can be used in performing a locutionary act is "The
cat is on the mat."

Uttering it, the speaker refers to

"the cat" and tells something about the particular cat.
The illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts go back to
the performative.

The illocutionary act is the component

of the utterance which determines its force, or the type of
action which the speaker is performing in uttering the sen
tence.

The speaker may be ordering, warning, or advocating,

or he may be stating.

Austin can find no clear examples of

utterances in which he is not doing some action such as
these when he is uttering a meaningful sentence and intend
ing to communicate with an audience.
his listener,

If a speaker says to

"The cat is on the mat," unless the circum

stances are completely outside the limits which define human
communication, he is performing an illocutionary act of
stating or asking or even warning.

The perlocutionary act

is "what we bring about or achieve b£ saying something such
as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, sur15
prising or misleading."
Every speech act will have its

12

locutionary and illocutionary components, but, since the
perlocutionary act is the effect on the listener, some
speech acts may not include a perlocutionary component.
One may warn of a danger, for example, without convincing
or deterring.
Austin says,

To sum up the character of the three acts,
"Thus we distinguished the locutionary act

. . .which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has
a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act
which is the achieving of certain effects by saying some16
thing."
Virtually all utterances are locutionary and illocu
tionary acts:

in the act of performing the locutionary

act, the speaker must employ a certain force and therefore
perform an illocutionary act.
locutionary effect:

Any act may also have a per

it may cause the hearer to change an

attitude, escape a danger, or rob a bank.

Whether this ef

fect is achieved is outside the full control of the speaker.
In fact, the effect which he achieves may not even be an
effect which the speaker has intended to bring about by his
speech act.

To Austin, the most interesting of the three

acts is, then, the illocutionary.

The locutionary aspect

of utterances he feels has been overemphasized by the logi
cal positivists.

The perlocutionary act is too subjective,

too dependent on the hearer's emotional response, to provide
material for the kind of objective study in which he is in
terested.

Ignored by the previous generation of philos-

13

ophers, yet possessing the built-in characteristics neces
sary for an objective study, the illocutionary act is
Austin's chief concern.
Austin's work with the theory of the illocutionary
act was not, however, complete at the time of his death in
1960.

Of his three major works, only Philosophical Papers

contains essays published during his lifetime and therefore
prepared for publication by Austin himself.

After Austin's

death, C. J. Warnock edited some of his notes for publica
tion as Sense and Sensibilia.

J. 0. Urmson, assisted by

Warnock, prepared the manuscript of How to Do Things with
Words from Austin's William James Lectures notes.

Because

his work was not considered finished, his fellow scholars
have found it possible to amend and supplement it without
assuming an adversary role in relation to Austin.

The most

important, John Searle, in Speech Acts and in articles based
on his dissertation, has expanded the Austinian framework
into the beginnings of a full philosophy of language.

Aus

tin's three books supplemented by the relevant portions of
Searle's works will provide the understanding of the illo
cutionary act which is the basis of this study.
IX
In the last ten years, encouraged,

it appears, by the

publication of How to Do Things with Words in 1962 and
Speech Acts in 1969, some literary critics and rhetoricians

14
have attempted to show that Austin's theory has signifi
cant implications for the formulation of literary theories
and new methods of teaching oral and written composition.
In a recent article in New Literary History, "Cumulation,
Revolution, and Progress," Martin Steinmann describes Aus
tin's speech-act theory as revolutionary and predicts the
emergence of a new school of criticism based on "the

Lit-

erature-as-Imitation-Speech-Act Theory" which may overthrow
17
the New Critics' "Literature-as-Special-Language Theory."
The effect of the use of the theory on the teaching of oral
and written composition as well as linguistic studies seems
likely to be equally revolutionary.
Richard Ohmann, editor of College English and a
leading proponent of the usefulness of speech-act theory in
literary criticism, called for a study of its usefulness as
early as 1971.

In that year he begins the final section of

his essay, "Speech, Action, and Style," with the following
statement:

"A discourse is a set of grammatical structures

with meanings.
reader.

It is also an attempt to influence the

I am suggesting that these facts about the ontol

ogy of discourse have been well recognized in theories of
style, but that a third— that a discourse is a series of
18
illocutionary acts— has not, and ought to be."
In the
same year in another essay, "Speech Acts and the Definition
of Literature," Ohmann proposes this definition:

"A liter

ary work is a discourse whose sentences lack the illocution

15

ary forces which would normally attach to them.
cutionary force is m imetic."

Its illo

Considering this defini

tion, Ohmann observes:
If the work of literature is mimetic of speech acts,
then it is in a sense exhibiting both quasi-speech-acts
and the sentences that purportedly help bring about
those acts.
To exhibit them is to direct attention to
them, and, among other things, to their intricacy of
meaning and their formal regularity.
Similarly, since
the quasi-speech-acts of literature are not carrying on
the w o r l d ’s business— describing, urging, contracting,
etc.— the reader may well attend to them in a non
pragmatic way, and thus allow them to realize their
emotive potential.
In other words, the suspension of
normal illocutionary forces tends to shift a reader's
attention to the locutionary acts themselves and to
their perlocutionary effects.2®
Ohmann studies the connection between style and the illocu
tionary act in "Speech, Action, and Style"— a connection
based on his view of literature as "a series of hypotheti
cal acts, grounded in the conventions for verbal action
21
that we have all thoroughly learned."
In "Speech, Liter
ature, and the Space Between," written in 1972, Ohmann ap
plies his understanding of the illocutionary force of ut
terances to an exploration of discourses ranging from news22
paper articles to television commercials.
In the essay,

"Literature as Act," printed in Seymour

Chatman’s Approaches to P oetics, 1973, Ohmann expands ideas
for which he has laid the foundations in the earlier arti
cles.

For one thing, he defines irony in speech-act termi

nology as the result of an illocutionary act's infelicity.
The desperate irony of a play like Beckett’s Endgame he

16

shows to be a result of the author's manipulation of
"quasi-speech-acts" in a milieu in which felicitous speech
acts are impossible since the understandings necessary for
their successful performance are no longer shared by speak
er and hearer.

Ohmann demonstrates that the irony of Un

dershaft’s speeches in Act II of Major Barbara results
from their infelicity and that Barbara's understanding of
the truths which they convey results from her knowledge of
their infelicity.

In addition, Ohmann makes an important

point concerning the speech act in fiction which applies
to the act in any written discourse:

"A written literary

work preserves in its words a record of purported speech
acts.

They are frozen in its text, to be brought alive
23
whenever a reader reenacts them as a participant."
Both
of these ideas are important as speech-act theory is ex
panded to explain other forms of literature.
Monroe C. Beardsley, co-author with W. K. Wimsatt of
"The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy," de
fines the lyric poem in The Possibility of Criticism, pub
lished in 1970, as "the complex imitation of a compound
24
illocutionary act."
Beardsley calls the imitation "com
plex" for the following reason:

"What makes a discourse a

literary work (roughly speaking) is its exploitation to a
high degree of the illocutionary-act potential of its verbal
ingredients— or, in more usual terminology,
complexity of meaning.

its richness and

And what makes a literary work a
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poem is the degree to which it condenses that complexity
25
of meaning into compact, intense utterance,''
Defining it
as "compound," he considers that the poem relies heavily
for its complexity on primary and secondary illocutionary
acts.

To explain these Beardsley compares "Bring me my

slippers" to "Bring me my favorite slippers, which are such
a comfort to me."

He calls both of these examples of or

dering, but the second he holds to be also an example of
praising.

Beardsley sums up the difference between the two

utterances:

"The second case is a compound illocutionary

act, though the syntax makes the ordering primary, the
26
praising secondary."
In a later essay, "The Concept of
Literature," Beardsley is less confident of his definition
of the lyric poem as "the complex imitation of a compound
illocutionary act,"but he is not willing to abandon it com
pletely.

He concludes, "What I wish to suggest, by way of

conclusion,
fense,

although without anything like an adequate de

is that there is indeed an underlying relationship

between (1) being an imitation illocutionary act and (2)
being distinctly above the norm in ratio of implicit to ex27
plicit meaning."
Since the relationship of implicit to
explicit meaning is basic to Beardsley's other theories, he
is expressing a crucial idea when he connects implicit and
explicit meanings to the illocutionary act.
In recent years at least four other critics have used
Austin's terminology, and Searle himself has smoothed the
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way for a consideration of the illocutionary act in fiction,
Marcia Eaton, in articles based on her 1968 dissertation,
Stanford University, adds the term "translocutionary act"
28
to Austin's three terms for speech acts.
Richard Gale in
the essay, "The Fictive Use of Language," which he describes
as "a paper on the ontology of fiction," considers fiction
from a philosophical viewpoint using the locutionary, illo29
cutlonary, and perlocutionary distinction.
In the essay,
"Three Kinds of Intention," printed in Modern Language Notes
in 1972, Michael Hancher distinguishes three kinds of inten
tion which may be discovered in a literary work:
author’s intention to make something or other;

"(1) the

(2) the au

thor’s intention to be (understood as) acting in some way or
other;

(3) the author's intention to cause something or
30
other to happen."
Hancher shows the problem discussed by
Wimsatt and Beardsley as the "intentional fallacy" to result
from confusing these three kinds of intention, which he
feels correspond roughly to the locutionary, the illocution
ary, and the perlocutionary acts.

Using speech-act theory,

Robert L. Brown, Jr., in "Intention and the Contexts of
Poetry," published in 1974 in Centrum, attacks the idea that
interest in the author's intention is a "fallacy" and dis
cusses two kinds of intention— the intention of the speaker
in the poem or work of fiction and the intention of the au31
thor of the work.
In a recent article, "The Logical sta
tus of Fictional Discourse,” Searle shows the way in which
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he believes the author of a work of fiction uses illocutionary acts and the status of these acts in the work of
32
fiction.
In the field of speech several works have explored
ordinary language philosophy as a possible source of in
sight.

Karl R. Wallace, author of Understanding Discourse:

The Speech Act and Rhetorical Action, uses Austin's ideas
to support his "notion of purpose" as well as the "notion
of material foundations of utterance and the form and sub33
stance of utterance."
John Stewart's dissertation, Uni
versity of Southern California, 1970, is entitled "Rhetor
icians on Language and Meaning:
losophy Critique."

An Ordinary Language Phi

Stewart, in a recent article based on

this study, summarizes a number of treatments of language
and meaning in recent speech communication literature and
the approach to these subjects of the ordinary language
philosophers, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, P. F. Strawson,
and William P. Alston.

In this article, printed in The

Quarterly Journal of Speech, he proposes a study of ordi
nary language philosophy by both the rhetorician and the
34
speech communication specialist.
Paul Newell Campbell,
on the other hand, tries to show in "A Rhetorical View of
Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts" that
ordinary language philosophy can have little importance in
35
the field of speech.
A few attempts have been made to incorporate the
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conclusions of speech-act theory into programs for teaching
writing.

For example, Ohmann has collaborated with Harold

C. Martin and James Wheatley in a

textbook for a composi

tion course, The Logic and Rhetoric Of Exposition (third
edition), in which the authors consider exposition as the
illocutionary act of stating or asserting and attempt to
list the rules and obligations of the writer of statements
or assertions.

In addition, they explain persuasion as a

perlocutionary act and strategies of persuasion as the
means of bringing about a change in an audience.

This book

makes a valuable contribution to the study of speech acts
and composition, but it does not fully exploit the possi
bilities of the Austinian theory.

It limits serious exposi

tory writing to the illocutionary act of asserting,

it does

not explore the relationship between style and illocutionaryforce potential, and it does not attempt the analysis of
whole works.
In addition to the Martin-Ohmann-Wheatley textbook,
three dissertations have contributed to the attempt to re
late ordinary language philosophy to the study of language
and composition.

One of these, "Illocutionary Acts and

Transformational Grammar," by Steven Davis, University of
Illinois., 196S, is concerned with the teaching of composi
tion only to the extent that generative grammar is consider
ed to be a tool for improving composition.

In it, Stevens

explores the relationship between generative grammar and
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speech-act theory and concludes that a "universal grammar"
will have an "illocutionary act component" which will ac36
count for questions and assertions.
In other words, he
concludes that the question and the assertion are present
in every language because the human mind works in a certain
way.

Jack Reitzes in "J. L. Austin's Theory of Speech Acts:

Its Theoretical and Heuristic Potential for the Study of
Language," Harvard, 1968, finds that "Austin's theory can
be construed as a valuable heuristic device both for theo
rists involved in the study of language, linguistic perform
ance and perception and for those who are in the process of
37
learning their language as well."
Reitzes' study is di
rected not to the teaching of composition but to the teach
ing of language, and it remains on the level of a theoreti
cal philosophical study.

Alan Lemke's "Philosophy of Lan

guage and the Teaching of Writing," University of Illinois,
1972, is the only dissertation at this time which offers
practical suggestions for teaching composition.

Lemke looks

for an approach to the teaching of writing in the works of
Wittgenstein, Austin, Alston, Kenneth Burke, and Brand
Blanchard.

Drawing upon the work of these men, Lemke advo

cates teaching writing as "a way of knowing," utilizing "a
process in which the student moves from a state of relative
38
incoherence toward the end of his knowing impulse."
Lemke's chief contribution to techniques for teaching writ
ing is his suggestion concerning pre-writing activities.

He
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feels that the student should be led through a dialectic
process to accept as his own the question or problem which
he is to consider.

Good writing will result from the stu

dent's serious consideration of the problem.

Lemke deals

with problems of style or arrangement only as they arise
and are solved as the student searches for a coherent an
swer.
One point emerges from a consideration of these uses
of the illocutionary-act theory.

A growing number of schol

ars feel that this theory, developed in terms of the simple
one-sentence utterance, can be applied to discourse of more
than one sentence in length and even to written discourse.
In addition, two definitions which apply the idea of the
illocutionary act to written discourse of some length have
appeared:

Beardsley’s definition of the lyric poem as "the

complex imitation of a compound illocutionary act" and Ohmann's definition of any discourse as "a series of illocu
tionary acts."
imitation of

In prose nonfiction the discourse is not an

an

illocutionary act:

the author performs the

act in his own right when he speaks in his own person.

Usu

ally in nonfiction the author is speaking for himself.

A

long discourse will be "a series of illocutionary acts," and
it will be a complex performance of illocutionary acts.

Its

separate sentences will usually perform a compound illocu
tionary act.

In fact, the discourse as a whole may be ana

lyzed as a compound illocutionary act.

For example, an
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article for a periodical may be, first of all, an act of
asserting and, second, an act of advocating.

Then it may

have within it a series of acts, most of them compound, all
of them contributing to the complexity of the performance
of illocutionary acts in the essay.

In this study, the

formal essay will be considered as a performance of a com
plex series of usually compound illocutionary acts all of
which contribute to the total illocutionary force, which
in turn may be compound.
Ill
When one applies to the formal essay the idea that
any discourse is the performance of a series of illocution
ary acts, he is broadening a theory based originally on
single utterances in speech situations to fit a discourse
that may run to thousands of words.

This application is

possible if one accepts the extended application of the
term supplied by Beardsley and Ohmann.

It becomes even

more plausible applied to the formal essay as I define it
in this study.
I define the formal essay by pulling from the histor
ical definition of the essay those elements which seem to
make it in its more formal instances a suitable label for
the type of writing which a student should master before he
enters a particular field with its particular writing de
mands.

In other words, this definition of the formal essay
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should apply to the ''theme11 which is the goal of freshman
English instruction.

James Kinneavy in A Theory of Dis

course comments on the ambiguous uses of the term essay
which, he feels, "make it presently unacceptable in any
39
precise context."
Certainly the term has been a catch
all term, used in fact to apply to any short prose non
fiction.

In its evolution, however, the term has kept

some elements which make it meaningful in spite of its
broadness.

The English word essay is derived from the

French essai used by Montaigne in the sixteenth century to
refer to his "attempts" to explore subjects of interest to
him in short prose works.

Samuel Johnson turned the defi

nition in a

pejorative direction in his eighteenth-century

definition:

"A loose sally of the mind; an irregular in

digested piece; not a regular and orderly composition."
OED lists its definition of the literary essay under the
second division of its definition of the word essay.

All

the definitions in this division are "a trying to do some
thing."

When

this definition is limited to written dis

course, OED picks up parts of Johnson's definition:

"A

composition of moderate length on any particular subject,
or branch of a subject; originally implying want of finish,
’an irregular undigested piece'

(J), but now said of a com

position more or less elaborate in style, though limited in
range."

The thread tying all these together is knotted at

Montaigne's first use of "attempts" to describe his short
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meditative sketches.

It is the key, in fact, to modern de

finitions such as the one in the 1971 unabridged edition of
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language and in
Barnet, Berman, and Burto's A Dictionary of Literary, Dra
matic, and Cinematic Terms.

The first defines the essay as

"a short literary composition on a particular theme or sub
ject, usually in prose and generally analytic, speculative,
or interpretative.”

The second defines it as "a composi

tion having no pretensions to completeness or thoroughness
of treatment."

This last definition keeps most clearly the

idea of the essay as an "attempt” or a "loose sally of the
mind," but even the Random House definition continues to
suggest that the work is not one in which the writer merely
reports but one in which he analyzes, speculates, and in
terprets in an "attempt" to produce a viable analysis,
speculation, or interpretation.

The OED adds the idea of a

"more or less elaborate style," rejecting Johnson's idea
that the essay must be "an irregular indigested piece."
In this study, the essay is defined first of all as
an attempt to explore a subject.

As such it will make no

claim to exhaustive treatment of the subject.

In the second

place, it will be speculative, interpretative, and analytic.
Finally, its style will be as elaborate as the subject and
the audience demand.

Since the type of essay studied here

is to be limited to the formal essay, its style will never
be "loose" or "irregular."
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The type of essay to be considered is then the for
mal essay.

According to Steinmann and Willen in the intro

duction to Literature for Writing, the goal in writing in
freshman English and most college courses is a paper which
is "rather formal, impersonal, and objective; essentially
40
serious."
They give the name formal essay to this type
of writing to distinguish it from the familiar or informal
essay.

No one can claim that the dividing line between the

formal and the familiar essay is so clear that essays can
be separated into two groups which will satisfy everyone.
Essays can only be arranged on a continuum from the most
formal to the completely personal and subjective.

In this

study, the essays to be considered will group themselves
far enough in the direction of the formal as to arouse no
real argument.

They will appear to be impersonal, objec

tive, and serious because they will be written in formal
English, will usually employ the third person, and will be
essentially serious.

Like any essay, they will be, in re

ality, somewhat personal, since each will be an "attempt"
by its author to develop a point which he has chosen to
make.

The style will often be appropriate for what Kin-

neavy calls "reference discourse," especially the "reference
discourse" which he classes as "exploratory," but the empha
sis on the author's opinion rather than the world which he
is describing will keep the work an essay.
Since the essay is closely tied to its author's
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attempt to convey an idea to an audience, even when it is
its most formal, it is especially amenable to analysis as
the performance of speech acts which result in a "complex"
series of illocutionary acts made up of "compound" acts.
The essay has, however, one characteristic which distin
guishes it from the spoken act.

The illocutionary acts in

written discourse are usually prepared with an audience in
mind, but the audience is not present during the writing or
speaking process.

The acts therefore become merely sen

tences when they leave the writer, and the sentences must
be re-incorporated into speech acts by the reader.

Thus,

each act cannot be considered successful or unsuccessful un
til the sentence is read.

Since the writer will not get the

kind of help with each utterance that the speaker gets from
his audience, he must work harder than the speaker to indi
cate the force of his utterances in his sentences which the
reader will transform into speech acts as he reads.

In

other words, the illocutionary acts in an essay should be
indicated in more obvious ways than the same acts in spoken
discourse, or, at least, in ways more closely tied to the
sentence.
The next chapter of this dissertation will be devoted
to a discussion of the theory of the locutionary, illocu
tionary, and perlocutionary acts.

Chapter III will explore

the conditions and rules which "constitute" illocutionary
acts and make them successful.

Then Chapter IV will record
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m y first attempt to analyze an essay as the performance of
a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts.
The essay chosen for this analysis is Howard Mumford Jones's
"The Iron String," which was originally prepared to be pre
sented as a speech to a group of Harvard students.

Any

editing which the original speech would need in order to be
intelligible to an audience of readers, one can assume has
been done, so the speech printed here should have the ex
plicitness in its use of terms and force indicators which
written discourse requires.

At the same time, as an essay,

it retains the value of having originally been a complicated
speech act of the kind which Austin and Searle specifically
discuss.

In this chapter, Jones's essay will be analyzed

as the performance of a complex series of compound illocu
tionary acts which are indicated in conventional ways and
constituted by certain rules and conditions.

The total

illocutionary force of the essay should become apparent as
well as its locutionary or propositional (Searle's term)
content and the complex of illocutionary forces within the
essay.

In addition, the function of force indicators will

be elucidated, and the list drawn from the work of Austin
and Searle will be amended.

Finally, the rules and condi

tions for the acts performed will be formulated.

Through a

consideration of this essay, close to Austin's original
theory since it was prepared to be delivered as a speech and
to the personal essay because of its occasional use of first
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person, the usefulness of the theory for the analysis of
essays further removed from the speech situation and placed
closer to the formal end of the essay continuum should be
come apparent.
In the fifth chapter, therefore, the points in the
theory which still appear to be pertinent will be applied
to the analysis of the following essays:

MWe Were Not

Skeptical Enough" by Joseph Wood Krutch, "It’s Pretty, but
Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus, and "Pornography and Censor
ship" by Irving Kristol.
In the sixth chapter, the practice in analyzing suc
cessful professional essays will supply the method for ana
lyzing student essays, some of which "misfired," to use
Austin's term.

Such an analysis will be shown to result in

a clearer insight into the student writer's problems.

More

important, it will provide a way to explain the student's
difficulties and suggest the way to correct them.
The study will end with the suggestions for using
the speech act theory in the composition class which seem
valid after it has been applied in these different ways.

CHAPTER II
LOCUTIONARY,

ILLOCUTIONARY, AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

J. L. Austin formulated his speech-act theory in
order to call attention to the dimensions of the total
speech act which philosophers in the decades before him
had not considered relevant in the study of philosophy.
In the William James Lectures presented at Harvard in 1955
and printed in 1962 as How to Do Things with Words, he
maintains that most utterances by a speaker who is ad
dressing an audience convey a meaning together with a
certain force and sometimes a certain effect or, in other
words, may be analyzed into a locutionary, an illocution
ary, and sometimes a perlocutionary act.

He devotes most

of his attention in How to Do Things with Words to the
illocutionary act and its relationship to the locutionary
act.

Because the illocutionary act is, unlike the perlo

cutionary act, dependent for its successful performance
on language conventions which the speaker and the hearer
must know, Austin maintains that he or any other third
person can listen to a conversation and determine what
illocutionary as well as what locutionary acts the speak
ers are performing and what language conventions they are
using to perform these acts.
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John Searle, in Speech Acts and a number of articles
published before Speech Acts, amends Austin's ideas and
applies the theory to specific acts.

He shares, moreover,

without reservation Austin's view of the conventional na
ture of illocutionary acts.
stated by Austin:

He agrees with the view

"A judge should be able to decide, by

hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary
acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were
1
achieved."
From the works of these two men, then, comes the
theory of the locutionary,

illocutionary, and perlocution

ary acts which I shall use as the basis for my analysis of
the formal essay.

According to this theory, a speaker in

a certain situation signals by conventional indicators that
he is performing a total speech act which has a certain
content and force.

Because of their conventional nature

these indicators can be interpreted by a third person or
Austin's "judge."
I
After J. L. Austin in the William James Lectures had
abandoned his earlier constative-perforraative distinction
between utterances in favor of the distinction between
meaning and force in a single utterance, he turned to the
analysis of two acts which he believed could be found in
any meaningful utterance, the locutionary and the illocu-
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tionary acts, and a third act, the perlocutionary act,
which he believed to occur in many speech acts.
most of his interest to the illocutionary act.

He devoted
Because of

their conventional nature, he believed that it is possible
to study speech acts and ascertain their illocutionary
force with more precision than is possible in the study of
most human activities and to discover conventional force
indicators which signal force changes.

The most reliable

of these indicators Austin concluded is the "explicit per
formative formula" which he used to make a tentative list
ing of illocutionary acts into five categories, "verdictives," "exercitives," "commissives," "behabitives," and
"expositives."

These categories are not mutually exclu

sive, but interrelated, Austin discovered, but with the
explicit formula and other force indicators they are help
ful in studying the illocutionary force of utterances.
The locutionary act is, to Austin, the carrier of
meaning defined as "correspondence with the facts" of a
linguistic form.

The locutionary act, in other words, is

the direct descendant of the constative.

In Lecture XI

Austin explains,
With the constative utterance, we abstract from the il
locutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of
the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary:
moreover, we use an oversimplified notion of corres
pondence with the facts— oversimplified because essen
tially it brings in the illocutionary aspect.
We aim
at the ideal of what would be right to say in all cir
cumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c. 2
When Austin considers the locutionary act, he says that he
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is abstracting from the total speech act "what would be
right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any
audience."

For example, the sentence "The cat is on the

mat" should convey to any audience of English speaking
people the "fact" that the cat is on the mat.
uttered by a speaker to a certain audience,

Of course,

it will never

convey only this fact, but Austin is willing to consider
the product of this abstracting, though it is "over
simplified," because of the need he feels for isolating a
facet of the speech act which conveys a "correspondence
with the facts."

Austin, in effect, recommends here a def

inition of meaning in which the performance of a locutionary
act is "roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence
with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly
3
equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense."
This
act will convey the same meaning in every speaking situation
as long as the "sense" and "reference" are

the same.

These

in turn equal "correspondence with the facts."
To explain his use of "sense" and "reference," in
Lecture VIII Austin breaks the locutionary act into three
other acts:

the phonetic,

the phatic, and

the rhetic.

Austin is not interested in the phonetic act, which is
"merely the act of uttering certain noises," though it is,
4
of course, a basic condition of all speech acts.
The
phatic act is "the uttering of certain vocables or words,
i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging
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to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming
5
to a certain grammar."
In other words, the vocables ut
tered in the phonetic act are organized into words and
grammatical phrases in the phatic act.
no meaning, however;

The phatic act has

it may even result in nonsense.

For

example, "The green grass is growing" used to perform a
phatic act and a phonetic act is a successful performance
of both acts because it uses the vocabulary, the grammar,
and the sound system of English.

"The boing boing is bo-

ing" :‘s a phonetic act but not a phatic act since it does
not use the vocabulary of English.

"The green grass is

growing" has no meaning until the speaker refers to certain
grass and describes it as growing.

The utterance can even

be nonsense if the only grass to which reference is made
is artificial.

It is in the rhetic act that sounds orga

nized by a particular vocabulary and grammar in the pho
netic and phatic acts become meaningful utterances or, in
Austin's words, acquire "a certain more-or-less definite
6
sense and reference."
Austin illustrates the difference
between the phatic and the rhetic acts with the same series
of vocables.

The utterance, "He said,

m a t , ’" reports a phatic act.

On the other hand, this ut

terance also reports a rhetic a c t :
is on the mat."

'The cat is on the

"He said that the cat

Employing essentially the same "vocables"

and the same vocabulary and grammar, the second construc
tion has "a certain more-or-less definite sense and
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reference":

a native speaker understands the second utter

ance as an attempt by a speaker to refer to the world of
facts or to secure a "correspondence with the facts."

The

first sentence, on the other hand, merely reports a sen
tence using the grammar and vocabulary of English.

It may

be a sentence uttered by a parrot or a robot in imitation
of human speech.
A more precise understanding of "sense" and "refer
ence" eludes even the reader who studies Austin's discus
sion in the essay, "How to Talk."

There Austin explores

what he calls "Speech-situation S »" in which there is only
7
one utterance pattern,"I is a T."
"I" is the symbol for
the "I-word," which refers or corresponds to a single en
tity, a sample of an "item-type."
"1227 is a rhombus."
identified as "1227."

Austin uses the example

"1227" refers to one figure or item,
Reference is made when "1227" is

linked with this figure or item.

The "T-word," on the

other hand, is linked to the "sense" or "pattern."
"Rhombus" gives the "sense" of the item-type "1227."
it seems to identify it, describe it, or limit it.

Thus
The way

this distinction would work even in a simple utterance such
as "The cat is on the mat" is not completely clear.

One

assumes that "the cat" refers and that "on the mat" carries
the sense of "the cat" in this context.

However, an at

tempt to extend this analysis further quickly becomes orig
inal work tied to Austin's thinking by conjecture only.

On
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the basis of Austin's work, one can conclude only that some
element in each speech act refers to the nonlinguistic world
and that another element gives the sense of that reference—
added information about it.
The phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts, the
last characterized by "a more-or-less definite sense and
reference," make up the locutionary act.

This act is the

uttering of sounds using a particular vocabulary and gram
mar to convey a certain sense and reference.

When one ques

tions the purpose of the utterance produced in this way, he
is moving from a consideration of the utterance as a locu
tionary act to a study of it as an illocutionary act, the
carrier of "force" in the utterance.
Acknowledging that the distinction is arbitrary, Aus
tin continues to separate meaning and force in discussing
the locutionary and illocutionary acts.

He says in Lecture

VIII, "Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference
to illocutionary force— 'He meant it as an order', &c.

But

I want to distinguish force and meaning in the sense in
which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as
it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference
8
within meaning."
Considering an utterance as a locutionary
act, Austin focuses on it as a phonetic act, a phatic act,
and a rhetic act or the sum of these— an utterance with
sense and reference.

Considering the same act as an illo

cutionary act, he examines it for its force in the context
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where it occurs.

Its force depends on the intention of the

speaker performing the speech act.

For example, the utter

ance of the series of vocables, "He ran ten miles," is a
locutionary act if it has sense and reference.

In every

case which Austin can discover, it is also an illocutionary
act with the force of a statement, an exclamation, or a
question.

In other words, the speaker who utters the

series of vocables with sense and reference in the locu
tionary act will utter them in order to perform an addi
tional act, the illocutionary act.

This additional act is

the force of the utterance.
To succeed in performing this act, the speaker must
secure from his audience only an intellectual response
9
called "uptake."
His utterance may be one which "takes
effect" as in the christening of a ship, or it may require
a response as in asking, but Austin is most interested in
the response he calls "uptake."

For this response to be

complete, the hearer must understand the meaning of the
locution and the illocutionary intent of the speaker.

Dis

cussing the appropriate responses to the illocutionary act
in Lecture IX, Austin uses the example of the "uptake" fol
lowing a warning.

For a warning to be a successful locu

tionary and illocutionary act, the hearer must understand
what he is being warned about and that the speaker intends
to warn him.

He does not need to act on the warning.

Though Austin is not interested in the perlocutionary
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act, which is too closely tied to audience attitude to be
studied objectively, he realizes that any speech act with
its locutionary and illocutionary aspects may have, if not
"a perlocutionary object,” at least "a perlocutionary
10
sequel.”
The perlocutionary act differs from the illo
cutionary act in the effect which it produces.

For a per

locutionary act to be successful, the hearer must respond
in an appropriate way.

When the act of persuading is suc

cessful, for example, the hearer is persuaded.

However, as

Austin expresses it, ”any, or almost any, perlocutionary
act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special
circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation,
of any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a
straightforward constative utterance (if there is such an
11
animal).”
Then the perlocutionary act may occur as a re
sult of a speech act which appears to be intended to per
form only the locutionary and the illocutionary acts.

The

"perlocutionary sequel” may, therefore, be a sequel which
the speaker did not expect or even desire.

A simple warn

ing may result in the speaker’s offending his hearer.

The

hearer may experience the appropriate "uptake,” but because
of his personal emotional and mental state also experience
the same effect that he would experience if the speaker
desired to offend him.

For example, a warning that his car

is in the path of another vehicle may arouse anger if the
hearer is a driver who is accustomed to being laughed at
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for his driving errors.

An observer has no way, however,

to predict this anger, and nothing in the utterance demands
it.
Austin maintains that "a judge should be able to
decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and
illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocu
tionary acts were achieved.”

The judge should have this

ability to distinguish locutionary and illocutionary acts
because he is a proficient speaker of the language which is
being used and therefore understands its conventions.

Since

the illocutionary act is basically conventional, it depends
on signals which the speaker and his audience as well as the
judge can understand.

Austin never reaches the point at

which he can define these conventions precisely and fully,
and his very use of the term conventional is not always
clear.

What is clear is his total commitment to the con

ventional nature of language in general and the illocution
ary act in particular.
Any speech act is to Austin largely dependent on
conventions for its usefulness as a conveyor of meaning.
Austin expresses his commitment to this idea in the essay
’’Truth” :
If there is to be communication of the sort that we
achieve by language at all, there must be a stock of
symbols of some kind which a communicator ('the speaker')
can produce 'at will' and which a communicatee ('the
audience') can observe:
these may be called the 'words',
though, of course, they need not be anything very like
what we should normally call words— they might be signal
flags, &c.
There must also be something other than the
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words, which the words are to be used to communicate
about:
this may be called the ’world'.12
Austin believes that many of the problems of the philosopher
arise when he fails to understand the arbitrary nature of
words.

Language symbols have no natural connection or

correspondence with the world about which they are used to
describe.

Philosophers

tend

to forget this character

istic of language symbols, especially as they examine the
meaning of words such as fact.

In this essay Austin avoids

the use of the phrase "the fact that" because, he says, in
philosophy it is often used loosely "with advantage in or
dinary life, though seldom in philosophy— above all in dis
cussing truth, where it is precisely our business to prise
13
the words off the world and keep them off it."
To "prise
the words off the world," Austin emphasizes the conventional
nature of words.

He says, concerning the use of "corre

sponds," "The only essential point is this:

that the corre

lation between the words (“sentences) and the type of situa
tion, event, & c . , which is to be such that when a statement
in those words is made with reference to an historic situa
tion of that type the statement is then true, is absolutely
14
and purely conventional."
One can say, then, that the
locutionary act, the act which embodies "correspondence
with the facts," employs the first level of language conven
tions, since this discussion in "Truth" involves the conven
tions of locution.
In "How to Talk," Austin shows how the conventions
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used in the locutionary act function in "Speech-situation
So ."

Two sets of "semantic conventions" operate in the

sentence of form S, "I is a T."

These are "I-conventions,

or conventions of reference," and "T-conventions, or con15
ventions of sense."
These conventions make possible the
relationship between the "I-word" and the "T-word" in the
sentence "I is a T," and they make it possible for such a
sentence to convey meaning to a hearer.

As a result of an

arbitrary decision, any "I-word" refers to an item.

In the

example which Austin uses, "1227 is a rhombus," as in all
sentences in "Speech-situation SQ ," the "I-word" is a num
ber so that no two items can be identified by the same
word.

The "T-word" Is more difficult to explain.

Austin

says, "Every word in our language SQ (except for 'is* and
'a') has either a reference fixed by I-conventions or a
sense fixed by T-conventions, but not both, and is accord16
ingly either an I-word or a T-word."
"T-conventions" in
volve two linguistic procedures:
giving."

"name-giving" and "sense-

"Name-giving," "allotting a certain vocable to a

certain item-type as its 'name'," and "sense-giving,"
"allotting a certain item-type to a certain vocable as its
'sense'," produce this result:

"when either has been gone

through, the item-type, attached by nature to certain items,
is attached by convention to a certain vocable, now a T-word
and (as we shall call it) its 'name', as the 'sense' of that
17
word."
As one sees in Chapter II, "Speech-situation SQ ,"
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limited to only one sentence pattern, provides little help
in the analysis of more complicated utterances.

The point

here is that to Austin, even on the locutionary level, the
meaning of the utterance depends on conventions which speak
er and hearer know how to use and recognize.
In this essay, Austin also describes one convention
related to illocutionary force.
He calls "is a" the
18
"assertive link."
Since asserting is an illocutionary act,
the use of "is a" to link the "I-word" and the "T-word" as
the "assertive link" must show the force of the utterance.
In English, as in "Speech-situation S0 ," the presence of a
part of the verb be used as the predicate will sometimes
signal assertions, since the pattern of the one sentence in
"Speech-situation SQ" is a common pattern in English.
By the end of these essays, Austin has made two
points which indicate the way in which he understands the
word conventional and the conventions of a language.

First,

language is conventional and language conventions operate
because of arbitrary agreements that certain words will
convey certain meanings.

There is no natural connection

between words and the "real" world.

Second, the locutionary

act, when he discusses it, will be as dependent on conven
tions as the illocutionary act.

As a judge, Austin or any

other person who knows these conventions can distinguish
locutionary and illocutionary acts.
The suggestions which Austin gives concerning illo-
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cutionary act conventional indicators in How to Do Things
with Words are helpful only if one realizes the limitations
of these suggestions.

At the end of his listing of types

of indicators in Lecture VI, Austin stresses that usually
one indicator is not adequate to show force and that several
will be needed together if the force is to be clear.

Austin

says, "No doubt a combination of some or all the devices
mentioned above (and very likely there are others) will
19
usually, if not in the end, suffice."
Only the explicit
performative, either already supplied in the utterance or
added to test the force, is a sure indicator to Austin, who
stresses the "vagueness of meaning and uncertainty of sure
20
reception" of the others.
The most important of the conventional devices which
Austin uses, the "explicit performative formula," he first
discovers when he is working with the performative and
finally fastens on after testing and discarding two other
formulas for distinguishing illocutionary from perlocutionary acts.

The formulas which he tests and discards are the

following:
•In saying
'By saying

x I was doing
or 'I did £',
x I did
or'I was doing £'.21

When meaningful lexical items are substituted for x and £,
these formulas result in the following sentences:
'In saying
♦By saying

I would shoot him I was threatening him'.
I would shoot him I alarmed him'.22

In Lecture X Austin concludes that "these formulas are at

best very slippery tests for deciding whether an expression
is an illocution as distinct from a perlocution or nei22
ther."
In some cases, for example, the formulas can be
used to identify locutionary acts; and, in some cases, the
formulas, when words are substituted, result in the identi
fication of the opposite act.

In other words, the "by"

formula produces the illocutionary act.

More important,

Austin finds the formulas to be no help in his study of
distinctions among illocutionary acts.

The significant

aspect of the formulas is their emphasis on the verb as the
key word in the perlocutionary and the illocutionary acts.
From the start of Austin's work with the performative, the
verb had this importance.

It is, of course, the key to the

explicit performative formula, which consists of the addi
tion of "I" and a first person singular present indicative
active verb to the beginning of an utterance in order to
make it "explicit" as a performative.

The illocutionary

force, Austin discovers, can be made "explicit" in the same
way.

Thus, in studying an utterance such as "He has told

the truth," Austin adds "I hold that,” "I promise that,"
or "I believe that" to the utterance.

If one of these works

in the context of the original utterance, then it makes
"explicit" the illocutionary act performed in the speech
act.

The verb, then, names the illocutionary act, and, in

turn, a list of verbs which will work in the explicit for
mula becomes a list of illocutionary acts.
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In Lecture XII Austin applies the first person singu
lar present indicative active test in order to set up five
categories of verbs naming illocutionary acts.

He begins

the procedure by listing all the verbs in a concise dictio
nary which seem to work in the explicit formula.

His list,

he jokingly says, is "of the order of the third power of 10"
24
or consists of more than one thousand verbs.
These he
classifies as "verdictives," "exercitives," "commissives,"
"behabitives," and "expositives."

Acts in the first group

give verdicts or a finding "which is for different reasons
25
hard to be certain about."
Examples of verbs which name
these acts are "characterize," "reckon," and "estimate."
(See Appendix I for Austin's examples in all five cate
gories.)

The exercitive involves "the exercising of powers,

rights, or influences" or "the giving of a decision in fa
vour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy
26
of it," as in appointing, dismissing, or pardoning.
Com
missives "commit you to doing something, but include also
declarations or announcements of intention, which are not
promises, and also rather vague things which we may call
27
espousals, as for example, siding with."
Examples are
"vowing," "undertaking," and "engaging."

Behabitives "have

to do with attitudes and social behaviour" as apologizing,
28
thanking, and complimenting.
Expositives, the fifth
group, "make plain how our utterances fit into the course
29
of an argument or conversation."
Examples are "affirm
ing," "remarking," and "informing."
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These lists of verbs which name illocutionary forces
and the headings themselves are not as helpful in identify
ing the various illocutionary acts as they appear to be when
one first studies them.

In the first place, Austin's verbs

will not all work in the explicit formula.
are not exhaustive.

Then, the lists

One cannot even be sure that Austin

would have retained these five categories if he had been
able to continue his study.

In Lecture XII, in discussing

expositives, Austin admits that one can often dispute his
placing of various verbs in the categories.

Then he men

tions the way an act tends to differ in particular cases
from another as a matter of degree, not kind.

Discussing

intention, for example, he says, "At the one extreme I may
just state that I have an intention, but I may also declare
30
or express or announce my intention or determination."
In other words, Austin acknowledges the difficulty in decid
ing even in cases where the explicit form is used which act
is being performed.

The formula, found in the utterance or

added to test the utterance in context, is, however, the
most useful indicator.
In his discussion of the performative, Austin lists
other indicators which, though vague and uncertain, will
work as illocutionary force indicators, especially if they
are used in combinations to support each other.

These are

the mood of the verb, adverbs and adverbial phrases, con
necting particles, the circumstances of the utterance, tone
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of voice, cadence, and gestures.

The imperative mood clear

ly points to such acts as ordering, requesting, and begging,
if it is used in its customary sense.

The subjunctive mood

also expresses a kind or degree of force which distinguishes
it from the indicative, which is used in too many dissimilar
situations to be a clear signal.

About adverbs and adver

bial phrases, Austin says, "Thus we can qualify the force of
'I shall' by adding 'probably' or— in an opposite sense— by
adding 'without fail'; we can give emphasis (to a reminder
or whatever it may be) by writing 'You would do well never
31
to forget that. . .
Austin cautions that these words
often signal intentions which he considers to be question
able as to force such as intimating and insinuating, so care
must be taken not to interpret all adverbial qualifiers as
simple force indicators.

When they do signal force, they

change the force to some degree from that expressed in the
verb or they simply make the force expressed in the verb
clearer by making it more emphatic.
By connecting particles, Austin means transition
words such as "still," "therefore," "hereby," and "moreover"
as well as subordinate conjunctions such as "although" and
"whereas" and presumably coordinate conjunctions like "and"
and "but."

He gives as examples of the way the connecting

particles convey force the use of "'still' with the force of
'I insist that,'" "'therefore* with the force of

'I conclude

that,'" and "'although' with the force of 'I concede
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that.'"

Austin does not mention the coordinate conjunc

tions, but they operate to indicate force very much as ei
ther the subordinate conjunctions or the transition words.
For example, "and,” used to connect independent clauses,
usually indicates that the force of the first part of the
utterance continues in the second part.

"But," on the other

hand, indicates a change in propositional act and sometimes
in force.

When one of these occurs as the first word in a

sentence, it ties the utterance which it introduces to the
one before it in a way that usually indicates whether or not
the force of the previous utterance is repeated.

The ways

in which all the connecting particles indicate force will
become clearer as I discuss their use in "The Iron String"
in Chapter IV.
When Austin speaks of the circumstances of the utter
ance, he discusses one of the most important indicators in
conversation and also in the essay.

One must see its use in

conversation in order to see its relevance to the interpre
tation of written discourse.

In a conversation, the first

speaker often needs no explicit word indicators to interpret
correctly the illocutionary act of the person who responds
to his utterance.

For example, the first speaker asks,

"When did you last see John?"
"I saw him last week."
also answering.

The person addressed answers,

The second speaker is stating and

Out of context, the utterance could be the

performance of a number of acts.

In this context, the
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speaker will seldom fail to secure the "uptake" which he
intends, even though the words in the sentence are neutral
as to force.
Austin mentions titles several times in his discus
sion of performatives and illocutionary acts, thus indicat
ing that the title of any discourse may play a part in in
dicating its illocutionary force.

In Lecture VI he mentions

that performative verbs may occur in titles and seems to in
dicate that they keep their performative characteristics in
titles.

Then, after pointing to the significance of words

like "whereas," "hereby," and "moreover," Austin says, "A
very similar purpose is served by the use of titles such as
Manifesto, Act, Proclamation, or the subheading 'A
33
Novel. . .
One can see that these announce something
about the nature of the act.

On occasion, the title may

even connect the chapter to follow with the one before it in
a way which indicates illocutionary force.

In this study,

the title will usually be considered as part of the context
of the discourse or the circumstances of the utterance,
since it usually prepares the reader for what is to come.
In his discussion of speech acts and conventional in
dicators, Austin leaves many problems unsolved.

One such

problem which will be important in this study is the status
of utterances by an actor on a stage or a persona in a poem.
Austin says in Lecture II, concerning such utterances:
a performative utterance will, for example, be in a
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peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the
stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in solil
oquy.
This applies in a similar manner to any and every
utterance— a sea-change in special circumstances.
Lan
guage in such circumstances is in special ways—
intelligibly— used not seriously, but in ways parasitic
upon its normal use— ways which fall under the doctrine
of the etiolations of language.34
Then, in Lecture VIII, Austin discusses certain nonillocutionary and nonperlocutionary uses of language, for ex
ample, "'the use of language' for something, e. g. for jok35

ing."

Here he means the utterance of a sentence which

seems, on the surface, to perform a legitimate illocutionary
act but actually is used "for something" else.

For example,

the sentence "She is a beanpole," when uttered by a speaker,
may appear to be a statement.

Its locutionary meaning is,

however, in question, and, if the person in question weighs
three hundred pounds, its force as a statement is question
able.

It seems to be a sentence used for joking, rather

than for the sake of its illocutionary force.
Austin cites the use of language in poetry as the
same use "for something," and he explains the problem in the
following way:
These references to 'use of language' have nothing to do
with the illocutionary act.
For example, if I say 'Go
and catch a falling star', it may be quite clear what
both the meaning and the force of my utterance is, but
still wholly unresolved which of these other kinds of
things I may be doing.
There are parasitic uses of lan
guage, which are 'not serious', not the 'full normal use'.
The normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or
no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary act, no
attempt to make you do anything, as Walt Whitman does not
seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar.36
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In addition to the examples of the use of language Mfor
something," Austin cannot fit into his categories those
utterances "which do not seem to fall, intuitively at least,
exactly into any of these roughly defined classes, or else
37
seem to fall vaguely into more than one."
For example,
the act of insinuating, "seems" to involve the use of con
ventions of the kind typical of the illocutionary act, but
Austin is troubled by the fact that a native speaker of
English would never use the explicit performative formula,
"I insinuate that.

. .," and the feeling that insinuating

"seems like implying to be a clever effect rather than a
38
mere act."
Using language to evince emotion is another
speech act which does not seem to fit Austin's application
of the performative formula:

"We may evince emotion in or

by issuing an utterance, as when we swear; but once again we
have no use here for performative formulas and the other de39
vices of illocutionary acts."
Since Austin's work is un
finished and he admits that these problems are unsolved, one
can suggest tentative solutions which do not seriously con
tradict the rest of the theory.

Therefore, these do not

interfere with the usefulness of the theory as a tool for
analyzing the formal essay.
As one begins a study of the essay as a compound
illocutionary act based on a series of locutionary acts, one
has, then, several reasonably clear formulations from the
work of Austin to use as guidelines.

In the first place,
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though sense and reference are never completely explained,
one feels able to separate the elements which merely repre
sent "correspondence with the facts," or the locutionary
acts, if only by reducing each utterance to a constative.
In the second place, it is possible to classify some illo
cutionary acts in the essays to be considered by choosing
the appropriate verb from Austin's list or using the per
formative formula.

In the third place, one knows to look

for subjects and verbs in the first person singular present
indicative active in the essays as an explicit indication
of the act which is being performed.

Finally, one has a

list of indicators of or clues to illocutionary force.

On

the other hand, the essays exemplify some of Austin's acts
which seem "like implying to be a clever effect rather than
a mere act."

For example, in "The Iron String," Howard

Mumford Jones "understates."

Does this fact vitiate the

force of the essay as an illocutionary act.

Before answering

this question, however, one needs to see what light the work
of John Searle can throw on the whole problem of distin
guishing locutionary and illocutionary acts.
II
By the end of How to Do Things with Words, Austin has
described a theory which he hopes will account for most se
rious utterances.

While attempting to base a "philosophy

of language" on Austin's work, John Searle in Speech Acts
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suggests another way to distinguish among illocutionary
acts.

In the process of expounding his philosophy, he ab

sorbs Austin's distinction between meaning and force in his
understanding of the relationship between the sentence and
the speech act, and he redefines the locutionary act as the
propositional acts of reference and predication, only a
slightly more useful formulation than Austin's.
Like Austin, Searle is committed to the study of
language as a speech act, the most interesting component of
which is the illocutionary act.

Searle defines the term

speech act in the essay, "What Is a Speech Act?":

"It is

not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol or word or
sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sen
tence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but
rather it is the product ion of the token in the performance
of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of lin40
guistic communication."
In Speech Acts Searle amends this
definition in a significant way.

He says, "More precisely,

the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain
conditions is a speech act, and speech acts (of certain
kinds to be explained later) are the basic or minimal units
41
of linguistic communication."
The "certain kinds" which
are "minimal units of linguistic communication" are illocu
tionary acts.

The performance of these is the result of the

"issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions."
The existence of the "certain conditions" give the speech
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act its significance.

In fact, they determine its illocu

tionary force.
Like Austin again, Searle uses the method and the
material of the ordinary language philosophers.

He says in

Speech A c t s , "My knowledge of how to speak the language

in

volves a mastery of a system of rules which renders my use
of the elements of that language regular and systematic.
By reflecting on my use of the elements of the language I
can come to know the facts recorded in linguistic character42
izations."
When Searle wants to state rules or list
illocutionary acts, he relies on his intuitive grasp of a
language which he has mastered without the necessity for
consciously learning rules or ways to perform illocutionary
acts.

This language is his native language.

Using it,

Searle does not need to gather information from a sampling
of informants.

Nor does he need to trouble himself because

he cannot give satisfactory definitions of terms as long as
he can use these terms.

His problem is merely "converting
43
knowing how into knowing that."
Searle sums up his
method:

"I am a native speaker of a language.

I wish to

offer certain characterizations and explanations of my use
of elements of that language.

The hypothesis on which I am

proceeding is that my use of linguistic elements is underlain
by certain rules.

I shall therefore offer linguistic charac

terizations and then explain the data in those characteriza44
tions by formulating the underlying rules."
This method
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Searle follows in his entire study of the illocutionary act.
Finally, like Austin, Searle is chiefly interested in
illocutionary acts.

Katherine Hammer in "Searle*s Condi

tions and the Determination of Illocutionary Force" points
out that basic to the conditions for the illocutionary act
is the intent of the speaker to perform a perlocutionary
act.

She adds, however, "This is not to collapse the dis

tinction between illocutionary act and perlocutionary act,
for the successful performance of some illocutionary act
does not necessarily result in the successful performance of
the intended perlocutionary act; e. g. , one can successfully
warn someone without persuading him to behave appropriate45
ly."
At the end of his discussion of promising, Searle
himself acknowledges the close tie between the illocution
and the perlocution, but he insists that the distinction is
vital to his theory.

Reducing the illocution to the perlo-

cution results, he feels, in a "stimulus-response account of
46
meaning."
His rules are tied, instead, to "institutional
47
theories of communication."
It is this characteristic
which makes his theories seem valuable in a study of lan
guage where any degree of certainty will depend on the ac
ceptance of the idea that there is a body of language data
which is the common property of the student and his society
and is not dependent on individual reactions,

ffhatever its

perlocutionary intent, therefore, the utterance is interest
ing in this study as a speech act which secures "uptake,"
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and this result is not dependent on the hearer's subjective
response.
Searle devotes no space to a formal definition of
the illocutionary act.

In the first p l ace, Austin's work

provides the basic definition, since Searle uses the term
essentially as Austin uses it.

In the second place, as with

the terms which Searle discusses in Chapter I of Speech Acts
as those which give philosophers unnecessary difficulty when
they try to define them, the illocutionary act, to Searle,
is understood when one knows how to use it.

In Speech A c t s ,

Searle equates "performing illocutionary acts" with "stat48
ing, questioning, commanding, promising, etc."
If a
speaker understands the nature of stating, questioning, or
promising to the extent that he can use these terms, he
understands the terms whether he can give a formal defini
tion or not.

If he knows when to use the term illocution

ary act to mean stating, questioning, or promising, then he
understands what an illocutionary act is.
Austin's recommendation to speak of illocutionary
force rather than illocutionary meaning is absorbed without
a real attack on the idea in Speech A c t s .

Searle's state

ment of the "principle of expressibility" is the first step
in this process.

The principle is that "for every possible

speech act there is a possible sentence or set of sentences
the literal utterance of which in a particular context would
49
constitute a performance of that speech act."
Or, to
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state it another way, "whatever can be meant can be said."
Searle never deviates from the idea that every meaningful
utterance is primarily an illocutionary act.

The literal

utterance of the sentence must supply the ingredients for
the illocutionary act as part of the total speech act.

Then

in the second chapter of Speech Acts Searle asks, "But what
is it for one to mean something by what one says, and what
51
is it for something to have a meaning?"
The first ques
tion is tied to the speaker's intention; the second refers
to the sentence used in the utterance.

Searle insists that

intention and literal sentence meaning go together.

He fi

nally states the relationship between the two in the follow
ing way:
In our analysis of illocutionary acts, we must capture
both the intentional and the conventional aspects and
especially the relationship between them.
In the per
formance of an illocutionary act in the literal utter
ance of a sentence, the speaker intends to produce a
certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recog
nize his intention to produce that effect; and further
more, if he is using words literally, he intends this
recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that
the rules for using the expressions he utters associate
the expression with the production of that effect.
Since it is possible for the speaker to convey that which
he intends to convey by "using words literally," it becomes
inconsequential to separate what he intends to convey into
force and meaning.

Austin's concept of force is nebulous

and difficult to discuss, and when it disappears in the
total meaning of the utterance,

its disappearance is not

even deserving of a comment from Searle.

One needs to
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remember, however, that when Searle examines the locutionary
act, he is not looking at it as the carrier of meaning.
This fact is the basis for the frontal attack on
Austin's locutionary act which Searle launches in the arti
cle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts."

Dis

cussing Austin's distinction between the locutionary act
and the illocutionary act, Searle observes that Austin uses
the same form for demonstrating rhetic and illocutionary
acts.

In Lecture VIII

Austin shows the phatic and the

rhetic acts with these sentences:
'He said "I shall be there'", 'Hesaid he would be there';
'He said "Get out'", 'He told me to get out';
'He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?'": 'He asked
whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge'.
In the same chapter Austin uses sentences such as these to
illustrate the illocutionary act:

"He urged (or advised,

ordered, &c.) me to shoot her" and "He protested against my
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doing it."

Changing from phatic to rhetic act, Austin

changes from a direct to an indirect quotation.

When he

changes a sentence from a locution to an illocution in form,
he changes from a direct to an indirect quotation.

In addi

tion, the verbs which he uses in demonstrating the rhetic
act— said, to l d , and asked— are verbs which he uses in his
formula for testing illocutionary force, and they also ap
pear in his lists of verbs naming illocutionary acts.

If

one cannot report a rhetic act without employing a verb with
illocutionary force and if the rhetic act is the necessary
ingredient of the locutionary act, then an attempt to
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separate meaning and force in the locutionary act and the
illocutionary act is doomed to failure.

The need for the

concept of the locutionary act seems to have disappeared.
Searle is not actually making such a dramatic depar
ture from Austin's divisions of the speech act.

He still

feels that he must distinguish two elements which he finds
in the total speech act, and he bases his method of making
this distinction on Austin's correlation of the constative
and the locutionary act and the performative and the illo
cutionary act.

Searle quotes from Austin's How to Do Things

with Words, "With the constative utterance, we abstract from
the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of
the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary.

. . .

With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possi
ble to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and ab55

stract from the dimension of correspondence with facts."
Since the constative represents the verifiable proposition
so dear to the hearts of earlier twentieth-century philos
ophers and the locution with its sense and reference is the
pure constative, Searle concludes that Austin is separating
content from force rather than meaning from force when he
defines the locution and the illocution.

Relying on the

constative's relationship to the proposition, Searle calls
the speech acts with which he replaces the locutionary act
"propositional acts."

He represents the utterances which

he examines as "F(p>" with "F" standing for force and "(p)"
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for content or proposition.

By the end of the article,

"Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," Searle has,
then, replaced Austin's five acts with four acts— phonetic,
phatic, propositional, and illocutionary.
In Chapter 2 of Speech Acts Searle describes the
relationship of the three acts which he finally substitutes
for Austin's five.

He lists these and explains each:

(a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences)=performing
utterance acts.
(b) Referring and predicating=performing propositional
acts.
(c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc.=
performing illocutionary acts .° *
In this list, phonetic and phatic acts are combined as
"utterance acts."

Searle then explains the way utterance

acts operate in a full speech act.

Utterance acts are not

means to propositional and illocutionary acts; "rather, ut
terance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts
in the way in which, e. g . , making an 'x' on a ballot paper
5.8
stands to voting."
Utterance acts do not cause proposi
tional acts and illocutionary acts, nor do propositional
acts cause illocutionary acts.

Instead, each is a part of

a process in the way that the "x" and the ballot are part
of voting.

The voter, using the "x" and the ballot and in

tending to vote, votes.

The speaker, uttering words, re

ferring and predicating, and intending to ask a question or
give a command, actually does ask a question or give a
command.
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Only the propositional acts of referring and predi
cating receive any detailed explanation from Searle, who is
satisfied that the reader will understand the other two if
he understands the normal use of the explanatory terms.

In

order to illustrate propositional acts, Searle lists four
sentences, each of which is used to perform a different
illocutionary act:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sam smokes habitually.
Does Sam smoke habitually?
Sam, smoke habitually!
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Would that Sam smoked habitually.

From each of these the same propositional acts can be ab
stracted:

"Sam" and "smokes habitually."

The utterance of

"Sam" is the reference act, and the utterance of "smokes
habitually" is predication.

Obviously, Searle's use of the

term reference corresponds closely to Austin's use of the
same term, but his use of the term predication is nearer the
use of the noun predicate and the verb predicate by an
earlier generacion of grammarians and philosophers.
To explicate his notion of reference, Searle deals
only with one kind, "single definite reference."

Tokens

used in performing this act may be proper names, -noun
phrases beginning with the definite article or a possessive
pronoun or noun followed by a singular noun, and pronouns.
Other types of referring expressions or tokens are indefi
nite referring expressions, expressions referring to universals, and plural definite referring expressions.

Obvi

ously, these last expressions are used to perform acts which
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are far more complicated than single definite reference,
but, at the same time, all reference acts share essential
features which enable Searle to group them as reference
acts.

The first of these features is Austin's "correspon

dence with the facts" or correspondence with a nonlinguistic element, something outside the speech act itself.
second is the result of this first characteristic:

The

the

reference act, Searle insists, is a speech act in itself.
Though Searle indicates that the only reference which he is
interested in occurs in the total speech act, still,

in re

ferring the speaker performs an act which has a degree of
autonomy.

This autonomy is best understood in a comparison

of the reference act to the act of predication.

Dropping

into the terms of an older grammar, Searle says, "The sub
ject serves to identify an object, the predicate, if the
total illocutionary act is one of describing or character
izing, serves to describe or characterize the object which
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has been identified."
Reference then is tied to ele
ments outside the utterance; predication turns inward as it
acts on the referring expression.

In addition, the refer

ring expression may occur within the predicate, or so it
seems though Searle never discusses this occurrence.
expressions,

These

in other words, seem "to identify an object"

and become part of a reference act wherever they occur.
The third feature which reference acts share is that they
are always neutral as to illocutionary force.
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Predication, on the other hand, is never a speech act
61
and is always "a slice from the total illocutionary act."
Rather than referring to an entity outside the context of
the speech a c t , the expressions which make up the predicate
act on the referring expressions in a way which is very sim
ilar to the way the predicate relates to the subject in
traditional grammar.

In addition, predication acts are

never neutral as to illocutionary force.

Like Austin,

Searle sees in the verb, the key word in predication acts,
the carrier of illocutionary force.

The following examples

illustrate this characteristic:
’Leave!’, 'Will you leave?',

"'You are going to leave',
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'I suggest that you leave.'"

Each has the same subject for "leave"— the single definite
referring expression "you."

The predication in each changes,

however, and with it, the illocutionary force changes from
stating to commanding, requesting, and suggesting.
When Searle tries to list verbs which stand for illo
cutionary acts, he drops Austin's five classes for the no
tion that there are "several different continua of 'illocu63
tionary force'."
He lists six types of illocutionary acts
or six "different continua" in Chapter 3, "The Structure of
Illocutionary Acts."

The description of these six types is

not so helpful in the process of identifying illocutionary
acts as the "principles of distinction" which. Searle uses in
order to arrive at the types.

These principles follow a

discussion of the rules for promising, and they are related
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to these rules.

For this reason, most of them only become

meaningful after the discussion of rules in Chapter III.
Two of them are, however, useful as tests of the illocu
tionary force of an utterance even without the rules.

The

first is "the point or purpose of the act (the difference,
for example, between a statement and a question)," and the
seventh is "the different ways in which an utterance relates
to the rest of the conversation (the difference between
simply replying to what someone has said and objecting to
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what he has said)."
The purpose of an utterance is usu
ally clear whether one can list the rules for the utterance
or not.

The seventh condition reenforces Austin's view that

the circumstances of the utterance are very important as an
indicator of the force of the act.
Since, to Searle, speech rules are universal and
conventions are found only in particular languages, he de
votes only an occasional sentence in his "philosophy of
language" to listing conventional force indicators in Eng
lish. Searle is, however, dedicated to the idea that "for
every possible speech act there is a possible sentence or
set of sentences the literal utterance of which in a partic
ular context would constitute a performance of that speech
65
act."
Here he is emphasizing two points in his under
standing of indicators.

In the first place, the "particular

context" is all-important.

In the second place, in the

sentence itself, it is possible to indicate every meaning
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which the speaker intends to convey.

These two points would

alone be an adequate guide to the person working within the
framework of Searle's theory and wishing to discover force
indicators in the sentences of English or any other lan
guage.
When Searle lists specific indicators, he lists them
primarily for spoken English, but he, like Austin, includes
some which can be found in written discourse.

Searle's list

includes the mood of the verb, the performative verbs, ca
dence, intonation contour, stress, word order, and punctua
tion.

It is interesting that Searle mentions two times the

use of the verb as a force indicator.

The verb in any sen

tence is so closely tied to the act of predication that one
can practically pick out the words which are used in this
act by the old subject-verb distinction.

Now, Searle says

that the act of referring "always comes neutrally as to its
66
illocutionary force."
Predication, on the other hand, "is
a slice from the total illocutionary act."

In the words

which are used to perform the act of predication, one can
expect to discover important clues to illocutionary force.
One can say, then, that Searle's work has clarified
and added to Austin's theory in several areas which are im
portant to this study of the formal essay.

First, Searle

has removed the need to consider force as separate from
meaning.

Second, by his understanding of the relationship

of the propositional acts and content and his explanation
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of the propositional acts of reference and predication in
terms which fit traditional ideas of these, he has provided
a way of examining the sentence for the speech act which
conveys content.

Third, he has formulated two distinctions

between illocutionary acts which are helpful in determining
which acts have been performed.
Austin's view of indicators.

Finally, he has added to

Like Austin, Searle has left

groups of utterances such as joking outside his classes of
serious speech acts.
Ill
At the end of a study of the locutionary, illocu
tionary, and perlocutionary acts as they are defined by
Austin and Searle, one has an understanding of these acts
as part of the total speech act.

Conventional in nature,

locutionary and illocutionary acts should be clear to a
third party to a conversation or to the reader of an essay.
They should be clear because the speaker or writer has sig
nalled his meaning with convenient force indicators.
At the end of a study of the work of Austin and
Searle, one has the following possibilities for considera
tion as force indicators:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Verbs— mood, performatives.
Vocabulary— connecting particles, adverbs.
Intonation and stress.
Word order.
Punctuation.
Gestures.
Tone of voice.
The circumstances of the utterance or context.

67

The importance of several of these will obviously change as
one turns from the spoken utterance to the essay.

Intona

tion and stress, gestures, and tone of voice will play no
part in one's reading of the essay.

On the other hand,

punctuation can be a subtle tool in the hands of the essay
ist, a tool by which he conveys some of the meanings which
he would convey orally or visibly if he were speaking.

The

circumstances of the utterance change to the total context
of the essay— the purpose for which it was written, its orig
inal place of publication, whether in a book or a periodical,
its title, each paragraph and each sentence as each creates a
context for the next.

Each sentence in an essay should set

up expectations in the minds of a reader to be satisfied in
the next sentence just as one utterance in a dialogue pro
vokes the utterance which follows it.

The list amended to

exclude intonation, stress, gestures, and tone of voice and
to include a new understanding of the circumstances of the
utterance provides the necessary framework for beginning the
search for indicators in essays studied here.

Before study

ing the essays, however, one must understand the cornerstone
of the theory of Austin and Searle— the notion of the condi
tions and rules for the successful performance of the illo
cutionary act.

These conditions and rules actually set up

the framework for illocutionary acts.
the act conventional.
devoted to these.

The next chapter

Their existence makes
will, then, be

CHAPTER III
THE CONSTITUTIVE RULES
As J. L. Austin and John Searle studied the illocutionary act and classified various acts, they both concluded
that the successful illocutionary act depends on its satis
fying certain conditions.

To Austin, the conditions equaled

the rules for performing an illocutionary act.

After a

study of the act of promising, Searle first formulated nine
conditions which must be satisfied if the speaker "sincerely
1
and non-defectively promises."
Then he extracted from
these conditions five rules for the use of "the illocution2
ary force indicator for promising."
Austin's conditions
will provide the basic guide in the formulation of condi
tions and rules for the illocutionary acts discovered in the
formal essays analyzed in this study, but the work of Searle
will be used for its three important additions to Austin's
theory.

His first contribution is his application of Aus

tin's idea of rules and conditions to a specific illocution
ary act— the act of promising.

His second contribution is a

list of suggested rules for a number of speech acts which he
does not analyze completely.

Probably his most important

contribution is his discussion of what speech rules do—
that they "constitute" a speech act.
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Before one attempts to formulate rules for the illo
cutionary acts performed in the essays analyzed in this
study, it is necessary, therefore, to understand the nature
of the rules and conditions of Austin and Searle— how they
are discovered, how they are instituted, and how they
function to constitute speech acts,
I
Austin's most detailed discussion of the conditions
or rules governing speech acts occurs in his early attempt
to distinguish performative from constative utterances, but
all the points which he makes apply to his discussion of
illocutionary acts.

The constative, Austin postulates, may

be examined for its "truth” and "falsity."

The performative,

on the other hand, is capable of being "happy" or "unhappy,"
"felicitous" or "infelicitous."

When Austin abandons the

constative/performative distinction for the notion that
every utterance in a meaningful speech act has both a con
stative and a performative dimension, he carries over to the
locutionary act the idea of truth and falsity and to the
illocutionary act the idea of felicity and infelicity.

The

locutionary act is defined by its "more-or-less definite
sense and reference" or its rhetic component.

Truth, for

Austin as for language philosophers such as Ayer, is a pro
duct of successful reference; so the locutionary act like
the constative is judged for its truth.

The illocutionary
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act rests in most cases on a

successful locutionary act,

but the added dimension of illocutionary force is subject
to the test of happiness or felicity.

This test is the ex

tent to which any act satisfies the conditions, and the con
ditions for the successful performative are the conditions
for the successful illocutionary act.
In Lecture II, Austin considers the performative as
an utterance which can be happy or felicitous or can go
wrong in various ways.

He uses the performative "I bet” as

an example, and he points out, "To bet is not.
utter the words 'I bet, & c . ':

. .merely to

someone might do that all

right, and yet we might still not agree that he had in fact,
3
or at least entirely, succeeded in betting."
He might say
"I bet” when the only appropriate linguistic procedure for
betting is to say "I wager."

He might be without money or

any other goods to bet, and he might say "I bet" to someone
not prepared to take bets.

He might even say "I bet" when

he had no intention of betting.

Any act such as christen

ing, marrying, or apologizing can go wrong, Austin concludes,
for the same kinds of reasons, and he calls this notion of
the things that can make a performative unhappy, the "doc4
trine of the Infelicities."
On the other side of the coin
is the idea of the things which must go right if the act is
to be happy.

Austin lists these as the conditions or rules

to be satisfied if the performative is to function happily.
The rules which Austin formulates for the happiness
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of the performative are general rules for all performatives.
Applied to the study of the illocutionary act, they become
general rules for all illocutionary acts.

The rules or

conditions as Austin states them follow:
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional proce
dure having a certain conventional effect, that
procedure to include the uttering of certain words
by certain persons in certain circumstances, and
further,
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a
given case must be appropriate for the invocation
of the particular procedure invoked.
(B.l) The procedure must be executed by all participants
both correctly and
(B.2) completely.
(v .l) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or
for the inauguration of certain consequential con
duct on the part of any participant, then a person
participating in and so invoking the procedure
must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and
the participants must intend so to conduct them
selves, and further
(^.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
The first two rules specify the setting in which the speech
act occurs.
the act.

They also define the conventional nature of

The conventional procedure must "exist" before

the speaker can use it.

It must be "accepted" in the reper

toire of the speaker and the audience.

In addition, the

first two rules define the proper relationship between
speaker and hearer:

"the particular persons" invoking a

"particular procedure" must be persons who are capable of
invoking that procedure whether the procedure is designed
for use in christening a ship, performing a marriage cere
mony, or apologizing.

The next two rules describe the

correct observance of the conventions in the act itself.
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Finally, the last two connect meaning with intention in
terms of the speaker's sincerity.
Applied to any one of Austin's performatives, the
rules work in a simple way which makes it possible to gen
erate rules for any speech act.
"I apologize."

For example, a man utters,

His utterance is happy or felicitous if the

utterance of "I apologize" is the correct procedure for the
person uttering it to use and he is uttering it to a person
whom he has wronged in some way, if the speaker utters the
words with the correct intonation and is not interrupted in
the process, and if the person actually intends to apologize
because he is sorry for his actions.

The apology may be un

happy or a "misfire" if the speaker intends to act but does
not proceed correctly.

The act may be an "abuse" if the

speaker is not sincere when he performs the act.

"I apolo

gize" uttered with the wrong intonation may become a "mis
fire."

Uttered when the speaker is not sorry,

it becomes an

"abuse."
In Lecture XI, Austin, discussing statements, con
cludes that the illocutionary act is also subject to infe
licities and is therefore covered by the conditions and
rules for performatives.

The statement is, of course, tested

for truth, but, in addition, the judge hearing the statement
uttered in a conversation may ask whether the speaker is the
appropriate person to make such a statement:

to apologize,

one must have done something wrong, and to state one must be
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in a position to know what he states.

He must not, for ex

ample, give population figures for China unless he can show
or his hearer knows that he has the information on popula
tion in China.

He can state successfully, in other words,

only if he satisfies the same type of general rules that he
must satisfy in apologizing or betting.

If stating, the

nearest to the pure constative of any speech act, is gov
erned by the performative rules and conditions, then cer
tainly acts such as ordering, begging, urging, and warning,
where the illocutionary force is more important, have rules
which can be derived from the general rules for the perform
ative.

An illocutionary act, like a performative, is infe

licitous or unhappy if any one of the six rules or condi
tions is not satisfied.
Austin uses the terms conditions and rules inter
changeably.

From allusions to games in How to Do Things

with Words, the reader concludes that Austin's rules are
game-type rules, but when Austin discusses them, his pur
pose is, first, to discover the ways in which a performative
utterance is different from a constative, not to discuss the
nature of the rules or even to discriminate between condi
tions and rules, and finally to show that even statements
must satisfy the rules.

Searle attempts to make such a dis

tinction, but his attempt is not his most important contri
bution to Austin's theory.

More important is his explana

tion of the nature of the rules which "constitute" a speech
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act.

More helpful as a guide to formulating rules for the

acts in the essays is his analysis of the act of promising.
II
John Searle proceeds from Austin's list of the condi
tions for the success of a performative utterance to an ex
planation of the type of rule which "constitutes" a speech
act and a detailed explanation of the conditions and rules
for promising.

In addition, he shows that predicating and

referring, propositional acts, are rule-governed.

His work

offers, then, the most specific guide to formulating the
conditions and rules for the illocutionary acts in the for
mal essay.

In some respects this attempt at a precise anal

ysis of the act of promising is very helpful in the prepara
tion of such an analysis of other illocutionary acts.
other respects, it is not helpful.

In

The distinction between

conditions and rules, for example, seems an unnecessary one
in this study; and since the rules as he states them have
aroused a number of attacks on Searle and his work, here the
conditions and rules for promising will be used to show how
Austin's conditions can be applied to a particular act with
out any attempt being made to extract rules from conditions.
Indeed, such an attempt seems more and more a mere exercise
in the manipulation of words as one considers the nature of
the rules and Searle's purpose in formulating them.
In the 1965 essay, '"What Is a Speech Act?", Searle
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introduces the distinction between regulative and constitu
tive rules on which his definition of speech rules rests.
About rules, he says, "Some regulate antecedently existing
forms of behaviour; for example, the rules of etiquette reg
ulate interpersonal relationships, but these relationships
exist independently of the rules of etiquette.

Some rules

on the other hand do not merely regulate but create or define
6
new forms of behaviour."
The second type of rule is the
type which constitutes games, as, for example, football or
chess.

These games and even the individual plays and moves

in them do not exist before a set of rules defines them.
For example, it takes the understanding that a player cross
ing the goal line without committing any of the infractions
of the rules possible at that point in the game and without
being tackled by a player on the other team who is also per
forming the actions permitted him by the rules of the game
constitutes a
football.

touchdown to set up the scoring procedure for

In chess, even the pieces are defined by the rules

of the game:

a pawn is a pawn because it is constituted a

pawn by the rules which define its movements.

Translated

into another language, the term pawn will be different, but
it will still name the pieces that perform certain moves as
constituted by the rules of chess.
This understanding of rules is found in John Rawls'
"Two Concepts of Rules," which Joseph Ransdell considers to
7

be the ancestor of Searle's conception.

Rawls distin
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guishes between what he calls the "summary" approach and
the "practice" approach to understanding law.

In the sum

mary approach, "rules are pictured as summaries of past
decisions arrived at by the direct application of the util8
itarian principle to particular cases."
The "particular
cases" must exist before the rules can be formulated.
the practice approach, the rules define the action.

In
They

9
are "logically prior to particular cases."

Of these rules,

Rawls says, "To engage in a practice, to perform those ac
tions specified by a practice, means to follow the appropri10
ate rules."
In other words, "if a person is engaged in a
practice, and if he is asked why he does what he does, or if
he is asked to defend what he does, then his explanation, or
11
defense, lies in referring the questioner to the practice."
This type of rule and this type of practice, Searle believes,
define the speech act.
Speech Ac t s , Searle substitutes for the distinc
tion between "summary" rules and "practice" rules the dis
tinction between regulative and constitutive rules.
presses the difference:

He ex

"Regulative rules regulate a pre

existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically
independent of the rules.

Constitutive rules constitute

(and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is
12
logically dependent on the rules."
Regulative rules, for
example, do not make it possible for a human being to con
sume food, but they may exist as commands to eat a certain
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way.

Such commands may become constitutive rules for the

consumption of a formal dinner, the procedure for the formal
dinner only existing after it is defined by the constitutive
rules.

Constitutive rules will often be definitions rather

than commands.

For example, in football or chess, each

playing position and each chess piece exists because it has
been defined in a certain way.

Rules which constitute an

activity, unlike regulative rules, can change without chang
ing the nature of the activity only if the rules are not
basic to the nature of the activity.

Searle cites "degrees
13
of centrality in any system of constitutive rules."
"Peripheral" rules can be changed without a change in the

nature of the game.

In football, the substitution rules are

changed periodically without the game becoming another type
of ball.

On the other hand, the introduction of a rule that

six points are scored only if a player can hold the ball for
sixty seconds on the fifty-yard line would result in a dif
ferent game altogether.

Searle sums up the difference be

tween the two types of rules:

"Regulative rules character

istically have the form or can be comfortably paraphrased in
the form 'Do X' or 'If Y do X'.

Within systems of constitu

tive rules, some will have this form, but some will have the
14
form 'X counts as', or 'X counts as Y in context C'."
Actually, all constitutive rules, it can be shown, have this
"counts as" quality, and Searle involves himself in unneces
sary controversy by insisting on separating some rules from
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others on the basis of this difference.

The very nature of

a constitutive rule is that it causes a particular "X" to
"count as" something.

In his discussion of the difference

between constitutive and regulative rules, however, Searle
has explained the nature of the rules to be formulated in
this study.
Searle gives some insight into the way these rules
operate in his discussion of "brute" and "institutional"
facts in Chapter 2 of Speech Acts.
or physical entities.

"Brute" facts are mental

"Institutional" facts depend on the

existence of human institutions.

According to Searle,"These
15
'institutions' are systems of constitutive rules."
Each

"fact" in such a system is undergirded by one or more rules
of the form "X counts as Y," Searle says.

For example, the

fifth rule which he gives for the proper use of any illocu
tionary force indicating device for promising (Pr) is of this
kind:

"The

utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an
16
obligation to do A [some future act of the speaker]."
If
one considers the act of promising as a human "institution,"
then all the "facts" that make up the promising act are de
pendent on this rule.

Whether one accepts the "counts as"

form as essential or not, the idea which Searle is explaining
is basic to an understanding of rule-governed speech acts.
Communication in the language "game" is possible because of
the existence of a network of constitutive rules, and the
"facts" in the repertoire of the players are "institutional"
facts.
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Since speech seems logically prior to other human
institutions, the process by which its constitutive rules
were established is puzzling.

Certainly, Searle is not

suggesting that a prehistoric committee on language set up
certain rules and thus constituted speech acts.
suggesting,

He may be

as Steven Davis tries to prove in his disserta

tion, "Illocutionary Acts and Transformational Grammar,"
University of Illinois, 1968, that the rules for such acts
can be traced to a source deep within the mind of all human
beings.

Davis considers promising and questioning, for ex

ample, to be accounted for in an "illocutionary act compo17
nent" of a "universal grammar."
The fact that Searle
considers his study to deal with a "philosophy of language"
rather than the working of a certain language seems to sup
port this view.

Without adopting such a comprehensive ex

planation or even attempting to explain how speech rules
were set up, the reader can find two significant ways in
which speech-act rules meet the requirements for constitu
tive rules.

In the first place, they possess the arbitrary

force that one associates with the rules set up by the
maker of a new game:

one does not question these rules if

he wants to play the game constituted by them, and one does
not question the necessity of the speech-act rules when he
wants to perform a certain act.

The second way in which

speech-act rules meet the requirements for constitutive
rules is merely the other half of the first way.

It is not
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only the speaker who follows the rules but also the hearer
who follows them In interpreting the speech.

The rules,

whatever their source, make the meaning of an utterance
accessible to the hearer, just as the rules which constitute
a game make it possible for the second player to understand
what his next move should be after he sees the move of the
player ahead of him.
For the rules basically deal with the manipulation of
words and terms in the way that the player of games manipu
lates men or chess pieces, in other words, with the forma
tion of the sentence.

Searle calls them rules for "the use

of the illocutionary force indicating device," and he uses
an analogy to the game of chess in describing them.

In his

analogy the speaker's and the hearer's repertoire of illocu
tionary force indicating devices corresponds to the chess
men.

The rules describe the way the devices may be manipu

lated.
Though the rules deal with the manipulation of de
vices in sentences, Searle stresses the fact that they are
"semantic” and not "syntactic."

His use of the term semantic

is intended to remind the reader that, if he wishes to con
sider the rules in the framework of transformational grammar
— a method of study which Searle does not himself pursue but
believes to be productive, these rules belong to the seman
tic component, not the syntactic component, of the deep
18
structure of the sentence.
It is also intended to
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emphasize the Idea that the rules and meaning are two sides
of the same coin.

Searle ties the sentence, the rules, and

meaning together in the following summary:
1. Understanding a sentence is knowing its meaning.
2. The meaning of a sentence is determined by rules, and
those rules specify both conditions of utterance of
the sentence and also what the utterance counts as.
3. Uttering a sentence and meaning it is a matter of
(a) intending (3.-1) to get the hearer to know (re
cognize, be aware of) that certain states of affairs
specified by certain of the rules obtain, (b) in
tending to get the hearer to know (recognize, be
aware of) these things by means of getting him to
recognize ji-1 and (c) intending to get him to recog
nize ^-1 in virtue of his knowledge of the rules for
the sentence uttered.
4. The sentence then provides a conventional means of
achieving the intention to produce a certain illocu
tionary effect in the hearer.
To understand an utterance and the commitments which the
speaker is making in the utterance, the hearer must have
internalized the rules which apply and must be able to as
sume that the speaker is using the rules properly.

If he

can assume that the utterance which he is hearing follows
the rules, the sentence used in the utterance will convey
the act with its full effect.
When Searle studies the rules for the use of the
illocutionary force indicating device in performing specific
acts, he has, then, two sources of information.

The first

of these is the sentence used in the utterance.

Since it

"provides a conventional means of achieving the intention to
produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer,"
Searle can study it without the fear of delving into the
mind of the speaker or the hearer.

According to the
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"principle of expressibility," whatever the speaker intended
to express, he should have been able to express in the gram
mar and vocabulary of his language.

Anyone studying his

utterance should be able to discover his intentions as well
as the contents of the utterance by studying the sentence.
The second source of information is his own intuition as a
native speaker of the language.

For information on the

rules governing speech acts, as a good ordinary language
philosopher, Searle relies on his intuitive grasp of the way
these acts work.

Relying on the sentence and his under

standing of the language which he speaks, Searle can formu
late semantic rules for predicating and referring as well as
the rules for illocutionary acts.
Before he attempts to formulate rules, however,
Searle, like the observer of the chess game who tries to
understand the game without having it explained to him, at
tempts to describe the conditions under which the illocu
tionary act which he is studying is performed.

In Chapter

3 °- Speech Acts as in the earlier article, "What Is a
Speech Act?", Searle lists nine conditions which must be
satisfied in a successful act of promising.

These nine

conditions, which should be compared with Austin's rules
discussed on pp. 70-72 above, must be satisfied if the act
of promising is happy or felicitous, or, in other words, if
the act is a promise at all.
these conditions:

The following list summarizes
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1. Normal Input and output conditions obtain. . . .
2. S [speaker] expresses the proposition that £ jUa the
utterance of T ( s e n t e n c e ). . . .
3. 2° expressing that £, S predicates a future act A
of S. . . .
4. H [hearer] would prefer S' s doing A to his not doing
A, and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his
not doing A. ! ! .~
“
i t A®, not obvious to
both S and H that S will do A
in the normal course
of events. .. .
S intends to do A. . . .
7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under
an obligation to do A. , . .
8* S intends (i-1) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that
the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an
obligation to do A.
S intends to produce K b£ means
of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i - 1 to be
recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of
the meaning of T. . . .
9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H
are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if
and only if conditions 1-8 o b t a i n ^ ^
"Normal input and output conditions" are present when, for
example, the speaker and hearer know the language being used,
the speaker does not have an impediment which makes his
speech unclear, and the hearer is not deaf.

In Searle's

words, "'Output' covers the conditions for intelligible
speaking and 'input' covers the conditions of understand21
ing."
Searle calls conditions 2 and 3 the "propositional
content conditions."

Four and five are termed "preparatory

conditions"; six, the "sincerity condition"; and seven, the
"essential condition."

Though the hearer is necessary in

the satisfying of these conditions, they do not rely on his
response.

Rather the burden is on the speaker, who must as

sess the situation which includes the expectations of the
hearer and must perform the act of promising using a sen
tence which contains the signs necessary for determining the
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hearer's response.
These conditions for promising are closely related
to Austin's general conditions for the performance of a
successful performative or illocution.

Condition 1 is not

included in Austin's list, though everything which Austin
says about language implies that the successful performance
of speech acts depends on the existence of "normal input and
output conditions."
"uptake" for the act.

Condition 8 specifies the appropriate
Condition 9 corresponds in some

respects to Austin's condition A.I.

Searle says, in explain

ing it, "This condition is intended to make clear that the
sentence uttered is one which, by the semantical rules of
22
the language, is used to make a promise."
Here one finds
the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the utterance
tied together again.

Searle points out that the conditions

1, 8, and 9 apply to all illocutionary acts.

Searle's con

ditions 2-5 correspond to Austin's A.2, B.l, and B.2, though
Searle does not make explicit the importance of the appro
priate person's performing the act.

Condition 6, the "sin

cerity condition," corresponds to 7 .1 and ^.2.

Together,

Austin and Searle indicate four basic components for the
conditions of promising:
1. Speaker and hearer must share a common language, and
no speaking or hearing problem must interfere with
their use of it.
2. The speaker, the appropriate person to perform such
an a c t , must intend to perform an act which he knows
the hearer wishes him to perform but does not know
that he intends to perform.
3. By the speech act, the speaker intends to place himself
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under obligation to perform the act described in the
sentence.
4. The existing linguistic formula is followed.
Conditions of the same type may be formulated for any illo
cutionary act.

These conditions are complete if they spec

ify (1) the speaker's intentions,
hearer's knowledge and desires,

(2) his assessment of the

(3) the position of the

speaker as the proper person to perform the act, and (4)
the extent to which the speaker obligates himself.
From his nine conditions, Searle "extracts" five
rules for "the use of the illocutionary force indicating
device" to be used in promising.
conditions 2-7.

These rules correspond to

Since conditions 1, 8, and 9 are applicable

to illocutionary acts generally, rules for the use of spec
ific act indicators need not include these.

By his use of

the term extract, Searle shows how closely he thinks the
rules follow the conditions.

By his calling them rules for

"the use of the illocutionary force indicating device," he
means that these rules are intended as a precise shorthand
statement of the constitutive rules that a native speaker
of any language will employ, automatically for the most
part, in choosing from his repertoire of conventional de
vices the appropriate ones to convey the force which he
intends his utterance to have.
"propositional content rule":

Searle calls number one the
"Pr [any illocutionary force

indicating device for promising]

is to be uttered only in

the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse)
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T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of
23
the speaker S."
Rules two and three are "preparatory
rules":

"Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would

prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H
would prefer S ’s doing A to his not doing A," and "Pr is to
be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S
24
will do A in the normal course of events."
Four is the
"sincerity rule":
"Pr is to be uttered only if S intends
25
to do A."
Five is the "essential rule":
"The utterance
26
of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A."
Whereas rules 1-4 are quasi-imperatives, rule five has the
form, Searle says, of a constitutive rule.

For that reason,

to Searle, this rule is "essential" in "constituting" the
speech act an act of promising.
The relationship between conditions and rules in
Searle's discussion is so close that one can profitably con
tinue with Austin to equate rules and conditions.

Certainly,

the two categories are never more than two views of the
same set of phenomena— the constitutive rules which estab
lish each speech act as a human "institution."

Conditions

are formulated when one views the speech act as it occurs
and describes what is happening as the speaker utters a
meaningful sentence with a certain force.

Rules are a

statement of the restrictions which the speaker must observe
as he chooses force indicators in order to perform the act
which he intends.

Or, at least, this seems a fair
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assessment of Searle's distinction between the two.

Condi

tions are discovered in the observable act by Austin's im
partial judge.

Rules are a level away from conditions:

theoretically, they explain why the conditions can be ob
served.

When the two are essentially the same, then, one

finds it difficult to justify considering rules and condi
tions separately.

Indeed, when Searle turns to other illo

cutionary acts after his analysis of promising, he erases
the distinction between rules and conditions.

The chart on

pp. 66-67 of Speech A c ts, reproduced in my Appendix II, re
flects the simplified set of distinctions which, he feels,
are all that are necessary for most purposes.
Searle has retained in this summary the key terms
that he used in formulating his conditions and rules for
promising.

The "propositional content" is given, not in a

sentence, but in a noun phrase, which makes it clear that
the important element is "something"— the content of the
propositional act.

The "counts as" terminology of the

"essential" rule points to Searle's original discussion of
constitutive rules in Chapter 2.

It should be pointed out

that this rule is controversial.

For example, Barry

Richards, in "Searle on Meaning and Speech Acts," objects
to the fact that only one of the five rules for promising
is a "counts as" rule, the others following the pattern
27
"________ is to be uttered only if. . . ."
However, with
out one rule of this form, even though the rule applies
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only if rules two and three also apply, Searle would not
recognize the act of promising as instituted by a set of
constitutive rules; thus the "essential" rule expresses the
basic arbitrariness of the rules and the conditions.

This

summary, because it contains the key ingredients of the
conditions and rules for all illocutionary acts, will form
the basis for formulating the rules and conditions of the
illocutionary acts to be studied in my next chapter.
Having explicated the rules and conditions for prom
ising and summarized the conditions for other acts in
Chapter 3, in Chapters 4 and 5 Searle sets up the semantic
rules for the two parts of the propositional act— referring
and predicating.

Since it will not be necessary to discuss

fully the propositional acts in the formal essay analyzed
here, it seems unnecessary to describe these rules fully.
However, one point which Searle makes in his analysis of
the conditions for successful predicating will, however, be
useful in studying illocutionary force indicating devices.
The conditions and rules for predicating support the idea
that predication "is a slice from the total illocutionary
act."

For example, condition 7 reads:

"S intends to pro

duce in H the knowledge that the utterance of P raises the
question of the truth or falsity of P o£ X (in a certain
illocutionary mode), b£ means of H* s recognition of this
intention; and he intends this recognition to be achieved by

~28
means of H's knowledge of the meaning of P."

Since the
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"meaning of P" is conveyed by the sentence and the part of
the sentence concerned with predicating is the grammatical
predicate, this condition supports the suspicion that illo
cutionary force indicating devices will be found in the
predicate or will in some way relate to the grammatical
predicate.

One recalls, too, Austin's explicit formula and

classification of illocutionary acts by a listing of verbs.
In his study of speech acts, Searle has, then, made
Austin's study of rules and conditions concrete.

Following

his lead, any other sophisticated introspective user of the
language should be able to arrive at the rules for any illo
cutionary act.

He needs only to ask himself concerning any

act what relationship exists between the speaker and his
audience, what commitments the speaker must make in perform
ing the a c t , and what the correct procedure is for perform
ing the act.

Assisted by Searle's analysis of promising

and his chart of other acts but not bound to follow slav
ishly his terminology, the reader of the essays can act as
Austin's judge to decide which acts have been performed and
then delve into his own experience in order to codify the
rules for the illocutionary acts found in them.

CHAPTER IV
"THE IRON STRING" AND SPEECH-ACT THEORY
If a reader attempts to use the theories of Austin
and Searle in the analysis of a complete formal essay as
the performance of a series of illocutionary acts, he will
get little help from critics and rhetoricians.

They have

taken only a few steps from the analysis of single-sentence
utterances to the analysis of longer discourse.

A few

critics have studied lyric poems as the performance of illo
cutionary acts, they have theorized on the place of fic
tional sentences in speech-act theory, and they have sug
gested that the theory can apply to discursive
more than one sentence.

prose of

No one, however, has reported an

attempt to analyze a formal essay as the performance of il
locutionary acts.

In this chapter I shall present the re

sults of such an attempt.

It is an attempt which reveals a

number of problems, some of which can be solved only tenta
tively at this time.
One of these problems is that the analyst, as a
reader, stands in a relationship to the essay different
from the relationship of the impartial judge overhearing a
conversation and deciding what locutionary and illocutionary
acts are being performed.

The difference is the result of

90

91

the fact that he must transform the written word into speech
acts.

Ohmann, in the passage quoted in Chapter I, comments

on the position of the reader as the audience which brings
alive the speech acts "frozen" in the text of the printed
work.

Now, the speech acts in the formal essay are closer

to ordinary speech acts than the utterances in many other
types of works.

Barbara Herrnstein Smith in her essay

"Poetry as Fiction" insists that "to the extent that the
writer's act of composing and inscribing is an historically
specific and unique verbal event, it is analagous [sic] to
the speaker's act of emitting the sounds that comprise

1
spoken discourse."

She maintains further that "a printed

work may.

. .be a natural utterance itself in written form,
2
exactly like a personal letter."
The utterances in an es
say in which the author speaks primarily in his own voice

are very similar to the utterances in a personal letter.
One difference is that the audience is not usually known to
the writer, and, therefore, he does not know the extent to
which he and his audience may share speech conventions.

As

with the letter, however, the writer must rely only on the
conventions which he can incorporate in print.
Another problem that the analyst of the formal essay
encounters immediately is the problem of handling the
single-sentence utterance which is not simple in terms of
propositional acts or illocutionary forces or both.

Few

sentences in an essay by a mature writer record simple
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propositional and illocutionary acts like the sentences
analyzed by Austin and Searle; most of these sentences con
sist of complicated arrangements of words, phrases, and
clauses.

In other words, they are the product of trans

formations and embedding, to use the terminology of trans
formational grammar, which I will employ in other sections
of this chapter.

As I showed in Chapter I, Monroe Beardsley

is one philosopher who has discussed sentences that incor
porate

within their structures two or more illocutionary

acts, one of which may be primary and the others secondary.
Such sentences Beardsley concludes are used in the utterance
of "compound" illocutionary acts.

In this study, I shall

develop this suggestion of Beardsley.

I shall analyze some

sentences by reducing them to kernel form to show that these
kernels correspond to the tokens of propositional acts, and
I shall examine many sentences as reflecting compound illo
cutionary force.
The biggest problem for the analyst of the essay is,
however, the act which does not appear to be completed with
the utterance of a single sentence.

Austin and Searle work

with simple single-sentence utterances, though they do not
rule out the possibility of longer utterances in which a
number of acts are part of the same act.

In an essay, one

sentence is often so closely tied to the ones which follow
it that it seems impossible to speak of its performing an
illocutionary act alone, and sometimes the act does not seem
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complete at the end of the sentence.

For these reasons,

I

found the analysis of single sentences did not always pro
duce meaningful results.
Fortunately, N. G. Fotion in two essays— "Master
Speech Acts" and "Indicating Devices?"— makes some sugges
tions on how this problem might be handled.

In the first

article Fotion contends that utterances should be analyzed
in units longer than the sentence and the individual speech
act.

A follower of Austin and Searle, he contends, is al

most forced to regard utterances as separate entities,
which, when they are put together, are characterized "much
like the way a child characterizes the marble collection
3
which he keeps in a bag."
The child may group his marbles
according to type, but they remain separate marbles.

Fotion

contends that, in most utterances, the relationship among
the sentences is more organized than is the relationship of
marbles in a bag and that this organic connection is fre
quently signaled by an author's use of a sentence like the
following:

"First of all, let us be clear about (i.e.,

state what) the facts (are)" or "Let us pray."

Such sen

tences, Fotion claims, control the linguistic behavior of
the sentences which immediately follow them.

The first

makes it necessary that the speaker state facts, and the
second guides him to pray.

Fotion calls such sentences

"master speech acts" or "speech acts which control other
4
speech acts."
He says that these sentences may control at
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least the following four aspects of the use of language:
1. Mode of expression (e.g., talking rather than writing;
this code rather than that one).
2. Manner of speaking or writing (e.g.,loudly rather
than softly; slowly rather than rapidly; prosaically
rather than poetically).
3. Topic (e.g., topic A rather than B; this aspect of A
rather than that one).
4. Nature of speech act (e.g., commanding rather than
promising; describing rather than evaluating).5
Each master speech act may control more than one of these
four aspects of the acts which follow, its function being
mainly to aid the hearer in identification of the act and
assessment of the acts which follow.

Fotion cites as an

example of a master speech act which controls more than one
aspect, "When you write, please tell me (i.e., describe)
what happened to June.”

Here the act controls mode—

writing; topic— what happened to June; the illocutionary
force of the act— describing.

In this way the master speech

act guides the reader’s expectations as to what is to fol
low.

The aspects of language use which Fotion is concerned

with in this paper and certainly the ones which I am partic
ularly interested in are the third and the fourth.

The

third is the aspect expressed in the locutionary or propositional act, and the fourth is the aspect expressed in the
illocutionary act.
Fotion analyzes master speech acts into two basic
parts.

These parts he refers to as the ’’formula” and the

"content" parts.

By the "formula” he means either the ex

plicit performative verb already supplied in the sentence
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or the part of the sentence which shows what explicit verb
could be added to the content portion to determine force.
For example, in the sentence, "First of all, let us be
clear about the facts," "let us" is a formula for request
ing.

It indicates that the utterance of this one sentence

is a request.

The rest of the sentence indicates the force

of the sentences to follow.
facts.

The speaker is going to state

The utterance has two forces then— requesting and

stating.

Because the content part controls the utterances

which follow, the entire utterance is called a "master
speech act," and it is actually part of the utterances which
it controls.
In "Indicating Devices?" Fotion focuses on speech
activities rather than individual speech acts.

He finds

that speech activities like a conversation or an essay or a
book frequently use "detached" indicating devices which are
similar in form and purpose to master speech acts.

Philo

sophers, Fotion believes, have "focused too much attention
upon locating these devices within the framework of the in
dividual speech act, rather than in the relationships be6
tween acts."
He first examines the "detached" indicating
device as it is added to an utterance to prevent ambiguity
or failure to secure "uptake."

For example, he cites the

following dialogue:
Speaker 1:
Speaker 2:
Speaker 1:

"You had better get a move-on."
"Are you threatening me?"
"Yes."?
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The first speaker’s response, "Yes," is a detached device
signaling or confirming that his first utterance was in
tended as a threat.

But Fotion feels that the more inter

esting indicating devices are those which occur "prior to
the 'original' speech act" and whose purpose is not remedial
8
but "preventive or lubricative."
His examples are "Let us
pray," "Here are your orders for the week," and "Here is a
list of things I want for Christmas."

These usually indi

cate the force or content or both of the sentences which
follow.

Others are what Fotion calls "referring-indicating"

devices, an example being "This is a true story."

Even the

title of a book or a chapter in a book may be used to indi
cate force and content.

This last indicates that the lin

guistic activity discussed may be as long as a chapter or
even a book.

A "detached" indicator, functioning in the

above manner, is part of the speech acts which it serves
since the acts are not complete without the indicator.
If this function of the master speech act or the
"detached" speech indicator is allowed, then necessarily
some speech acts must consist of more than one-sentence
utterances.
ment.

A clear example of such utterances is the argu

On a very general level, most illocutionary acts per

formed in exposition can be classified into two groups:
(1) those that are claims, conclusions, assertions, etc.,
and (2) those that provide the justification for group 1
acts, such as proving, making good, justifying, inferring,
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backing up, defending, supporting, etc.

Usually the pattern

is that a claim or assertion is made and then justification
for that claim or assertion is provided.

Together they

constitute an argument which frequently may be introduced
and organized by a master speech act.

For example, a mas

ter speech act such as the following might begin a paragraph
of arguing:

"I claim that the following reasons will demon

strate that under no circumstances should the United States
intervene in Angola."
by the formula.

Here the force of claiming is carried

The content shows that an argument support

ing this claim is to follow.

The act of arguing seems to

consist of the master speech act, the stated conclusion, and
the sentences which supply the reasons and the evidence.

As

we shall see, the illocutionary acts of exemplifying and ac
counting for work somewhat the same way.
I
I chose to analyze "The Iron String" as the first
test of the usefulness of speech-act theory in teaching the
reading and writing of the formal essay because, though my
position as Austin’s "judge" is still shaky in this situa
tion, the essay itself surely is what Smith calls a "natural
9
utterance."
It was originally a speech made to a group of
students at Harvard, where Jones was a professor of American
literature.

It was printed in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin,

April 8, 1950.

I read it as it appears in Steinmann and
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Villen's Literature for Writing, an anthology for freshman
English classes.

(It is reproduced in Appendix III as it

appears in Literature for Writing.)

Beading it, I must, as

Ohmann says, bring alive the speech acts "frozen" in the
text.

Though I find my role as the judge hampered by my

participation in the speech act which I must bring alive, I
will at least be analyzing a "natural utterance."
The title of the essay comes from the following quo
tation from Emerson's essay "Self-Reliance":

"Trust thyself

— every heart vibrates to that iron string."

Emerson's

ideas of self-reliance are the basis of a view of education,
the advocacy of which is Jones's main intention in the es
say.

Jones begins the essay with a list of the things for

which Emerson has been criticized:

his transcendentalism,

his optimism, his liberalism, and his failure to understand
human weakness.

To Jones, it is contradictory for an Ameri

can to criticize Emerson for these positions:

instead

Emerson should be considered as a leading proponent of "the
custom of dissent," and "the custom of dissent" is necessary
for the maintenance of this country's institutions.

The

"drive for conformity" is strong in this country in politics
and in education, according to Jones.

The present need in

education is to reverse this drive, to educate men, not
train them, and finally to produce "man thinking" (Emerson's
term again).

Jones says, "The educational problem is not

conformity to any pattern, however lofty in intent; it is
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how to remove obstacles from the lonely path by which edu
cation sometimes results in man thinking."

In this process,

according to Jones, Emerson is "the most excellent catalyst
we have in a democracy."
It is obvious that Jones's intention was to convince
or persuade his audience to accept this view of education,
but the securing of conviction or persuasion is a perlocutionary act and will not be studied in detail here, though
the direction such an analysis would take seems clear.

As

Austin and Searle both point out, illocutionary acts may be
and usually are performed with a perlocutionary intent.
Certainly the essay can be analyzed (and probably usually
is in the classroom) as persuasive discourse with ethical,
pathetic, and logical appeals, in the full Aristotelian
sense, which, as Kinneavy reminds us, are the same set of
appeals used by rhetoricians and propagandists of all
10
times.
Thus, the reader (the analyst of "The Iron
String") can see ethical proof in the way the author por
trays himself as a person who possesses a tremendous amount
of knowledge of his subject, who is willing, on the surface,
to see both sides of the subject, and who has only the in
terests of his country at heart.

Examples of his pathetic

or emotive appeals appear in the irony of his pose:

"All

these fine scholars see it as a weakness that Emerson lacks
'a vision of evil,’ but I, a plain man who cannot under
stand their devious and subtly intricate explanations, am
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so naive that I see only that he has a ’vision of good.1"
Finally, an analysis of Jones's logical argument would show
how he "stacks the cards" and throws in "glittering general
ities" such as honor and love of country in order to achieve
his persuasive effects.

It is possible then to analyze the

speech as persuasive discourse, but Austin's judge does not
want to examine or evaluate this aspect of i t .

His main job

is with the illocutionary forces incorporated in the speech
acts that constitute this essay.

The reaction of the audi

ence is involved only to the extent that "uptake" must occur
if these acts are to be felicitous.
When I began to study "The Iron String" as a series
of speech acts, I did not have a clear view of the steps
that I should take in such an analysis.

Following the sug

gestion of Searle, I decided to begin with the attempt to
isolate propositional acts, since this part of the analysis
seemed simple compared to the discovery of illocutionary
acts and since it appeared that this might be a necessary
first step in the discovery of illocutionary acts.

When

this process was explored and found to be unnecessary to the
discovery of illocutionary acts, I decided to begin identi
fying illocutionary acts by using the two most obvious in
dicators which Austin discusses— the circumstances or con
text of the utterance and the explicit formula.

I felt that

I could use the circumstances or the context of each utter
ance at least as effectively as all of us use them to
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interpret the utterances of another speaker and that Aus
tin's faith in the explicit formula justified working with
it.

It should be pointed out at once, however, that neither

of these indicators, as yet, can be used with complete as
surance; the theory of each is incomplete and unsettled.
For example, no complete list of explicit formulas is avail
able; there is disagreement as to whether certain verbs can
be used in the formula or not; no sharp differentiation has
been made between the meaning of verbs that name closely re
lated illocutionary acts; and, except for the very tentative
treatment by Austin, no classification of illocutionary acts
is available.

There are also problems in the use of the

context or circumstances of an utterance as an indicating
device.

The problems of defining and particularizing the

context remain unsolved.

Perhaps a rough distinction can be

made between the "internal" and "external" context of an ut
terance, but the specific aspects of the kinds of contexts
which are relevant for determining illocutionary force,
particularly in written discourse, remain to be fully worked
out.

Fotion's notion of the master speech act and the de

tached indicating device I assumed would be helpful in my
use of context or the circumstances of the utterance.
The indicators other than context and formula verbs
which Austin and Searle mention I found to be as vague and
uncertain as Austin says they are.

Thus my procedure was to

use the explicit formula and the circumstances of the
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utterance with some consideration of master speech acts to
determine roughly what acts are being performed.

It soon

became apparent that an analysis which is aimed at isolat
ing every secondary component of every compound speech act
is impractical:

such an analysis would extend for too many

pages and be far too complicated to have any practical ap
plication.

At the same time that I was determining which

acts are being performed, I was formulating the constitutive
rules for each of the major acts performed in the essay.
Neither Austin nor Searle has worked out rules for most of
these acts.

My formulation of these rules is summarized in

Appendix II, but the chief characteristics of each are dis
cussed as I discover the act in the essay.

Finally, I ex

amined the essay for the other indicators which Austin and
Searle mention with the idea that the function of these will
become more meaningful when they appear in context and that,
since I had a hypothesis about what acts are being per
formed, I could tell how each indicator works to signal
these acts.

The following is a list of indicators mentioned

by Austin and Searle which apply to written discourse:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Circumstances of the utterance
Verbs— performative, mood
Vocabulary— connecting particles, adverbs
Word order
Punctuation

By the end of the analysis, I was aware that indicators
which neither author discussed had signalled some acts to
me.

Thus, in addition to studying the five indicators above
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lor their potential to convey force, I had added certain
others.
So, from a start with context and the performative
formula to a listing of acts to a study of the rules for
the acts and the indicators in context, the study proceeded,
as this chapter will show.

By the end of the chapter,

I

hope to show that it is not unreasonable to say that "The
Iron String" represents the successful performance of a com
plex series of usually compound illocutionary acts.

Almost

all the individual acts in the essay can be classified as
stating, one kind of explaining, arguing, deprecating, com
mending, evaluating, and advocating.

However, analysis will

support Beardsley's contention that many sentences are com
pound illocutionary acts.

For example, many sentences are

used to state and deprecate, or to state and commend, or to
state, commend, evaluate, and advocate.

Further, my anal

ysis will show complex interrelationships among individual
speech acts.

For example, a series of statements may come

together to constitute a speech act of a higher order, such
as an argument or an explanation.

Indeed, the stated master

illocutionary act for the entire essay may be considered as
the advocacy of a certain view which Jones has evaluated and
concluded to be good.

Jones's advocacy of this view seems

to control a complex intertwining of various kinds of Aus
tin's verdictives, exercitives, behabitives, and expositives.
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II
If speech-act theory is relevant in the analysis of
the formal essay, in "The Iron String," Howard Mumford Jones
is first of all uttering words and performing the propositional acts of referring and predicating.

It will become

immediately apparent that it would be tedious and unneces
sary to follow propositional acts through the entire essay,
but it seems important to see the way in which this part of
the theory works.

I have, therefore, analyzed the first

paragraph for propositional content as an example of a pos
sible procedure to follow in determining propositional acts.
The paragraph follows:
I have lately been reading a Harvard author who is
just now out of favor here.
He has been unpopular be
fore.
He once made a speech^ at this college, a speech
so disliked that he was persona non grata
in Cambridge
for thirty years.
However, the alumni and the Faculty
finally decided he was a solid citizen— this was after
the Civil War— and so they made him an Overseer, they
gave him an honorary degree, and they asked him to de
liver a course of lectures.
In view of this history I
take some pleasure in remembering that the title of
these lectures was:
"The Natural History of the Intel
lect." Another thirty years or so drifted by, and they
erected a building in his honor.
On any class day in
winter you can enter it and see Frank Duveneck's statue
of him buried under the coats and hats.
Somehow, this
symbolizes what has happened to Emerson.
speech:
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882; American
poet, essayist, and philosopher), "The Divinity School
Address," July 15, 1838.
^persona non grata: unacceptable person.
This paragraph is printed here as it appears in Literature
for Writing complete with footnotes provided by the editors.
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These notes are a reminder that here one is considering the
speech as an essay and that full reference may not be com
pleted successfully by the wider audience of recent college
undergraduates which the book will reach without these ex
planations of allusions which the original audience of Har
vard students was expected to understand.

The only semantic

problem is the need to understand these allusions.
To provide an analysis of the sequence of proposi
tional acts that appear in a discourse consisting of a
series of sentences, almost all of which are, grammatically,
compound or complex, is an extremely difficult matter.
Neither Austin nor Searle, in their concentration on single
sentence utterances, is of much help.

Discussing proposi

tional acts in Searle's work, one concludes that the tokens
of the reference act will correspond to the grammatical sub
ject and the tokens of the predication act will correspond
to the grammatical predicate, but when one attempts to sep
arate these tokens in a complex sentence, the result is far
removed from Searle’s division of acts in his typical fouror five-word sentences.

The sentences which Searle works

with are the simplest possible forms.

In fact, they contain

simply the ingredients of the kernel sentences of transform
ational grammar.
When one realizes that the sentences which can be
divided into reference and predication act tokens with ease
and certainty are the same as the kernel sentences of
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transformational grammar, he sees almost immediately a di
rection to take in analyzing complex-sentence utterances
for propositional acts.

Now, this direction is not new
11
and unheard of among speech act theorists.
Indeed, in
the introduction to The Philosophy of Language, Searle him
self affirms his belief that a theory which combines the
insights of ordinary language theory and generative grammar
is the most promising approach in modern philosophy.

Re

peatedly, in Speech Ac ts, Searle describes aspects of his
theory in the terms of generative or transformational gram
mar.

In Chapter 4, for example, discussing reference, he

says that "generative syntax" can be used to explain expres12
sions such as "his sake" and "the lurch."
Searle is
chiefly interested in deep structure and the semantic com
ponent, but he obviously makes a connection on the syntactic
surface level.

Steven Davis, whose dissertation "Illocu

tionary Acts and Transformational Grammar" is also directed
primarily at deep structure relationships, suggests in Chap
ter VII four hypotheses which he feels account for illocu
tionary act potential.

They are the study of the forms

underlying the surface structure of an utterance, the study
of these forms using Austin’s explicit formula, a semantic
study, and finally a study of illocutionary act features
which do not seem to be included in the other three.

The

first hypothesis, which he feels works in some instances,
would call for the discovery of the structure embedded in
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the completed utterance or an analysis of the kernel sen
tences.

In the second hypothesis, there lies the possibil

ity that this analysis should take place in some utterances
before one uses the explicit formula.
Just as speech-act theorists have incorporated
transformational grammar in their studies, so linguists have
begun to use speech act theory and transformational grammar
together in interesting ways.

For example, Chungmin Lee

describes ’’suggest" in "May I suggest that you run for the
13
presidency this time" as an "embedded performative."
Julian Boyd and J. P. Thorne in "The Semantics of Modal
Verbs" propose an explanation of modal verbs which begins
with a discussion of their differences with Katz and Postal,
leaders in the generative grammar movement, and they use
generative grammar terminology as tools in their speech-act
explanation of modal verbs.

Certainly, the use that has

been made of transformational grammar by speech-act theo
rists and speech-act theory by grammarians prepares one to
recognize kernel sentences in Searle's propositional act
tokens.
Paul Roberts' definition of kernel sentences in
Modern Grammar seems to support the relationship between
propositional act tokens and kernel sentences.

Roberts de

fines a kernel sentence as one "to which no optional trans
formation rules have been applied" and adds, "It is made up
of two main parts— a noun phrase that functions as the
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subject, and a verb phrase that functions as the predi14
cate."
The propositional act, consisting of a reference
act and a predication act, certainly seems to be represented
in its simplest form by a kernel sentence.

In most of the

sentences in a formal essay, then, one may expect to find
the tokens of more than one propositional act, and each act
may be analyzed as a kernel sentence.

In addition,

if Davis

is correct in his first hypothesis, then illocutionary force
may be made clearer by this analysis.
Using Roberts' definition of the kernel sentence but
simplifying it to allow such "kernels" as "Thirty years or
so drifted by," I have broken the sentences in the first
paragraph into these basic structures.

Sentence 1 yields:

I have been reading books lately.
The author is from Harvard.
He is out of favor just now.
Sentence 2 is the only kernel sentence in the paragraph:
"He has been unpopular before."

Sentence 3 yields:

He made a speech at Harvard once.
The audience disliked the speech.
He was persona non grata in Cambridge for thirty
years.
Sentence 4 becomes:
The alumni decided [it].
The faculty decided [it].
He was a solid citizen.
It was after the Civil War.
They made him an Overseer.
They gave him a degree.
The degree was honorary.
They asked him to deliver a course of lectures.
Sentence 5 breaks into:
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I remember the title of the lectures.
I take some pleasure in the title.
The title was "The Natural History of the Intellect."
Sentence 6 can be analyzed thus:
Thirty years or so drifted by.
They erected a building.
The building honors Emerson.
Sentence 7 becomes:
You can enter the building any class day in winter.
You can see Frank Duveneck's statue of Emerson.
It is buried under coats and hats.
In sentence 8, "this" is substituted for the statement in
sentence 7 that the statue is buried under coats and

hats.

Analyzed into kernel sentences, sentence 8 becomes:
This symbolizes it somehow.
It has happened to Emerson.
This analysis clears up several problems in applying
Searle's definitions of successful reference and predication
acts.

Searle

occurs within

does not give an example of reference which
the predication act, yet the reader feels that

reference according to his definition takes place in the ut
terances in this essay in other positions than in the sub
ject position cited by Searle.

Many of these become the

tokens of reference in the subject positions in the kernel
sentences.

In addition, the complexity of the act of predi

cation in the

surface structure of the final utterances

result of the

embedding of kernel sentences.

is a

Such an analysis is the necessary first step in de
termining the compound illocutionary force of most of the
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sentences in a typical essay.

The sophisticated reader

makes such an analysis intuitively.

It must become a con

scious process only when a question of content arises or
when he wants to pare away indicators.

In addition, in

some cases, a separation of a transformation into its con
stituents will make the illocutionary force of each of the
constituents more readily apparent and, as Davis suggests,
provide the structure for the use of the explicit formula.
Thus, the usefulness of a combination of speech-act theory
with transformational grammar is increasingly recognized in
philosophical and linguistic circles.
Ill
In this section of Chapter IV, I shall show my tenta
tive attempts to identify illocutionary acts in "The Iron
String."

My method will be chiefly a reliance on the in

stinctive "uptake" provided by a careful reading of the
essay supplemented by a study of the context of the essay
and a search for the guidelines which Jones provides by his
selection of a title for the essay and his use of Austin's
explicit performative formula at strategic points within
the essay.

The results of this method will be tested by the

Austinian procedure of introducing each sentence with an
explicit formula in order to make the implicit force of an
utterance explicit.

I shall end the section with an outline

of the illocutionary acts which, one must remember, will

Ill

suffer from all the weaknesses inherent in the process in
which the judge is also the audience.

How successful a

summary it is will be clearer when the other indicators are
examined later in the chapter.
In "The Iron String" the internal context of each
separate sentence as well as the context of the whole dis
course plays a part in indicating illocutionary force.

In

fact, as with many single-sentence utterances, the context
is the most important single indicator.

The context of this

utterance must include its original setting— the Harvard
lecture room in which Howard Mumford Jones addressed stu
dents.

Studied here, the essay appears in Literature for

Writing, already identified as an anthology for undergrad
uate students.

In both cases, the author stands in a rela

tion to his audience which enables him to state and recom
mend felicitously.

Fotion says that the title of a

selection may be a detached indicator and therefore an im
portant part of the context of the remainder of the work.
Actually, the title of this essay has minimal indicative
use.

It does not indicate the illocutionary act or acts

that will appear in the essay.

To a reader who does not

know where the expression "the iron string" comes from, the
title will not indicate even the content of the essay.

How

ever, a reader who does recognize the title as a quotation
from Emerson will expect that the essay will be dealing in
some manner or other with Emerson’s advice, "Trust thyself."
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All readers, moreover, will recognize the metaphoric nature
of the phrase, "the iron string."

The idea of an "iron

string" provokes a number of questions:
for?

What is one used

Does the use of the word iron suggest rigidity or

merely strength?

The reader wants an explanation of the

title’s significance, and he expects the writer to supply
it.
In paragraph 7, Jones uses a master speech act to
indicate that he intends to advocate a certain position
which he has evaluated and found to be good.

He begins the

paragraph, "By now you have rightly inferred that I find
something important in Emerson.

I am speaking of Emerson

A propos of our time in order to revalidate an old Harvard
custom— the custom of dissent."

The reader who recognizes

the phrase used as the title knows at this point, if he has
not suspected it before, that Emerson’s "iron string" and
advice, "Trust thyself," will not be disparaged in the essay.
In these two sentences, Jones clearly indicates that he
evaluates Emerson's position as good, that his position
favors dissent, and that Jones is prepared to advocate—
"revalidate"— that position.

The future of American insti

tutions, he is prepared to argue, depends upon the fostering
of the inclination to dissent.

One is not surprised then

when Jones advocates education which will produce "man think
ing," since, to him, "man thinking" will be man dissenting
when dissent is needed.

Other master speech acts occur in
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the essay, but they are more profitably discussed in a dis
cussion of the acts which they control than in a discussion
of the indicators which signal Jones's overall intent.

Ad

vocating and evaluating will be discussed at the very end
of the discussion of the acts as the two acts which to
gether control or organize the others.
Proceeding from this very general consideration of
these matters of external and internal context to the deter
mination of the illocutionary force of smaller units of
utterance within the essay,

I turn to an examination of the

essay for verbs that can be used in Austin’s explicit per
formative formula.

Some which have the form, first person

singular present indicative active, on examination do not
function as part of the explicit formula.

These are "I

take," paragraph 10, and "I come," paragraph 19.

They are

mentioned because the reader, seeing the forms which do not
work, will better understand the ones which do work.

These

name and report acts, but they do not name speech acts.

Nor

do they indicate that the speaker is performing a speech act.
One group which Austin does not mention is included here
because it seems to fit.

The groups includes verb-adjective

and verb-noun combinations which are synonymous with certain
formula verbs.

The examples are "I take pleasure," "I am

afraid," and "I am ashamed."
"I rejoice.”

The first seems synonymous with

The second translates "I fear."

"Fear" seems

like the doubtful cases which Austin lists under exposi
tives, such as "doubt," "know," and "believe."

The third
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seems a synonym for the behabitive "deprecate."
A certain pattern appears even on a cursory examina
tion of the explicit formula verbs.

In addition to the ones

mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are at least ten
true expositives and six such as "I think" that seem to be
covered by Austin's doubtful cases such as
"doubt."

"believe" and

"I find" in paragraph 7 is one of these.

They are

expositives in the sense in which Austin explains the term:
"Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the
expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the
14
clarifying of usages and references."
Expositives are "I
suggest," "I wonder" (conjecture), "I mean," "I cite," "I
suppose," "I submit," "I detect," "I repeat," and "I quote."
Each of these indicates the "expounding of views" or the
"conducting of arguments."

They show that various acts such

as stating, arguing, and opining will take place.

Some that

contain more than two words can have expositives from Aus
tin's list substituted for them as "I can only point" and
"I take my third example"— "I illustrate."

Most of the ex

positives signal acts which are statements or show relation
ships between statements.

Two formula verbs, "honor" and

"am ashamed," are behabitives and indicate that Jones is
expressing his feelings for the ideas which he discusses.
Identifying the explicit formula verbs in the essay
does not exhaust the possibilities for the use of the form
ula.

The formula was used by Austin to make "explicit" or
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clear and unequivocal the force which he believed an utter
ance to have "implicit" in it.

From the context and from

conventional indicators which he grasps only half con
sciously, the reader or the listener may suspect that a
certain illocutionary act is being performed.

To test the

utterance, he adds the appropriate explicit formula verb to
the utterance.

If the utterance still works in the context,

he has made explicit what he knew implicitly from the con
text and other indicators.

He will have demonstrated what

he knew intuitively without demonstration.

This is the

process to be applied in summarizing the illocutionary acts
in "The Iron String."

After using context consciously and

other indicators only half consciously at this point, the
reader will then test utterances with the explicit formula.
It will not be necessary to record every test here, since
the process becomes too monotonous, but enough tests will be
given to demonstrate the method.
Applying the formula-indicating device in this double
fashion,

I found that a large number of the propositional

acts in the essay are asserted or stated.

A full clarifica

tion of stating and the other illocutionary acts that occur
in the essay appears in Appendix II, where I present a form
ulation of the rules, either taken from Searle or developed
by myself, that govern the happy performance of each of the
acts.

However, a general notion of these acts is indispens

able as I trace their appearance in the essay.

Thus, a
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statement, as defined by Austin and Searle, asserts the
truth of the propositional act which is its content.

This

is similar to what I. A. Richards and others call the ref
erential use of language in which a sentence is to be taken
as referring to some state of affairs in the real world
with the implication that the speaker of the sentence be
lieves that what he says is true and that he can support the
15
truth of the statement with hard evidence.
Now, in Lec
ture XI of How to Do Things with Words, after attempting to
set stating apart as an act distinct from such acts as warn
ing, arguing, judging, and blaming, Austin concludes that
this "hard evidence" is not always so firm a means of dis
tinguishing statements as he would like it to be.

He exam

ines such statements as "France is hexagonal" and "Lord
Raglan won the battle of Alma."

He calls the first "rough"

and the second "exaggerated and suitable to some contexts
16
and not to others."
The first would satisfy the require
ments for a statement if uttered by virtually anyone except
a geographer; the second works in an elementary textbook
where the point is that Raglan was the commander of the win
ning forces, not an analysis of the factors involved in his
army's victory.

Austin concludes that, "in the case of

stating truly or falsely, just as much as in the case of
advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the
utterance and its context are important; what is judged true
in a school book may not be so judged in a work of

117

17
historical research."

In other words, Austin seems to be

saying that there is a range of degrees of fidelity to the
truth into which an utterance may fall and still remain a
statement.

In "The Iron String," one finds sentences such

as this one:

"His life was threatened by tuberculosis, he

abandoned his pulpit, his first wife died young, his broth
ers were sick men, and his son perished.

. ."

Each clause

seems to represent a statement, but not a statement with the
kind of verifiability that it would have if it specified
time, place, and degree.

Again, Jones concludes the first

paragraph, "Somehow, this symbolizes what has happened to
Emerson."

Austin might describe this utterance as "exagger

ated and suitable to some contexts and not to others," but
it seems to fall within the statement range.

Most state

ments in an essay of this type, one begins to feel, will
not be precise, though they may refer, as these do, to his
torical events.

To be felicitous, they must only satisfy

an audience which respects the ability of the speaker to
supply precise information and can assume some responsibil
ity on its own for assessing the statements.
Now, there are similar utterances which seem even
less susceptible to verification.

In paragraph 2, one finds

this sentence, "He was a transcendentalist, and any beginner
in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with transcendenta
lism."

The first clause is a verifiable statement, though

again it does not specify when Emerson was a transcendenta-
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list and therefore seems vague.
an opinion.

The second, however, gives

It is an opinion tainted with irony, as I shall

show later, but one would find it difficult to prove that
"any beginner in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with
transcendentalism."

Or one finds a statement such as this

one made concerning Harvard:

"I sometimes think dissent may

have no other place to go if the drives for conformity con
tinue."

The use of "I think," a doubtful performative in

Austin's list, indicates that Jones is expressing an idea
which is personal to him.

He is performing an act similar

to stating but distinguished by the speaker's understanding
that he cannot demonstrate the point conclusively by supply
ing additional information and by his hope that the audience
will be willing to accept the point tentatively as his per
sonal opinion.

This act I shall distinguish in this study

from stating and call "opining."

Webster's New Dictionary

of Synonyms groups "opinion" with "view, belief, conviction,
persuasion, sentiment" and sees them as "comparable when
they mean a more or less clearly formulated idea or judgment
which one holds as true or valid."

The term opinion it

distinguishes by "a personal element in the judgment, the
possibility of its being in error, and the strong probabil
ity that it will be disputed."

Now, opinions like state

ments cover a wide range of utterances, some of them hardly
distinguishable from statements.

For example, Jones's view

of Harvard as the home of dissent remains an opinion in this
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study even though it is not completely personal, being
shared by many people.

Stating and opining, distinguished

in this way, become valuable labels for the acts in this
essay.

They are distinguished by the degree of certainty

of the speaker in his utterance, the type of evidence which
he can supply, and the nature of the "uptake" which the
audience gives to the intention of the speaker.
Going back to the use of the explicit formula, one
finds in the introductory paragraph of this essay the per
vasiveness of stating or asserting.

In the first paragraph,

only one explicit performative verb is used, "I take some
pleasure."

Thus it is necessary to preface the other utter

ances with the appropriate explicit formula.

Now, I have

already extracted kernel sentences from the sentences in
this paragraph; so in an attempt to discover all the illocutionary acts conveyed in the utterance of these sentences, I
shall use the explicit formula on these.

When this process

is completed, one has the following:
I state that I have been reading books lately.
I state that the author is from Harvard.
I state that he is out of favor just now.
I state that he made a speech at Harvard once.
I state that the audience disliked the speech.
I state that he was persona non grata in Cambridge
for thirty years.
I state that the alumni decided it.
I state that the faculty decided it.
I state that he was a solid citizen.
I state that it was after the Civil War.
I state that they made him an Overseer.
I state that they gave him a degree.
I state that the degree was honorary.
I state that they asked him to deliver a course of
lectures.
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I state that I remember the title of the lectures.
I rejoice that the title was what it was.
I state that the title was "The Natural History of
the Intellect."
I state that thirty years or so drifted by.
I state that they erected a building.
I state that the building honors Emerson.
I state that you can enter the building any class
day in winter.
I state that you can see Frank Duveneck's statue of
Emerson.
I state that it is buried under coats and hats.
I state that this symbolizes it somehow.
I state that it has happened to Emerson.
This consideration of the first paragraph indicates that the
illocutionary act of stating will appear frequently in the
kind of discourse usually called "expository."

The act will

appear either as an end in itself as in the first sentences
in paragraph 1 or as a part of a higher order act, such as
explaining, arguing, or evaluating.
A more refined analysis of the first paragraph will
show that other illocutionary acts are also being performed.
There are touches of explanation, deprecation, and commend
ation.

For example, in sentence 5, the formula-like expres

sion, "I take some pleasure," is an explicit indication that
the speaker is approving, applauding, or favoring.

These

acts will be discussed more fully as more clear-cut examples
are discovered later in the essay.
After the introductory paragraph, the next major
block of the essay consists of paragraphs 2-6.
is introduced by a master speech act:

This section

"The reasons for

Emerson's current lack of favor are understandable."

Jones,

following this utterance, proceeds to discuss four reasons
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for Emerson's "current lack of favor":

his being a trans-

cendentalist, his having no vision of evil, his being a
liberal, and his having no understanding of human nature.
The master speech act indicates that, by discussing these,
Jones intends to explain.
ple term.

Now, "explanation" is not a sim

Austin lists the verb explain under expositives,

but the act performed in explaining is far more complicated
than the act performed by most of the other expositives.
Abraham Kaplan in The Conduct of Inquiry speaks of the end
of explaining being to secure understanding, and he says of
scientific explanation, "It does its work, not by invoking
something beyond what might be described, but by putting
18
one fact or law into relation with others."
When one ex
plains, as when he describes, Kaplan is saying, he is not
merely reporting facts which can be grasped and used.

In

explanation, however, the relationship between the parts is
of even more importance than it is in a description.

Though

there are, of course, one-sentence explanations, the act of
explaining which is intended to secure understanding will
usually consist of more than one sentence, and each sentence
will be carefully related to the others in the explanation.
For this reason, the explicit formula, "I explain that,"
does not work in the neat way that "I state that" or "I warn
that" will work.
The word explain, probably because of the vagueness
of the word understanding, has several different meanings
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which apply to radically different uses of the word.

Web

ster1s New Dictionary of Synonyms divides the definitions
of "explain" into two groups.

In one group, it places

"explain, expound, explicate, elucidate, interpret, con
strue," and in another, "explain, account, justify, ration
alize."

Kaplan says of explanations, "We use the verb 'to

explain' in connection with very many different things.

We

may be said to explain ourselves, a dream, or a text; ex
plain how to do something or other; explain why a particular
event occurred or a certain law obtains; or explain for what
19
reason a person or group acted as they did."
Though he
acknowledges that all explanations seem to be intended to
secure understanding, Kaplan finds that the type of under
standing and the appropriate response by the hearer differ
to such an extent that he must separate explanations into
several types, two of the most prominent being what he calls
semantic and scientific explanations.
make clear a meaning.

Semantic explanations

Scientific explanations supply other

kinds of understanding, mostly "reasons why."

The explana

tions which Jones is undertaking in this essay probably have
characteristics of both kinds of explanations.

Kaplan would

then call them "interpretations," but in this study it is
important to distinguish the two types.
The reason why the distinction must be made is that,
according to Kaplan's discussion of the two types of explan
ation, semantic explanation is a perlocutionary act, and
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scientific explanation is an illocutionary act.

Since a

study of the explaining acts in the essay support the idea
that illocutionary and perlocutionary explaining take place
and since this study is devoted to illocutionary acts, then
the two must be kept separate.

Kaplan shows the difference

when he says that semantic explanation must be clear, but
scientific explanation must only be true.

In other words,

semantic explanation must produce the perlocutionary effect
of clarification, but scientific explanation can be success
ful whether or not it succeeds in clarifying an idea for an
audience.
having an

As Kaplan says, "There is a difference between
20
explanation and seeing it."
One need only

"have" a scientific explanation.

Converted into speech-act

terminology, this distinction means that the semantic ex
planation is a perlocutionary act, and the scientific ex
planation is an illocutionary act.

In Jones's essay, then,

most of the explanations seem intended to "clarify" or per
form a perlocutionary act.

Both Austin and Searle point

out that many illocutionary acts are characterized by the
perlocutionary intent.

An

illocutionary act with the in

tent to clarify is illustrating or exemplifying.

For the

acts seemingly intended to clarify, I shall use the terms
exemplify and define.

Other acts of explanation where Jones

seems to be engaged in a kind of scientific explanation I
shall call "accounting for."
Now, the act of exemplifying seems to be felicitous
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when the audience understands that the speaker is supplying
information intended to clarify a generalization.

Webster*s

New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "exemplify" and "illus
trate" are "comparable when they mean to use in speaking or
writing concrete instances or cases to make clear something
which is difficult, abstract, general, or remote from ex
perience or to serve as an instance, case, or demonstration
of a point or matter under examination."

"Exemplify," it

adds, "implies the use of examples for clarification of a
general or abstract statement or as an aid in revealing the
truth of a proposition or assertion."

The audience may not

find that the act produces clarification, but it must under
stand the speaker's intent.

In accounting for, on the other

hand, the audience recognized the speaker's intent to supply
reasons and his belief that he can supply valid reasons.
Both of these acts are usually performed in more than one
sentence, the act consisting of the generalization or the
statement of the phenomenon and then the concrete detail or
specific reasons.

In other words, exemplifying commits the

speaker to supplying examples intended to secure the perlo
cutionary effect of clarification, whereas accounting for
commits him to supplying reasons or causes for the existence
of something.
In paragraph 2, then, the first sentence, a master
speech act, commits Jones to accounting for Emerson's lack
of popularity, but far more is going on than the simplest
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understanding of the master speech act would indicate.

In

the first place, Jones is stating and opining, acts which
seem to underlie most explaining.
is commending and deprecating.

In the second place, he

Now, the acts of commending

and deprecating have certain characteristics common to all
members of Austin's class of behabitives.

Austin says,

"Behabitives include the notion of reaction to other peo
ple's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expres
sions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or immi21
nent conduct."
He adds, "There are obvious connexions
with both stating or describing what our feelings are and
expressing, in the sense of venting our feelings, though
22
behabitives are distinct from both of these."
Austin
seems to mean that behabitives will not be mere exclamations,
but he also seems to imply that the propositional content
will be limited in a way which will distinguish the behabitive from other speech acts.

He gives as examples words

like "thank," "apologize," and "welcome."

In the essay,

however, the behabitive act will seldom be as simple as the
acts which Austin describes.

Instead, it will usually be

the secondary act in a compound act.
Taking commending for an example, one has the sen
tence in the first paragraph:

"I take some pleasure in re

membering that the title of these lectures was:
ral History of the Intellect.'"

'The Natu

Here, as I demonstrated

already using the explicit formula, one has a statement plus

126

the force of praising or commending.

Vebster 's New Diction

ary of Synonyms defines "commend" as a synonym of "recom
mend," "applaud," and "compliment," saying that they "are
comparable when they mean to voice or otherwise manifest to
others one's warm approval."

This source adds that commend

"usually implies judicious or restrained praise, but it sug
gests as its motive a desire to call attention to the merits
of a person or a thing."

Obviously, as Austin points out

about all behabitives, the sincerity condition is especially
important.

The audience must believe that the speaker is

sincere if it accepts his intent to call attention to the
merits of the thing commended.
On the other hand, "deprecate" means, like its syn
onym "disapprove," "to feel or to express an objection to
or condemnation of a person or thing."

It "stresses the

implication of regret, frequently profound, occasionally
diffident or apologetic."
sentence:

In paragraph 8, one finds this

"There is with us a set of persons called Demo

crats, some of them in office, and another set of persons
calling themselves Republicans, not so many of whom are in
office, but neither you nor I nor more competent observers
can define the philosophic difference between these sets of
persons in terms that will really make sense."

In the con

text of the paragraph, this sentence is used to express
Jones's objection to a two-party system where no differences
separate the parties and to express his regret at this state

127

of affairs.

The sentence is used in a compound act, con

sisting actually of three acts— stating, comparing (to be
discussed later), and deprecating.

In performing this last

act, the speaker is obviously committing himself to a sin
cere objection to the absence of a real difference of
political principles separating Republicans from Democrats.
In paragraph 2 and then in paragraph 3, the thrust
of commending and deprecating is conveyed in interesting
ways.

The last sentence in paragraph 2 follows:

"All it

[transcendentalism] has is imagination and insight."

This

is the sentence which turns the force of the paragraph to
commendation of Emerson's views and deprecation of those who
criticize him.

His views possess the merits of imagination

and insight; his critics do not understand that possessing
imagination and insight will atone for other weaknesses.
One's understanding of this sentence depends on one's under
standing of understatement as well as on one's understanding
that enough imagination and insight will compensate for any
other weakness.

In paragraph 3, one finds understatement

and an apparent paradox.

The paradox is that in a society

with a certain vision of good as its ideal the only person
with that vision of good is condemned.

The discussion of

understatement and paradox is deferred to the fourth section
of this chapter, where devices such as these will be dis
cussed as conventional force indicators.

Here it is suffi

cient to see that Jones regrets that a view as close to the
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American ideal as Emerson's should be criticized in America
and by reverse implication commends this view.
Paragraph 4, in addition to being a part of the unit
of speech acts controlled by the master act in paragraph 2,
is a fine example of the complexity which makes exhaustive
analysis virtually impossible.

The paragraph begins with a

master speech act which operates within the framework of the
act in paragraph 2, it contains its quota of statements and
opinions, it defines, it exemplifies, and it commends and
deprecates.

The paragraph follows:

A third reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that
he was a liberal.
A liberal, says the Oxford Dictionary,
is favorable to changes and reforms tending in the direc
tion of democracy.
Emerson favored these changes.
How
ever, liberalism is dead^
It is not merely dead, it was
mistaken.
Mr. Wallace's failure to create a liberal
party in this country is proof. The latest British elec
tion, which again buried the liberal party, is proof.
The liberal point of view in economics is wrong.
The
liberal point of view in history, or rather the point of
view of liberal historians, is wrong.
These historians
denounced Talleyrand,® but Talleyrand was a force for
stability.
They attacked Metternich,7 but Metternich
was a force for order.
I am afraid Emerson was a lib
eral; that is, he assumed that man might amount to some
thing by and by if he would but consult his better self,
and that men, taken individually, might improve them
selves, so to speak, into a democratic state.
This is
the American dream which, through the Voice of America,
we are broadcasting round the world, particularly into
darkest Russia.
I am not a politician, merely a literary
man, and I cannot explain this contradiction.
Wallace's:
Henry Agard Wallace (1888-1965; secre
tary of agriculture, 1933-1940; vice-president, 19411945; unsuccessful Progressive Party candidate for presi
dent, 1948).
®Talleyrand:
Charles Maurice de TalleyrandPerigord, Prince de B€n6vent (1754-1838; French states
man ).
7Metternich:
Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar
von Metternich (1773-1859; Austrian statesman).

129

The sentence following the master speech act which begins
the act of accounting for defines.

Jones feels the neces

sity to tell what a liberal is, since one reason for Emer
son's lack of popularity is that he is a liberal.

The

phrase, "says the Oxford Dictionary," shows that this ut
terance is intended to define.

Now, Austin lists "define"

as an expositive, and like exemplifying, it is a type of
explaining intended to clarify.

The word "define," The

Random House Dictionary of the English Language says, means
"to state or set forth the meaning of" and "to explain the
nature or essential qualities of; describe."

The second of

these definitions seems the one which most exactly corre
sponds to the act being performed in the utterance of the
second sentence.

Jones is giving the "essential qualities"

of the liberal, as they are given in the Oxford Dictionary.
He is also, however, quoting, the original speech act of
defining having been performed by the editors of the dic
tionary.

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "quote"

with "cite" and "repeat."

They share the meaning, "to speak

or write again something already said or written by an
other."

According to this source, "Quote usually implies

a use of another's words, commonly with faithful exactness
or an attempt at it."

Here the purpose is to give a gener

ally accepted definition of the word "liberal."

Quoting

does not commit Jones to accepting this definition.

In

deed, in sentence 11, Jones propounds his own definition.
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It does not contradict the first one, but it turns the term
"liberal" into an expression of strong commendation, and in
the next sentence he shows that the liberal is actually
only a man committed to the American dream.

Here, Jones is

not quoting but attempting to set forth the "essential
qualities of."
Going back to the intent in the master speech act,
one needs then to see that the entire paragraph is an act
of accounting for, but that accounting for proceeds by a
complex of acts.
the statement,
mistaken."

After defining comes arguing.

One finds

"It [liberalism] is not merely dead, it was

In the next two sentences, Jones gives "proof."

Now, the "proof" works to some extent as an indication that
liberalism may be dead:

Wallace's defeat and the defeat of

the liberal party in Britain do indicate that the state of
the party is not healthy, though they do not necessarily
indicate that it is dead.

If these are supposed to show

that the party is "mistaken," the problem is even more
complicated.

Does defeat at the polls prove a party's

platform to be wrong?

However, the real thrust of the

argument comes when Jones says that the liberal historians
were wrong because they criticized Metternich and Talley
rand.

Few students of history give unqualified approval to

either of these men, and certainly a person committed like
Jones to the beliefs of Emerson could not be genuinely
praising two of the most reactionary figures in nineteenth-
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century Europe.

With the definition of "liberal" and its

association with the American dream, Jones shows that he
has indeed been arguing, but he has been arguing the oppo
site side from the literal expression in sentence 4.
Through the entire paragraph, Jones is commending and de
precating, and the act that begins as a simple explanation
controlled by a master speech act has been compounded and
complicated to give it a richness that Austin's and
Searle's one-sentence utterances do not even approach.
Arguing, one of the acts discovered in paragraph 4,
is another expositive, already mentioned as an act requir
ing more than a one-sentence utterance.

"Argue" is grouped

with "discuss," "debate," "dispute," "agitate" in Webster1s
New Dictionary of Synonyms, and it shares with them the
meaning "to discourse about something in order to arrive at
the truth or to convince others."

The very word "dis

course" suggests a longer than one-sentence utterance.
"Argue," in this source, "usually implies conviction and
the adducing of evidence or reasons in support of one's
cause or position."

The abridged Merriam-Webster adds to

the meaning "often heated adducing of reasons and evidence
in support of one's position."

In arguing, then, the

speaker commits himself to a conviction of the truth of the
side which he argues for, and he must be prepared to offer
evidence or reasons for this conviction.

In paragraph 4,

Jones is convinced that liberalism expresses the American
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dream, and he argues for this conviction by attempting to
make the other side look absurd by giving reasons why the
idea that liberalism is dead and mistaken are foolish.

In

paragraph 8, he argues the idea expressed in this state
ment:

"No such issue [Tory vs. Socialist] divides the

Republican state from the Democratic state."

He uses per

formatives like "I cite"— paragraph 10, saying, "I cite
these familiar facts only that you measure from what Massa
chusetts permitted in 1850 what California demands in 1950."
"Cite," listed with "quote," according to Webster *s "is
likely to stress the idea of mentioning for a particular
reason (as proof of a thesis or substantiation of a posi
tion taken)."

In paragraph 10, then, devoted by the first

sentence to exemplifying, one has also the stated intent to
give reasons to back up a thesis.
Arguing proceeds from a variety of other speech acts,
acts which, by the way, become part of the act of arguing.
For example, Jones begins paragraph 12 with an evaluation:
"I suppose the greatest president Harvard had in the nine
teenth century was Charles W. Eliot."

In the paragraph he

then proceeds to argue for his evaluation of Eliot.

He

also argues to show that he is right in condemning the
political and educational systems of the country:
he detects "a failure of nerve."

in them,

He argues for the thing

which he advocates when he quotes Mrs. Roosevelt in para
graph 27.

Arguing, then, winds through the essay, but,
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because of the obvious intent to persuade, it is subtly
intertwined with other acts.
Before discussing advocating and evaluating and
analyzing one of the later paragraphs in the essay, it
seems important here to mention an act which forms part of
exemplifying and arguing in many instances.
comparing.

The act is

Webster*s New Encyclopedia of Synonyms places

"comparing'1 with "contrasting" and "collating" and defines
the three verbs as "to set two or more things side by side
in order to show likenesses and differences."

Of "com

pare," it says, "Compare implies as an aim the showing of
relative values or excellences or a bringing out of char
acteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent;
contrast implies as the aim an attempt to emphasize their
differences; thus, one may compare the movement of the
Odyssey with that of the Aeneid to arrive at their distinc
tive qualities; one may thereupon contrast the buoyancy and
rapidity of the one with the stateliness and dignity of the
other."

Now, comparing is an act that can occur without

speech, but in the essay it involves the "relating" of
"characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or di
vergent."

It takes place, like other expositives, "in acts

of exposition involving the expounding of views, the con
ducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of
references."

For comparing to take place there must be the

intent on the part of the speaker to place relative values
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or characteristics side by side and show their likenesses
or differences.

This action would seldom be performed as

an end in itself, however, in an essay.

It would be per

formed in arguing or in some kind of explaining or in ad
vocating, or at least this is the case in "The Iron
String."

For example, paragraph 8 is controlled by the

master speech act which ends paragraph 7:

"Let me briefly

discuss four examples of the drive for conformity— two from
politics, two from education."

The first two sentences

seem to indicate that simple exemplifying will take place:
The British election shows what a genuine two-party
system is— a system in which there is a fundamental
philosophic difference.
In Great Britain that issue
lies between the Socialist state and the Tory state.
However, the next sentence begins a comparison of the
British system with the American system which still seems
to have as its primary aim to exemplify but with the added
aim to argue.
sentence:

The intent to compare appears in this one

"No such issue divides the Republican state from

the Democratic state."

Here Jones is comparing the Ameri

can system to the British system, but he is also heading
for a comparison of the two parties in America.
cludes his comparison,

He con

"Almost nothing could be more comic,

if it were not so tragic, than to watch the Republicans
hunting for somebody who will tell them what to do— a party
in search of a platform.

The only thing just as comic and

just as tragic is the Democrats hunting for somebody who
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will tell them what they have done— a platform in search of
a party."

Here, comparing has been used in exemplifying

and in arguing.

In paragraph 9 Jones compares the politi

cal fates of Wallace and McMahon in order to advance his
argument and to exemplify.

In paragraphs 12 and 13 he com

pares President Eliot of Harvard with President Hutchins of
Chicago in order to show that his evaluation will lead to
advocacy of a certain educational system.

In paragraph 9,

he "cites" "familiar facts" from the life of Thoreau as
part of his argument against the loyalty oath demanded of
California professors.

Obviously, comparing has been per

formed in order to satisfy the conditions for felicity of
other acts— in order to provide reasons for, examples of,
or assessments of.

In the essay, it is then a peculiarly

semi-dependent act.
In this essay, advocating or urging— to use the term
which Austin uses in his list of expositives— seems closely
tied to evaluating.

Jones urges a course of action which

he has evaluated and concluded to be worthwhile.

The re

lationship between the two is supported by Austin’s classi
fication of the two acts.

As a "verdictive," evaluating is

"the giving of a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury,
23
arbitrator, or umpire."
Urging, on the other hand, as an
exercitive is "the giving of a decision in favour of or
24
against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it."
For the verdictive, according to Austin, the decisions
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"need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate,
25
a reckoning, or appraisal."
The verdictive "is essen
tially giving a finding as to something— fact, or value—
26
which is for different reasons hard to be certain about."
In uttering the exercitive, the speaker is taking the ver
dictive and acting on it:

"Its [the exercitive's] conse

quences may be that others are ’compelled' or 'allowed' or
27
'not allowed' to do certain acts.”
The acts which the
speaker is compelling others to perform in uttering an
exercitive is an act appraised as good and expressed in a
verdictive.

Now, it is not necessary to the act of urging

or to any exercitive that the speaker choose to back it
because he evaluates it as superior to other acts.
advocate an act purely out of self-interest.

He may

The act which

he advocates or urges may be chosen through his appraisal
of the worth of the action, however, and this is the rela
tionship which one finds in "The Iron String."
Evaluating is an act performed in a number of places
in the essay.

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms places

"evaluate" with "estimate," "appraise," "value," "rate,"
and "assess," and it defines them as "to judge a thing with
respect to its worth."

It continues, "Evaluate.

. .sug

gests an intent to arrive at a mathematically correct
judgment" but seldom one given in monetary terms.

In

other words, when he evaluates, a speaker commits himself
to a verdict concerning the worth of something.

His
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utterance "counts as" his assessment of its worth.

He is

not committed to a demonstration of the reasons for his
evaluation:
worth.
larity.

he must merely show "intent to determine" its

Evaluating and opining have then a certain simi
Neither is verifiable in the sense that a state

ment is verifiable.

Evaluating is not verifiable, however,

because it is practiced in an area where certainty is never
more than what value judgments are capable of.

Opining is

performed in areas where truth and falsity are theoreti
cally possible:

the speaker is willing to rely on his

personal decision concerning truth or falsity, either be
cause verifiable statements are difficult to arrive at or
because he feels that they are unnecessary.

In addition,

evaluating has similarities to deprecating and commending.
Austin recognizes that the behabitive can come close to
giving a verdict.

I have defined deprecating and commend

ing by limiting them to "expressing" approval or disapprov
al.

In evaluating, on the other hand, the speaker is

"judging."

One finds in this essay, then, utterances with

some evaluative force like this one in paragraph 5:

"That

somewhat frightened conservative, Matthew Arnold, came here
in the eighties to lecture us about culture."

The primary

force of this utterance is stating, but the phrase "some
what frightened conservative" gives a value judgment of
Arnold.

In paragraph 9, Jones says, "I wonder what Emerson

would tell us here about a foolish consistency, that
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hobgoblin of little minds."

Here, by quoting Emerson,

Jones gives his evaluation of the conformity in government
policies in his own day.

In paragraphs 12 and 13, he

evaluates Eliot and Hutchins.
uates the Great Books Program.

In paragraph 14, he eval
Paragraph 17 is largely

evaluative, the argument showing how the judgment is
weighed and arrived at.

The paragraph begins, "In each

case, of course, there is something

to be said for conform

ity."

gives his verdict:

Evaluating conformity, Jones

the

conformity necessary for a coalition government to survive
is good, but the conformity that makes the government a
"Papa knows best" institution is not good.
Paragraph 18 is an interesting example of defining
and evaluating, both of these secondary acts to

stating,

The paragraph follows:
Honor is not manufactured by printed forms to
be taken before a notary public; it is a function of
manly self-respect— and it is a mark of the time that
I feel almost apologetic for using so old-fashioned a
phrase.
The notion of standardized wisdom--so many
parts of Plato, T s o many parts of Newton,28 so many
parts of M i l t o n , ® do not shake before taking— is a
product of this same loss of nerve.
It reveals hurry
and distrust— hurry, because when you have invented
the formula, you can push the product through to its
shaping, faster; distrust, because when you substitute
uniformity of pattern for equality of individuals, you
transfer your belief from the individuals to the pat
tern.
A belated Emersonian, I am still, in things of
the spirit, for the individual.
Robert Frost^O re
minds us that a one-man revolution is the only revolu
tion that is coming.
27Plato: (c. 427-347 B.C.; Greek philosopher).
28jjewton:
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727; English
physicist and mathematician).
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^Milton:
John Milton (1608-1674; English poet).
30Robert Frost:
(1874-1963; American poet).
The first sentence is used to state and to define.

The

first part of the sentence tells what honor is not and the
second part gives one attribute.

The third part of the

sentence deprecates a prevailing attitude in which an apol
ogy for holding this definition is necessary.

The third

sentence is used partly to define "standardized wisdom."
It is also an evaluation:

"Standardized wisdom" itself

must be bad since it results from "loss of nerve."

The

next sentence is used to argue for the idea that the trust
in "standardized wisdom" reveals loss of nerve.
Jones gives his verdict:

Finally,

he is not for "standardized wis

dom," but for the individual.

In the last sentence, when

he quotes Robert Frost, he is evaluating any movement based
on standardization and finding it wanting.
As I indicated earlier, evaluating and urging go
together in this essay.

In paragraph 7, Jones shows this

relationship, and finally in paragraph 27, he clinches it.
He quotes Mrs. Roosevelt:

"Have we really reached the

point where we must fear to join any group because at some
time or other a person of Communist leanings, or supposed
Communist leanings, might also join it?
thing and we should be ashamed of it."

That is a terrible
Jones shares this

evaluation, and he adds, "I do not think it is too late in
the history of the republic, whether in education or in
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politics, to believe that Emerson is still the most excel
lent spiritual catalyst we have in a democracy."

Now, a

catalyst is an agent effecting change of which it is not
itself a part.
deprecating.

Jones is then not only evaluating and
He is attempting to "revalidate an old Har

vard custom— the custom of dissent."

In doing that he is

urging or advocating.
Webster1s New Dictionary of Synonyms defines "urge"
along with "egg, exhort, goad, spur, prod, prick, sic" to
mean "to press or impel to action, effort, or speed."
"Urge," it says, "implies the exertion of influence or
pressure either from something or someone external or from
something within (as the conscience or the heart); specif
ically it suggests an inciting or stimulating to or toward
a definite end (as greater speed or a prescribed course or
objective) often against the inclinations or habits of the
one urged."
"advise."

Urging seems to come close to Searle's use of
There is no necessity, however, for the thing

advocated to be in the best interest of the person who is
urged.

The speaker must merely favor the desired change

or action, and his utterance must count as the exertion of
influence to cause the hearer to change or act.

The

speaker's statement of intent need be no more explicit
than Jones's in paragraph 7:

he is attempting to "revali

date" an idea and a custom which have all but disappeared.
Probably, in the essay written for the type of audience
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which Jones was interested in addressing, the urging would
usually be this subtle.
Up to this point in this essay, I have, then, dis
covered a complex of illocutionary forces conveyed in a
variety of ways.

Jones, I have concluded, has stated,

opined, argued, accounted for, exemplified, defined, com
pared, and defined, thus performing acts classed as expos
itives; deprecated and commended, performing acts classi
fied as behabitives; evaluated, performing an act classed
as a verdictive; and urged, performing an exercitive.

Fur

ther analysis might disclose more acts, as some utterances
yield not one or two but as many as three or four acts
piled on each other.

Such analysis seems unnecessary to

demonstrate that this essay is indeed a complex utterance
of a series of compound illocutionary acts.

Certainly, in

teaching the essay, the analysis would have to stop at this
point or even sooner if the freshman student is not to be
come hopelessly lost in the maze of interrelated acts.

The

question which remains, before I proceed to further enum
eration of force indicators, is not, then, how many more
acts can be discovered but whether these acts are felici
tously performed.
In Chapter III I concluded that the conditions for
the felicitous performance of an act must specify the
speaker's intentions, his assessment of the hearer's know
ledge and desires, the position of the speaker as the
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proper person to perform the act, and the extent to which
the speaker obligates himself.

The conditions summarized

in Appendix II specify these elements, all of which must
be satisfied if these acts are to be felicitous.

Now, the

first real test is the extent to which the audience accords
"uptake" to the speaker.

By the fact that I have been able

to isolate these acts, one can conclude tentatively that
they are felicitously performed.

If I have recognized the

speaker's intent, the extent to which he has obligated him
self in each act, and his position as the proper person to
perform the act, then the acts appear to be felicitous.
For example, I have distinguished between the commitment
of the author when he states and when he opines, when he
evaluates and when he commends, when he argues and when he
accounts for.

However, I may have read his signals wrong,

and his intent in some cases may have been different.
conclusion is definite:

Jones stands In the proper posi

tion to perform the acts which he is performing.
one assumes that a man of

One

Again,

his reputation would only per

form these acts sincerely, that Austin's dictum that a
man's word is his bond would apply.

Certainly, we rarely

read a serious nonfiction work unless we have some reason
to trust the author as a person capable of committing him
self in the proper way in the acts which he performs.
Further testing of the extent to which I have interpreted
the acts correctly or given the proper "uptake" will come
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in the next section, when I turn again to force indicators.
IV
Having tentatively identified the illocutionary acts
performed in the essay by using the explicit formula and my
intuitive grasp of the nature

of these acts, I next tried

to study in more detail the other indicators.

This part of

the study, I felt, would reenforce or correct my assumption
concerning the acts performed and, at the same time, ex
plore the nature of these indicators.

The indicators which

were not discussed in Part III are verb forms besides the
explicit performative formula, connecting particles, ad
verbs, word order, and punctuation.

In addition, rhetori

cal devices function in conventional ways, and occasionally
the author simply states his intention to perform a certain
act.
The verb in the independent clause is the one which
must be examined for illocutionary force, since it comes
directly from the speaker and carries his full intent.
Verbs in dependent clauses may carry the force of an utter
ance which the speaker is quoting, but the verb in the main
clause, or, in transformational terminology, in the matrix,
is the key to the speaker's primary intent.

In Part III

the verbs occurring in the explicit performative form have
already been used as the first indication of the basic
force of the essay.

The mood of the verbs supplies another
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indication.

The use of indicative mood supports the idea

that stating and asserting are basic acts, but since almost
any force can be expressed with the indicative mood, this
indicator alone is ambiguous and uncertain.

In three

places the mood becomes imperative with the form "let me."
Again, in paragraph 19, the following sentence contains the
imperative mood:

"If all you want to do is to train the

young, establish your pattern— Great Books, General Educa
tion, call it what you will— and the training may be admir
able."

In the following paragraph, the imperative occurs

twice:

"Ask any Harvard graduate" and "ask him who taught

him."

When one examines these three instances of the use

of the imperative, one sees that this mood by itself as an
indicator is little more help than the indicative mood.
As force indicators, the "let me" constructions have no
real request intent.

Here, the best explanation for the

utterances in which they occur is that they are master
speech acts in the sense in which Fotion uses the term.
In paragraph 7, one finds "Let us briefly discuss.
paragraph 11, "Let us turn.

.

in

. ." (meaning "let us discuss");

and "let me briefly contrast.

. ."

According to Fotion,

the "let me/us" would become the formula governing the
speech act in the single-sentence utterance and the rest of
the sentence the content governing the sentences which fol
low.

An explanation by Chungmin Lee in a recent article,

"Embedded Performatives," contains a similar explanation,
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one which perhaps accounts better for the "let us" portion
of the utterance.

Lee shows that in a construction using

"let" and a performative verb, as in "Let me briefly dis
cuss.

. ." the "let me," may function as a "sign of defer28
ence."
The "let me," according to Lee, has no illocu
tionary force.

With either explanation, the act functions

as a detached indicator.

Considering the sentence in para

graph 19 out of context, one would conclude that the force
is advising:

the "if" clause suggests that one try the

performative formula, "I advise that.

. ." and it works.

In

context, the sentence becomes merely a summing up of the
basic difference which Jones wants to show between training
and educating, and it secures the "uptake" of an opinion.
In the "ask" constructions, the requesting force disappears
as one sees that the use is merely another way of express
ing condition:

"if you ask any Harvard graduate" is actu

ally what Jones is saying.

The whole sentence becomes

again an expression of an opinion, and the mood of the verb
is seen as an indicator which needs help from others if it
is to function clearly.
Certain verbs in themselves carry considerable force
even when they are not used in the explicit formula or
would not fit in the formula.

An example is the verb seem.

In paragraph 3, the following sentence occurs:

"It seems

that Herman Melville had a vision of evil in Moby Dick,
that Nathaniel Hawthorne had a vision of evil in The
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Scarlet Letter, and that Henry James had a vision of evil
in The Turn of the Screw."
and to account for.

The sentence is used to state

By the very word seem itself, however,

Jones is indicating that he is not stating a belief that he
is committed to but one that others hold.

By using the im

personal "it" as subject, he reenforces this idea and sug
gests that those who hold the belief may not be willing to
support their opinions with their names.

The attempt to

interpret the verb seem shows again that one must constant
ly remember that vagueness and uncertainty inflict all in
dicators unless they are used in a context where the con
text and other indicators support them.
The connecting particles make an interesting list.
One might argue that every conjunction has a part in con
veying the force of the utterance.

The words which connect

independent clauses and provide transitions between sen
tences are probably the most important because of their
contribution to the effect of context on each utterance.
In this list, therefore, connecting particles are limited
to conjunctions connecting independent clauses, subordinate
conjunctions connecting dependent clauses to independent
clauses, and transition words between sentences and para
graphs.

Subordinate conjunctions which introduce noun

clauses and ones which occur in adverb clauses which are
embedded in peculiar ways in other clauses will not be
marked because the importance of these as force indicators
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is not clear.
Looking at these as a list of words out of context
one sees that, alone, each one is ambiguous and uncertain.
Put into a context, the most neutral of them gains explic
itness.

For example, in paragraph 1, "however" emphasizes

the change from one level of popularity to another, thus
contributing to the overall force of the paragraph utter
ance.

The use of "and" in the second sentence of paragraph

2 is significant.

This conjunction is the kind of neutral

term which stating and most kinds of explaining demand.
Two ideas are combined using "and" with no indication that
one is more important than the other.

Through the entire

paragraph, there is only one subordinate clause, since "as
we owlishly say" functions as an interrupter and will be
listed here as an

adverbial phrase.

The use of short

simple sentences and compound sentences with the clauses
joined by "and" indicates that the author is merely piling
one detail on another, and it makes the final sentence,
which at first seems only to add another idea, hit with
double force when the reader sees that it has more to do
than to state and account for.

The use of the word now in

paragraph 9 shows the uncertainty which afflicts the word
indicator with no help from the other indicators.
first one— "Now I do not care.
ment force of the utterance.

The

. ."— emphasizes the state
The second— "Now that the

situation has worsened"— is an indication of time sequence.
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Both are valuable connective words in explanations, but
they do not function in the same way.

On the other hand,

a cursory reading of the list indicates that the kind of
words needed to make the relationships between statements
and utterances in an explanation clear is

present.

When

Jones argues in paragraphs 16-20, he begins to use "but"
and "if" with considerable frequency.

Both indicate that

opposing sides will be given.
Several adverbs are used in an interesting way.
of these is "merely."
essay.

One

This word occurs six times in the

When it occurs, Jones is deprecating his own abil

ity and his own views.

Now, deprecating may be an illocu

tionary act itself, but here it is an act used "for some
thing."

The "for something" is the establishing of the

persona in order to praise and condemn.
discussed below under rhetorical devices.

This use will be
"Only" is used

nine times, three times as an adjective and six times as
an adverb.

The adjectival use adds emphasis to the force

of utterances in

some contexts:

paragraph 8— the "only

thing"; paragraph 14— "only great readers of books"; para
graph 22— "only opportunity." Austin, one recalls, mentions
that some indicators do not change the force but merely
give emphasis to it.

When "only" is used as an adverb, it

means "merely" in this essay, and again Jones is deprecat
ing his own actions and views.

Then "all" is used in the

second and third paragraphs, not as an adverb but with the

149

sense in the context of "only” or "merely."

Here again the

effect is deprecatory.
Unusual word order seems to convey force in several
ways.

In some sentences, the indirect quotation is handled

with an interrupter such as "he said."

This word order

emphasizes that Jones is quoting Emerson.

In paragraph 7,

one finds a sentence such as "Long may it be so."

Para

phrased this becomes, "I hope that it may be so for a long
time."

The hope is almost a prayer, but the illocutionary

force is still commending.
sentence:

In paragraph 9, one finds this

"Mr. Wallace is on the political left and must

therefore be intrinsically wrong; Senator McMahon is an
administration Democrat, and must therefore be intrinsi
cally right."

The repetition of the pattern in the two

clauses makes nonsense of the conclusions, thus adding to
the praise and blame force of the utterance.

Paragraph 14

is largely composed of rhetorical questions:

"But why a

library?"
book?"

"Why is bookishness a virtue?"

"What is a great

The reader answers for himself as Jones wants him

to answer.

Most important, he realizes that Jones is argu

ing against the Great Books Program and condemning those
who would pour in knowledge and expect to turn out an
educated man.
The use of the rhetorical question leads into the
whole question of the use of traditional rhetorical devices
or the linguistic techniques of persuasive discourse as
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illocutionary force indicators.

Searle gives as the pre

paratory condition for a genuine act of questioning that
the speaker must not know the answer which he is asking
for.

Since, in this essay, Jones obviously knows the an

swers to the questions which he asks, the questions are
rhetorical and the sort of utterance that Austin labels
"for something."

Such questions along with similes, under

statement, antithesis, apostrophe, hyperbole, and (in some
lists) as many as a hundred and fifty others
tional rhetorical devices.

are tradi

Austin would consider all of

these to be usages "for something" besides the performance
of the act which each seems to perform.

An example of

understatement or litotes, for example, will appear to
state but actually perform another act, often an act of
praising.

Now, most rhetorical devices have been consid

ered as persuasive devices and therefore tied to the perlocutionary act, if one tries to fit them into speech-act
theory.

They are, however, conventional in

one sense and

on one level, and they certainly can be used to indicate
illocutionary force.

Turning first to the conventional

nature of these devices, one sees that they originally are
used, in most cases, in unique ways, but to the sophisti
cated user of the language many of them are

just as con

ventional as the customary word order of the language.

To

the less sophisticated, rhetorical devices will remain
literal expressions.

The thesis here is that even the most
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subtle rhetorical device becomes conventional if it is in
the repertoire of the speaker and the audience.
Certainly, these uses of language "for something"
in "The Iron String" help to indicate the force of the
utterances.
1:

A critical sentence is this one from paragraph

"In view of this history I take some pleasure in remem

bering that the title of these lectures was:
History of the Intellect.’"

’The Natural

Jones’s pleasure here results

from his use of this title in an ironical way to describe
the history of Emerson's reputation.

One has the manipula

tion of utterances to produce irony, or the use of language
"for something":

Jones takes pleasure in order to make an

ironic assessment of the fickleness of people.

This under

standing rests on the ability of the audience to pick up
certain conventional clues.

The clues are the word some

and the position of the sentence in relation to others in
the essay.

The word some understates in a subtle way which

directs attention to the title.

The position of the sen

tence demands that the reader think about the reasons why
the title gives pleasure to the speaker:

nothing in the

previous sentence has prepared the reader to anticipate
that this title will give pleasure to the speaker.

In

stead, the previous sentences have been flat statements of
fact.

Taking the speaker seriously when he says he takes

pleasure, the reader then must look for his reason.

It can

only lie in an ironical twisting of the meaning of the
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title to apply to the history of Emerson's ideas or to the
fact that Emerson has greater insight into the intellect
than his detractors.

By using words "for something" in

this sentence, the speaker has conveyed his praise of Emer
son, and in so doing he has performed an illocutionary act.
The final sentence of paragraph 2 and sentence 6 in
paragraph 3 use understatement as a conventional device for
conveying the author’s approval of Emerson.

The final sen

tence in paragraph 2 can be rephrased as follows:
only imagination and insight."

"It has

Sentence 6, rephrased,

reads "He has only a vision of good."

Obviously, the read

er will feel that "imagination and insight" and "a vision
of good" are not small and unimportant attributes.
stated, they loom larger than ever.

Under

Again, it is necessary

for the audience to understand this use of "all" and the
reason for understatement.

If the audience does have this

understanding, then the use functions as an illocutionary
force indicating device to enable the speaker to praise.
In paragraph 3, the repetition of "vision of evil"
seven times and the apparent paradox signal to the audience
that Jones is condemning those who praise a writer for hav
ing a vision of evil to the point where he makes them ri
diculous.

To the reader who is so unsophisticated that he

sees nothing strange about the use of this phrase in the
same construction seven times in one paragraph, this repe
tition will convey no idea except that each of the writers
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mentioned had a "vision of evil."

The discovery that Amer

icans condemn Emerson for holding the view that is suppos
edly the cornerstone of their system is only an apparent
paradox.

It conveys to the reader the ridiculousness of

the criticism of Emerson.

Here one has, then, conventional

uses which are conventional only to users of the language
of a certain sophistication.

They seem, however, to be

fully as conventional as the use of the "assertive link."
All speakers of the language would be expected to recognize
the function of "is," but only one large group would recog
nize the use of repetition as Jones has used it in "The
Iron String."
Another device which Jones uses in these first para
graphs is his adoption of a persona.
unassuming, modest.

He becomes ingenuous,

He is "merely a literary historian,"

"merely a literary man," and "not a theologian."

Again,

the sophisticated reader is assisted in detecting the force
which Jones wishes to convey.

He is not "merely" anything

in this essay; he is the authority giving his opinion to
students.

In other words, he is employing the "Plain

Folks" technique, a technique for performing perlocutionary
acts, in order to show the real thrust of his support for
Emerson's ideas.
These uses with their rlJtorical appeal definitely
have perlocutionary effect.
suading.

They are all useful in per

This fact does not seem to destroy them as
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illocutionary devices.

The reader who does not understand

these uses will miss both perlocutionary and illocutionary
reactions.

In other words, a native speaker may grasp con

ventions on two levels.

On the lowest level, he will mere

ly understand illocutionary acts performed simply with no
hint of the use of language "for something."

On the high

est level, he will have in his language repertoire a set of
conventions which convey illocutionary force at the same
time that they aim to secure a perlocutionary effect, and
he will see in language used "for something" a complicated
way of bringing about the "uptake" of the illocution.

One

is reminded of Ohmann's discussion of irony in "Literature
as Act."

In the sentences discussed in paragraphs 1, 2,

and 3 and in the repetition of "vision of evil" in para
graph 3, the irony does result from the

author’s perform

ance of an infelicitous illocutionary act.
knows the conventions of the use of the

To a reader who

infelicitous act,

however, the infelicitous act is used to perform a felic
itous one.
A device which is so simple that it almost escapes
notice is the author's simple statement of intent, which
corresponds to Fotion*s master speech acts or "detached"
indicators.

Such a statement occurs in paragraphs 2-5.

Jones states that he is going to supply reasons for Emer
son's unpopularity.

In so doing, he is committing himself

to accounting for the act which he is performing.

Jones
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has not hesitated to tell his reader what he intends.
Punctuation is important as an indicator in several
striking instances.

The period, comma, and semicolon are

indicators chiefly in the sense that they do not call at
tention to any one force but direct the reader to other
signs.

The dash, on the other hand, seems to exist to call

attention to a force.

In eight places, the dash is used

instead of the comma to set off appositives.

These appos-

itives are in every case ones which add extra dimensions
to the words they explain, and thus they emphasize.

For

example, in paragraph 19, one finds the following:

"If all

you want to do is to train the young, establish your
pattern— Great Books, General Education, call it what you
will— and the training may be admirable."

Here Jones is

condemning Great Books, General Education, etc., as "pat
terns" for training.

Placing these in apposition to "pat

tern" and setting them off in dashes emphasize the pattern
quality which results in training, not education.

In three

places, the dashes signal interruptors, each of which is a
significant key to the author's attitude.

For example, in

paragraph 3, Jones sets off in dashes two lines from Emer
son's poem describing his son.

These lines occur in

Jones's listing of all the bad things which happened to
Emerson, and they emphasize that the death of his son, at
least, must have seemed to Emerson an evil.

Finally, the

dashes signal expressions, even clauses, which the author
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wishes to call attention to as being subtly worded ("a
party in search of a platform" and "a platform in search of
a party") or as expressing an idea which he feels has been
ignored in paragraph 18.

Exclamation marks are used for

sentences with the word order and structure of exclamatory
sentences in paragraph 21.

The utterances have the force

of statements, however.
After looking at these indicators, the reader is
struck more and more by several points.

In the first place,

an exhaustive list of force indicators in each category is
not possible.

Almost any word can be used to convey force

in a given context, and
same force.

few words consistently convey the

Instead of a list of indicators, one has sug

gestions concerning the positions and the functions of the
indicators.

The suggestions of Austin and Searle concern

ing the verb, connecting particles, adverbs, word order,
and punctuation (useful here only as an indicator of the
rhetorical question) are consistently helpful.

In addi

tion, conventional rhetorical devices and direct statements
of intentions, or master speech acts, sometimes direct the
reader to the intended force.

Certainly, the context of

every utterance provides the first important sign.
In the second place, the relationship between style
and illocutionary force seems apparent, though nebulous.
Beardsley, Ohmann, and even I. A. Richards, a critic who
has not used speech-act terminology, support the idea of
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29
a relationship between style and illocutionary force.

Is

illocutionary force to propositional content as style is to
content?

Or, in other words, is style merely the manipula

tion of illocutionary force indicating devices?

If one

sets out to study style apart from content, how does the
process which he uses differ from the process used in sep
arating illocutionary force indicating devices from the
basic indicators of propositional content?

It appears now

that the study of illocutionary force indicating devices
will not be as comprehensive as a study of style.

In addi

tion, a speaker or writer has considerable choice among
devices to convey the same force.

Until the extent to

which each word in a particular context conveys force is
known, or it can be shown that no two arrangements of words
or phrases can convey the same force, then one cannot
equate style and the way the author conveys force.

One

can, however, say that the way the author conveys illocu
tionary force is one aspect of his style.

Since he seems,

at the present time, to have a variety of ways to convey
the same force, this discovery will not prove a single
answer to the question of ways to distinguish between
styles.

A study of this relationship therefore is a sub

ject for further consideration,
V
In this chapter, I set out to describe my analysis
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of "The Iron String" as the performance of a complex series
of compound illocutionary acts in Beardsley's sense of the
word complex, assuming that, in this essay, Jones has ex
ploited "to a high degree the illocutionary act potential
of its verbal ingredients."

Stating, opining, accounting

for, exemplifying, defining, quoting, arguing, comparing,
commending, deprecating, evaluating, and urging assume
various degrees of importance in the essay as the "verbal
ingredients" from the simplest indicators to sophisticated
rhetorical devices convey force.

On the whole, evaluating

and advocating seem to control the other acts:

Jones is

continually evaluating one view of politics and one view of
education— in both cases views that discourage dissent— as
he urges that another view— one which encourages dissent—
be adopted.
pound.

Most of the utterances in the essay are com

If one considers, for example, as simple a sentence

as "There is a country called Russia" in paragraph 9, he
finds two acts being performed and the sentence forming
part of a third act.

Part of the speaker's understanding

comes from the context:

Jones is discussing "the drive for

conformity" as it is demonstrated in people's various views
toward Russia.

The sentence is used first to state:

"Russia is a country."

The word arrangement of the origi

nal shows another act— the deprecating of people who hold
certain views of Russia.

In other words, "I deprecate for

holding these views people who are so simplistic that they
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need to be told that there is a country called Russia."
The views of such people change as the man advocating them
changes, and the changes are the result of the ignorance
of the people.
lifying" act.

The utterance is also part of an "exemp
These compound acts are signalled by various

indicators, and each is constituted by rules.
Or, at least, this interpretation seems possible as
one analyzes "The Iron String" in terms of speech-act the
ory.
tion.

Certainly,

it is still merely a possible interpreta

The reader-judge cannot be certain of attaining the

objectivity which illocutionary act analysis promises.

He

cannot even be certain that the acts which he has isolated
are the only way to name the acts in the essay.

Using

speech-act theory to discover locutionary and illocutionary
acts, he hoped for certainty of the kind which should re
sult from knowing the rules of the language game.

This

certainty has not resulted, and this analysis of "The Iron
String" is no more than a beginning.
If it has been successful at all, however, the anal
ysis of "The Iron String" as a series of illocutionary acts
should make it easier to analyze other essays in the same
way, and the analysis of these should proceed more expedi
tiously.

In addition, analysis of other essays might show

a kind of pattern in the illocutionary acts performed in
the formal essay, if such a pattern exists.

In this essay,

I contend that Jones states, accounts for, opines, exemp
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lifies, defines, argues, compares, commends, praises, and
deprecates in order to urge the adoption of a position
which he has evaluated and found satisfactory.
Jones hopes to convince and persuade.

Probably

In addition, he may

perform other perlocutionary acts such as clarifying.

The

three essays discussed in the next chapter will be ex
plored, then, as a further test of the usefulness of this
theory in the study of the formal essay.

I will try to

see the illocutionary acts which are performed, the indi
cators which signal these acts, and the pattern which the
complex arrangement of acts forms.

CHAPTER V
THE FORMAL ESSAY AND AUSTIN'S JUDGE
If Austin is correct, a judge, a disinterested third
person, should be able to observe a speech act being per
formed by a speaker in the presence of a hearer and con
clude that certain locutionary and illocutionary acts have
been performed.

Searle, too, says that a sentence can con

tain all the indicators necessary to reveal the speech acts
performed by an utterance.

Since the writer of the essay

cannot rely on gestures, intonation, and stress as indica
tors, he can or should be expected to place in each sen
tence tangible clues to the force which he intends each
sentence to carry in the context of the essay.

Up to this

point in the study of the essay as a complex series of com
pound illocutionary acts, I have begun the analysis of an
essay with an attempt to grasp intuitively the nature of
the acts performed, the only really helpful criterion being
the explicit formula.

Now I can use with greater certainty

the indicators which Searle and Austin discuss because I
have found them in "The Iron String," and, in addition, I
have discovered indicators which they do not list.

If the

impartial judge can indeed tell what illocutionary acts are
being performed by hearing them performed, then I should be
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able to follow the writer's indicators to the same kind of
conclusion.

With each essay analyzed, I should become more

adept at interpreting indicators, and I should gain new in
sight into the way the individual illocutionary acts which
the author has performed relate to each other.
To continue this investigation, I have chosen three
essays:

"We Were Not Skeptical Enough" by Joseph Wood

Krutch; "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus; and
"Pornography and Censorship” by Irving Kristol.

I chose

these, first of all, because they are all found in recent
anthologies of essays used in freshman English classes;
thus they should be typical of the essays used in such
classes to explain expository techniques with the help of
traditional terminology.

Next, I considered the audience

for which each was first written.

By choosing an essay

treating a philosophical subject for a lay audience, an
other written for a literary publication like The Saturday
Review of Literature, and a third written for a newspaper
magazine like The New York Times Magazine, I felt that I
could insure that I had essays which employed a variety of
conventional indicators in order to reach a
readers.

variety of

Finally, I considered the extent to which each

essay remained close to Barbara Smith's "natural utterance"
such as a personal letter, which I discussed in Chapter IV.
Krutch's essay is written in the first person almost en
tirely, employing "I" or "we" as the subject of the main
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clause in all but seven sentences.

The other two essays

use the first person only a few times.

I hoped to move in

easy stages from an essay like "The Iron String," which was
originally a speech act in the truest sense, to an essay in
which the explicit performative formula would still be
found and finally to essays which used the first person
very seldom.

These last, I believe, remain "natural utter

ances," but their nature is not so obvious as the nature of
those essays which employ the first person extensively.
My discussion of these three essays, then, repre
sents further experimentation with the instruments of anal
ysis that I had applied to "The Iron String."

I hoped to

refine these instruments and develop them further.

My re

port of my experimentation with these essays will, there
fore, confirm what I had already learned from the analysis
of "The Iron String"; but I will stress the new things that
I learned from the application of speech-act analysis to
essays which, as I worked with them, I realized were in
certain ways very different from "The Iron String."

These

differences which I had grasped intuitively before I began
my analysis actually constitute a fourth reason for my
choice of these essays for my next application of speechact analysis.

I was increasingly aware of illocutionary

acts which are not found in Jones's essay and indicating
devices that Jones did not have occasion to use.

For ex

ample, in interpreting Krutch's essay, the reader is faced
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with the crucial problem of understanding the illocutionary
force or forces behind sentences explicitly referring to
the writer's "beliefs."

Similarly, in Angus's essay, even

the title indicates that a crucial illocutionary act will
be that of defining, an act which I touched on only very
briefly in my treatment of "The Iron String."
essay has been published in two versions.

Kristol's

A comparison of

the two versions provided me with an opportunity to study
how some of the changes that Kristol made influence the
ease with which the reader is able to make out the illocu
tionary forces operating in the essay.

Also, Angus's and

Kristol's essays are interesting because of their rich use
of verbs, adverbs, and punctuation as indicating devices.
Finally, in examining these essays, I raised with more
seriousness a question which I only touched on in examining
"The Iron String":

How well can Austin's impartial judge

see not only what illocutionary acts are being performed
but also whether they are being performed felicitously?

In

talking about these three essays, I will attempt a brief
answer to this question.
The process of analysis to be tested in this chapter
is basically the attempt to answer three questions:

(1)

What illocutionary acts are performed in each essay?
Are these acts successfully or felicitously performed?
What is the relationship of these acts to each other?

(2)
(3)
Be

cause the writers of these particular essays are successful
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professional writers, the assumption will be that the acts
are, in the main, felicitously performed.

Thus, the empha

sis in answering the second question will not be on finding
them unsuccessful for some obscure reason but on discover
ing the ways each satisfies the most important conditions
for success.

The first question will be answered by the

search for illocutionary force indicating devices in each
essay.

The ordinary reader of such an essay, if his read

ing completes a successful illocutionary act, will rely on
these indicators usually in a mechanical, unself-conscious
way as he interprets the sentences in the essay.

Here I

will consciously study the essay for the devices which
signal certain acts.

From a study of the indicators, I

should know what acts are performed and then be prepared to
test their felicity by the rules which constitute each as a
certain type of speech act.
The following devices, discussed in my preceding
chapter, will also be useful in the study of the three es
says analyzed here:
1. The context, including the circumstances of publica
tion, the relationship of each sentence to the oth
ers, and the relationship between paragraphs.
2. Master speech acts including detached indicating
devices such as titles.
3. Verbs— mood, tense, performatives.
4. Vocabulary— connecting particles, adverbs.
5. Punctuation.
6. Word order.
7. Rhetorical devices such as irony and understatement.
In the reading of each essay, any other indicators which
appear can be added to this list.
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I
In the short essay, ”We Were Not Skeptical Enough,"
Joseph Wood Krutch addresses an audience as wide as the
intended circulation of the anthology, This I Believe, in
which his essay first appeared.

The anthology, which is no

longer readily available, is described by the editors of
Patterns of Exposition, the college text in which Krutch's
essay is reprinted, as "a collection of philosophic obser1
vations from famous people."
(The essay from Patterns of
Exposition is reproduced in Appendix IV.)

In the essay,

"We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Krutch states that, though
young people of his generation thought that they were ex
tremely skeptical, in reality they "believed very firmly in
a number of things which are not really so."

Basically,

their mistake, according to Krutch, was that they accepted
the idea that man is merely an animal, that man and his
society can be studied in the same manner in which one
studies the animal world, and that man has no power to in
fluence the direction of his individual life or his soci
ety.

Krutch, on the other hand, has concluded that man

"can will, and choose and prefer," that he can make society
what he wishes it to be, and that the belief that man is an
autonomous creature is important in building a free soci
ety.
The title of this anthology and the title of the
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the essay are the first indicators of force and content and
are perfect examples of Fotion's ”detached" indicators.
Examining the title of the collection, I was immediately
struck by the presence of a construction which Austin
classifies as a doubtful expositive, "I believe."

The

Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms places "be
lieve" with "know" and "think" and defines them as "to hold
something in one's mind as true or as being what it pur
ports to be."

For "believe," Merriam-Webster adds that it

"stresses assurance but implies trust and

faith (as in a

higher power) rather than evidence as its basis."

Obvious

ly, then, "believe," as here defined, is not the name of a
speech act in the fullest sense, yet as Austin indicates,
its use shows something about the nature of the act being
performed.
What does a speaker seem to be doing when he says,
"I believe"?

Mats Furberg in Saying and Meaning distin

guishes two senses in which "I believe" is used, and this
distinction seems more helpful in working with the title,
This I Believe, than the definition given above.
2
Furberg terms the "degree-showing employment."

The first
In this

sense the expression indicates that the speaker is not
certain; or, as Furberg says, "'I believe’ is, roughly
3
speaking, replaceable by 'probably.'"
The second or the
"psychological" employment Furberg explains using as an
4
example the "delusional employment."
The mental patient
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tells the psychiatrist, "I believe that pink elephants are
5

running after me."

Here the term "I believe" expresses

the fact that the utterance is "a piece of information
6
about the speaker's state of mind."
The psychological use
by the normal person is similarly a report on the speaker's
state of mind, though the "state of mind" may be the result
of rational processes and bring about rational actions by
the person holding the belief.

Furberg sums up the differ

ence between the two uses of "I believe":

"Whilst the

degree-showing employment simply serves to warn the listen
er that the utterance has less than its normal [assertive]
strength, the psychological one serves to tell us something
about the subject's state of mind— viz. that he is ready to
claim certain things and/or prepared to act in certain
7

ways."
Now, the use of "I believe" in the title of this
anthology indicates that the essays in the anthology are to
be taken primarily as reports on the psychological state of
the writer of each piece.

The quotation from Patterns of

Exposition shows that the volume is intended to deal not
with the degree of credence with which the writers hold
certain beliefs or necessarily with their reasons for
holding these beliefs but with their beliefs as states of
mind or "philosophical observations."

Now, considering the

title and the description of the essays, I concluded that
the use of "I believe," though certainly intended to signal
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a report of a psychological state, also signals an act
which is different in some respects from the simple report
of a psychological state.

The title of the book seems to

use "believe" in one sense of "affirm," thus taking it out
of the group of doubtful expositives and making it a legit
imate speech act.

Now, in his summary of rules, Searle

equates stating, asserting, and affirming.

The title of

this book uses "believe" in a way that seems synonymous
with a meaning of "affirm," which is not an exact equiva
lent of stating and asserting.

It uses "I believe" in the

sense in which one uses it in saying a creed in church, in
an organization, or at a patriotic program.
saying the creed, "I believe in.

The person

. .," is reporting a psy

chological state, and, as such a report, his utterance can
not be challenged as an assertion of his belief.

In addi

tion, however, he is affirming in the sense in which Web
ster 1s New Dictionary of Synonyms defines "affirm" as
synonymous with such words as "assert" and "declare" and
differentiates it in the following way:

"Affirm implies

conviction of truth and willingness to stand by one's
statement because it is supported by evidence or one's ex
perience or faith."

Supposedly, the men writing for this

anthology have formed certain beliefs on the basis of ex
perience or faith.

The utterance of "I believe" in this

sense is close to Austin's original performative:

in say

ing "I believe" the author is affirming, performing the
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act of confirming his belief.
lieve.

.

The utterance of "I be

also has its constative element, however, and

it is this element which the hearer can challenge for truth
or falsity.

Though I think that it is possible to consider

"I believe" here as merely the report of a psychological
state, I shall consider "believe" as a true speech act
meaning "affirm."

As such I shall find the act felici

tously performed if the hearer understands that the speaker
is uttering a proposition which he obligates himself to
support with evidence from his own experience or with a
statement that his faith supports the statement.
When one substitutes the title of Krutch's essay for
"this" in the title of the book of essays, one has the as
sertion, "I believe that we were not skeptical enough."
The author has made a value judgment at some time in the
past.

This judgment constitutes his state of mind, and he

is affirming that his state of mind is such.

He does not

appear to be merely reporting personal psychological
states:

he seems to want to be taken seriously as a critic

of the "we" of which he was a part.

Again, one can ques

tion the truth of the belief which he reports or any evi
dence which he offers, but one cannot question his asser
tion that he believes.

The titles of the two works, the

book of essays and the individual essay, prepare the reader
for the speaker to report his beliefs, first of all.

In

addition, one expects the speaker to affirm beliefs which
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he can support with evidence or faith.

Finally, the title

of the essay indicates that deprecating will take place:
the author is regretting that in the past a group (we) to
which he belonged was not skeptical enough.

One expects in

this essay, then, to find asserting or opining, believing
defined as affirming, evaluating, and, perhaps, some form
of explaining and justifying.
Each paragraph from the first sentence to the last
provides a further context for every other paragraph and
for every sentence.

Following the title, the reader ex

pects the author to report beliefs and to deprecate certain
beliefs.

He expects the beliefs which he deprecates to be

ones held in the past, since the verb in the title is in
the past tense.

Paragraphs 1-6 obviously deal with beliefs

from the author's past.

Paragraphs 1-2 state:

the author

was born in "An Age of Unbelief" and he came to realize
that this title was not accurate.
exemplify with statements.

Krutch probably wants to clari

fy his assertions in paragraph 2.
paragraph 4 evaluates:

Paragraphs 3-4 primarily

The last sentence in

"The trouble was not that we were

not skeptical but that we were not skeptical enough."

In

the context, because of the expectations aroused by the
four statements used to exemplify, the reader would know
that one of the possibilities for this sentence in para
graph 4 is a statement of a conclusion based on the pre
ceding sentences.

The sentence does conclude or sum up the
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author's belief exemplified in the preceding sentences that
his generation was not really skeptical, but, in addition,
it evaluates this condition:

"We were not skeptic enough."

A certain degree of skepticism is, then, desirable, and
Krutch's generation, he believes, did not attain this de
gree.

Paragraphs 5-6 exemplify the last utterance in para

graph 4.

In these paragraphs, the use of the past tense

indicates that the beliefs asserted were those held in the
past.

The evaluation in paragraph 4 shows that Krutch is

also deprecating in paragraphs 5-6:

his generation be

lieved that man was "not a cause but an effect,1' a belief
which shows that its members "were not skeptical enough."
Paragraph 7 turns to beliefs which Krutch holds as he
writes the essay:

the world is in a "parlous" state and

man has lost faith in himself as an agent capable of im
proving it as well as in a God who can save him.

Para

graphs 8-9 report the author's beliefs at the present time,
exemplify these, and, by implication, advocate them.

The

reporting of beliefs in chronological order as they change
strengthens the force of deprecating and commending and
adds this implied advocating.

Man, Krutch now believes,

a free agent with power to shape his world, and a demo
cratic society demands that its members operate on the
basis of this belief.

The final paragraph asserts:

"we

cannot set the world free until we believe that the indi
vidual himself is free."

Again, an idea is commended

is
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and, by implication, advocated.
In paragraphs 8 and 9, Krutch introduces what ap
pears to be an act not encountered before in this essay or
in "The Iron String."

The act is the one indicated by his

use of the verb me a n .

He begins paragraph 8, "What I be

lieve in most firmly is man himself."

He continues, "And

by that I mean something quite specific."
the act performed here "interpreting."

I shall call

By interpreting,

I

shall not mean the act described by Abraham Kaplan and
discussed in Chapter IV of this study.

Kaplan views inter

pretation as an explanation having both semantic and scien
tific components.

I shall use instead the definition in

Webster1s New Dictionary of Synonyms, which lists "inter
pret" with "explain" but differentiates it in the following
way:

"Interpret implies the making clear to oneself or to

another the meaning of something (as a poem, a dream, an
abstraction, or a work in a foreign language) which pre
sents more than intellectual difficulties and requires
special knowledge, imagination, or sympathy in the person
who would understand it or make it understood."

One finds

in this definition the same perlocutionary intent, clarifi
cation, that one finds in exemplifying, but the act is
different from exemplifying in that it does not involve the
giving of examples.

When he interprets, the speaker be

lieves that he has imaginative or sympathetic insight or
special knowledge, and he obligates himself to provide that
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insight or special knowledge to explain a concept "that
presents more than purely logical difficulty" for his aud
ience.

His interpretation need not be a formulation which

he can defend with facts or logic.

About interpretations,

there can be considerable difference of opinion, yet each
interpretation can be felicitous because the speaker is
relying on private knowledge, his possession of which can
not be disputed, and he indicates to his reader that he is
relying on this kind of knowledge.

Here, Krutch is inter

preting a belief and the logical consequences of one's
holding that belief.

When he says that he believes in man,

he means "that he descended from the animals but that he
has powers which animals share but little, if at all."

He

means "that he is something in himself," "that he can will,
and choose

and prefer."

Krutch is using imaginative in

sight based on his experiences to formulate his belief in
man.

Next, he extends this interpretation to society, and

he interprets the society of men understood as he under
stands men as one in which men can be free to think and
choose and live in a truly democratic society.

Perhaps

the attempt to separate interpreting in this way is a
futile attempt to distinguish too finely between acts, but
the desire to set up an act called "interpreting" rests on
the premise that there is an act of explaining similar to
defining but going past defining because the meaning to be
elucidated cannot be supplied without special insight,
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knowledge, or sympathy.
In the process of understanding these acts, the
reader has repeatedly used a set of indicators which seem
inextricably tangled with everything which he learns from
the context.

These are the connecting particles and cer

tain adverbs which function as connecting particles.

In

the first paragraph, ’’then" and "and" indicate an order
according to time sequence and the absence of contrasting
ideas.

In paragraph 2, the reader finds the adverbial con

necting particle, "Only very slowly," signaling an orderly
progression of time and the contrast between "really" and
"not really" preparing for the examples to be used to ex
emplify— all of these showing what was "really character
istic" of the age or "not really so."

In paragraph 3, "for

example" indicates that exemplifying will be undertaken.
In paragraph 4, "as I still do" shows that the author is
reporting what he, like his contemporaries, believed and
still believes.

"And then" in paragraph 5 shows a time

connection between ideas in the two sentences:

the speaker

is still reporting beliefs, this time a belief he holds as
a consequence of the ones he has just discussed.

In para

graph 6, "to take the most familiar example" signals that
the author is exemplifying;

"What is even more important"

indicates an evaluation of the relative importance of the
ideas; and "we tended to believe" reenforces the idea that
he is asserting a belief.

"Seldom before" and "not often
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before" in sentence 1, paragraph 7, indicate the assertive
nature of the utterance. "Yet," sentence 2, shows that the
ideas will conflict, but the utterance still expresses the
author's belief.

The second sentence in paragraph 8 begins

"And by that," thus tying the exemplifying in sentences 3-5
to the first sentence in the paragraph.

Then, in paragraph

9, one has "for example" to indicate exemplifying, "not"
and "not merely" to tie these ideas to the evaluation of
earlier mistaken beliefs, and "therefore" to signal present
beliefs.

These particles, by indicating the relationship

between sentences and paragraphs and sometimes by naming
the nature of the speech act, show either that a certain
force is to continue from one sentence to the next, that
the force is to change, or that the force is to be of a
certain kind.

They make explicit the effect of context on

the utterances in the essay.
A peculiar use of quotation marks is also a clue to
the author’s beliefs and his attitude toward his beliefs.
These phrases are placed in quotation marks:

"An Age of

Unbelief," "that science proves," "science proved," and
"nothing but."

Not one of these groups of words is so

definitely a quotation from another waiter's work that it
would have to be placed in quotation, marks.

The marks,

therefore, call attention to the fact that the author is
questioning the ideas expressed by the portions of the
utterances enclosed as quotations:

he wants his reader to
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know that these Ideas are not his but someone else's.

By-

showing that he questions these beliefs, the author is
showing at least a mild condemnation of them.

The use of

quotation marks plus the change in tense of the verb as the
author's ideas change with time point clearly to such an
attitude.
The verbs in the essay become, then, the most impor
tant single indicator, since they convey the force of as
serting and interpreting as well as deprecating and com
mending.

Through paragraph 6, the verbs in the individual

sentences are past tense indicative mood.

In paragraph 2

"did come" signals the point toward which the author's be
liefs were moving in the past.

The past tense in para

graphs 3-6 shows beliefs, most of which the author has dis
carded.

This use is made clear in paragraph 4 by the al

ready mentioned "as I still do."

The sentence in which

this clause occurs is used to report a belief which the
author still holds, and because it is an exception, it must
be pointed out.

The change in paragraph 7 to present per

fect and present brings the reader to the beliefs which the
author holds at the present time.

In paragraph 8, the

verbs with their subjects are the following:

"What I be

lieve in most firmly is," "I mean," "I believe," "I be
lieve," and "I believe."

In paragraph 9, they are "This

means," "It means," "I believe," and "The difference is."
In the final one-sentence paragraph, the verb with its

178

subject is "I believe.”

The author is reporting his be

liefs, and with "I mean,” he is signaling that he is inter
preting his beliefs.

By the change in tense which occurs

in paragraph 7, the author clearly signals a change from
deprecating to commending in addition to asserting, exem
plifying, and interpreting.

For this essay, then, it is

possible to make an outline of speech acts simply by using
the verbs in the main clauses.
In this essay, the reader concludes, the indicators
show that Krutch asserts, exemplifies, deprecates, com
mends, evaluates, and interprets.

One feels that he also

advocates, since he so obviously believes that his ideas
are good that he presumably wants his reader to adopt them.
However, unlike Jones's "The Iron String," this essay seems
to secure adequate "uptake" if the reader merely accepts it
as an assertion of Krutch's beliefs.

In "The Iron String,"

Jones argues for his beliefs, and the overall thrust is his
urging the acceptance of a view of education and government
which he does not believe that people in America hold at
the time when he makes the speech.

Krutch, on the other

hand, is exploring a psychological state, and the nearest
he comes to urging that others adopt this state is his
equating of his view with a democratic society and the op
posite view with totalitarianism.

Believing defined as the

affirming of something more than a psychological state is
supported through the essay as the author shows his
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experience with beliefs through the years.

As with a re

port of a psychological state, believing as affirming can
be felicitous without the reader accepting the belief him
self:

he needs merely to know that the author intends to

affirm his belief.
The

next question is then whether or not these acts

are felicitous.

It is in the process of reading the essay

that the sentences on the page again become utterances and
speech acts, so the first consideration in testing the
felicity of this essay as the performance of a complex
series

of compound illocutionary acts is a study of the

reader for whom it can be felicitous.

The reader must be

capable of reading the language, and he must know something
about modern scientific thought in order to grasp the propositional content as well as the force of the utterances in
the essay.

The first requirement obviously follows from

the conditions of Austin and Searle.

The second becomes

obvious as one considers the allusions to evolution and
various behavioral sciences which the reader must under
stand if Krutch's examples "illustrate" anything to him.
The whole notion of "normal input and output conditions"
(see pp. 83-84 above) must be expanded to include the
writer's assessment of the body of knowledge which he can
expect his audience to have.

A successful speech act can

be performed only when the hearer knows the language which
the speaker is using.

If the speaker alludes to a body of
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knowledge which the hearer does not have, he will fail to
secure ’’uptake" as surely as he will if he speaks in a
language the hearer does not know.

When Krutch wrote the

essay, he intended it for the sort of people who would be
attracted to "a collection of philosophical observations
from famous people."

In Patterns of Exposition, the essay

is intended for college undergraduates.

Neither audience

is completely homogeneous and neither shares the same body
of knowledge.

In either audience, only the reader with the

necessary background knowledge will understand the content
or the force of the essay.

The writer will, however, stand

in a perfect position to perform the intended acts for the
readers who can comprehend them.

A professor of literature

at Columbia University for many years, Krutch could be ex
pected to speak as an authority on some subjects to some
audiences.

Here, however, he is not speaking as an author

ity in a field, though his position earned him the invita
tion to write for the anthology.

Rather, he is asserting

his beliefs as a young man and his present ones.

He stands

in a perfect position to make these assertions, since the
propositional content of the acts which he performs is his
own beliefs and the beliefs of people whom he knows.

When

he evaluates, because he shows his wide range of experi
ence, the reader may be able to listen, but again his
evaluations, also his beliefs, do not have to be in any way
convincing to stand as assertions of his beliefs.
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The question of the speaker's sincerity, certainly a
big factor when one examines assertions of beliefs, is a
more difficult one to deal with.

As Furberg points out,

the question of sincerity when a person says, "I believe”
is always a big one.

How does one evaluate the sincerity

of an author affirming beliefs?

Probably, the best test

again is the reputation of the author.

The reader who

chooses to read this essay must be convinced that the
writer is a man who would not affirm beliefs which he does
not hold.

He will be willing to accept the author's sin

cerity, too, if he does not see the author to be further
ing his own self-interest as he asserts his beliefs.

This

essay by Krutch, a man of integrity in the academic world
with no selfish interest to further by expressing these
beliefs, seems felicitous as judged by the sincerity condi
tion to the extent to which one can judge its sincerity.
Again the question of the perlocutionary effect of
the essay which is a series of illocutionary acts must be
considered.

The intent to clarify seems present wherever

an author exemplifies and interprets.

An older man showing

the way his ideas changed as he matured can be expected to
desire to persuade his audience to adopt his later views.
The way in which Krutch aligns his view with democracy and
its opposite with communism certainly seems to show that he
hopes to persuade, but the judge cannot decide whether or
not the reader is persuaded without his direct testimony.

182

Certainly, a description of a change in ideas from youth to
maturity would sway some to adopt the ideas of the older
person.

On the other hand, there are those who arbitrarily

decide with youth.

In other words, the perlocutionary act

remains hidden in the minds of writer and reader, inacces
sible to Austin's judge.
Examining this essay, then, I have discovered a com
plex series of compound illocutionary acts performed in a
very different manner with a different intent from those
performed in "The Iron String."

Both seem "natural utter

ances," to use Barbara Smith's term again, but one is an
oration to a stage full of people and the other is a solil
oquy, a man's musings on his personal beliefs.

The ora

tion, "The Iron String," employs elaborate devices and a
tremendous complexity of texture.

"We Were Not Skeptical

Enough," the soliloquy, is simple and straightforward.
II
The essay "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia
Angus is a far more complicated series of illocutionary
acts than Krutch's essay, even though the audience for it
is more clearly defined and restricted.

This essay was

originally printed in The Saturday Review of Literature,
the readers of which are not only literate users of the
language but also usually people who are interested in and
knowledgeable about art, literature, and current affairs.
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The content can be summarized in the following way:

Art

lovers have become unwilling to criticize experiments in
the arts to the extent that they accept whatever is experi
mental, even the "random," as art.

This attitude conflicts

with the "critical faculty," which demands the willingness
to criticize the product of the artist and is dependent on
this idea:

"Art is not what we experience; it is the con

trolled product of the artist's experience."

Angus finally

defines art as "the controlled structuring of a medium or a
material to communicate as vividly and movingly as possible
the artist's personal vision of experience," thus providing
a basis to criticize "random" art.
The reader of "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" finds
the context and the title as helpful in indicating the il
locutionary force of the essay as did the reader of "We
Were Not Skeptical Enough."

The article did not appear in

the art section of the Saturday Review but in the first
section which is devoted to articles of general interest.
In Design, it is printed in a section called "The Arts."
(The essay from Design is reproduced here in Appendix V . )
The title, a "detached" indicator of content and force, is
more important as an indicator than either position in
which the article was printed.
uation and asks a question:

The title gives an eval

"It's pretty, but is it art?"

This title indicates that the utterances in the essay will
be concerned with defining art, since the question poses
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the problem of whether "it" fits the definition of art.

As

an illocutionary act, questioning is not indicated so much
as arguing in order to define.

The title is not asking a

question to be answered so much as it is proposing an argu
ment about a

definition.

It leads the reader, moreover,

to expect statements and explanations.

To what does "it"

refer, the reader wants to know.
The first two sentences are acts of opining.
read:

They

"In art, this is not the age of anxiety, the pill,

or the bomb.

It is the age of ’willingness.'"

paragraph, Angus

begins to argue.

In the next

Art lovers are supposed

to find experiments in art "interesting," but, unfortunate
ly, many of them are "not interesting."

Angus devotes

paragraphs 3-5 to arguing for her conclusions or her eval
uation of this art as "not interesting.”

In these para

graphs she exemplifies in order to argue her point.

She

uses as her example a touring group called "Contemporary
Voices in the Arts."

She points out that the performances

of this group, which espouses "random" art, are boring and
confusing.

On the other hand, the talks defending their

performances are lucid and persuasive.

In other words, the

members of the group define art with the clarity and pre
cision which they condemn in the art itself.

With her ex

ample, Angus has demonstrated that the logical and ordered
are more interesting than the "random."
In paragraph 6, Angus proposes a possible relation-
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ship between modern science and "random" art.

She asks,

supposedly for the proponents of "random" art, "If random
ness is a fundamental truth of science, why is it not also
applicable to art?"

Then, in paragraph 7, she presents

five problems with "random" art which make a telling argu
ment against it.

In paragraph 8, she evaluates and opines

concerning "random" art, preparing for paragraphs 9-15 in
which she argues against the "random" in art.

In paragraph

12, she attacks those who would relate scientific relativ
ity to art:

"The atomic particle may be indeterminate, but

man is not.

The random, the formless, is basically impos

sible and uninteresting to man, who is, willy-nilly, a
pattern-making animal."

Paragraph 16 opines as Angus sums

up what is needed at the time in art.

The last two para

graphs, the point toward which the argument in the essay
has moved, offer a definition of art, a definition which
Angus believes to be needed as a result of the argument
through which she has led her readers to this point.
Now, in "The Iron String," I discovered an inci
dental act of defining.

This essay, unlike "The Iron

String," indicates by its title and the master speech act
in the last two paragraphs that its main purpose is the act
of defining.

Monroe Beardsley in Thinking Straight calls

8
definition "the most important kind of verbal elucidation."
He points out that a

definition "consists of two parts,

the term whose meaning is in question or in doubt and is to
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elucidated (this is the term to be defined), and the term
that is offered as synonymous with the first term and is
assumed to be more familiar or more explicit (this is the
9
defining term).11
In this essay, "art" is the "term to be
defined," and the "defining term" is "the controlled struc
turing of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly
and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of
experience."

According to Beardsley, there are two types

of "defining terms":
proposals."

"definition reports" and "definition

Both of these are found in paragraph 4 of "The

Iron String" in which Jones first reports the Oxford Dic
tionary 's definition of a "liberal," a definition which to
the lexicographer seems to be sanctioned by common usage,
and then proposes his own definition which deepens and en
larges the dictionary definition though it does not contra
dict i t .
In the last two paragraphs of "It's Pretty, but Is
It Art?", Angus presents a "definition proposal."
not merely quote a definition of art.

She does

Instead, what she

gives is what Beardsley calls "a decision to use a word
one way rather than another for certain purposes in certain
10
contexts."
Angus uses a master speech act to signal that
she is making a proposal:
sense,

"With more bravery than good

I will climb well out on a limb and define it [art]

as follows."

It is the act which results in the "defini

tion proposal" which I shall arbitrarily call "defining" in

187

this study.

When the speaker merely quotes a definition

from a dictionary, he is not actually performing the act
of defining, but the act of stating or reporting.

The

editors of dictionaries who report definitions discovered
in common usage and phrase these definitions for their
publications are performing an act of defining, but for
convenience's sake I shall use the term only when the
speaker obligates himself to provide a "defining term"
which involves a "decision to use a word one way rather
than another for certain purposes in certain contexts."
Probably, this is the only act of defining usually found in
the essay, the chief source of "definition reports" being
the dictionary.

As Beardsley points out, the speaker per

forming this act does not obligate himself to verify a
statement:

not being a statement, Beardsley says, a "defi

nition proposal" "can't be refuted, and it can't be
11
proved," though it is not "immune to criticism."
To be
successful, the definition must, moreover, "be more famil
iar or explicit" than the "term to be defined."
other hand, it need not clarify.

On the

The "uptake" desired is

the reader's understanding that defining is intended.

The

defining of "art" is, then, the point toward which the
argument in this essay leads.

Angus argues and exempli

fies, opines and states, deprecates and commends, and
finally arrives at her definition of art.
Now, the question is, "What role does defining
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actually play in Angus's essay?"

The title has indicated

that a definition is to be tested or that a product is to
be measured by a definition.

Throughout the essay, Angus

is deprecating and arguing against "random" art.

By her

definition, she excludes the "random" from the class of
things defined as art, answering her question, "Is it art?",
and completing her argument against it as art.

The perlo

cutionary intent— to convince the reader that this is not
art by defining art to exclude the "random"— seems obvious.
The use of the definition as part of her whole argument
against "random" art seems equally obvious.

The reader is

impressed again, at this point, by the complexity of the
series of illocutionary acts which a writer like Sylvia
Angus is able to perform in order to convey the overall
force

which she hopes to convey.

By the end of this es

say, the reader may not be convinced, but he certainly
should realize that the author is arguing against the "ran
dom" in art.
Again, connecting particles play a tremendous role
in making the context a clear indicator.

An especially in

teresting pattern occurs in paragraphs 12-15.

In these

paragraphs, the author is arguing, and the particles which
recur are "if" and "but."

The way these work is apparent

in the last sentence of paragraph 12:

"Man is a sensing

animal all right, but he is also a thinking reed.

. ."

Here the fact that each clause represents one side of the
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argument is emphasized and made clear by the conjunction.
The fact that basic acts through the essay are
stating and opining is supported by the use of the verb to
be in the present tense fifty-six times in the essay's
eighteen paragraphs.

(As in the study of "The Iron String,"

only verbs in the main clauses are considered.)

"Is a" is

called the "assertive link" in Austin's early essays, and
it often signals the predication of a truth about a sub
ject.

Opining also has the form of the statement.

The

first two sentences of the essay illustrate the use of "is"
in opining.

Since the utterances do not contain a verifi

able proposition, the act is opining.
The force of the simple present tense "be" works in
an interesting way with certain conditional verbs to convey
the force of arguing.

The following conditional verbs can

be found in the main clauses:

paragraph 9— "can be," "can

turn," "can stimulate and entertain," "can provoke"; para
graph 10— "can be had"; paragraph 12— "may be," "may seem";
paragraph 13— "may be"; paragraph 14— "may be"; paragraph
15— "may produce," "can [produce]"; paragraph 16— "can be
defined"; and paragraph 18— "can go."

In a number of cases,

the conditional verb sets up one side of the argument which
is then demolished by an utterance containing an assertive
use of "be."

An example of this use is found in the fol

lowing sentence in paragraph 10:

"Experience can be had,

and is had, at any time of the day and night."

This
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sentence occurs in a paragraph of assertions, but the two
verbs stage an argument over possibility and actuality.
Here the "be" verbs are technically auxiliaries, but the
effect is the same as

if they were main verbs.

paragraph 14, one finds the following sentence:

Then in
"If we

select the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress,
the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the
merchant a couturier?"

Again, "may be" is not positive,

and the positive "do call" is used to emphasize the asser
tion, since the question is clearly rhetorical.
Adverbs also play an important part in the felici
tous performance of the illocutionary acts in this essay.
It seems more profitable to consider the ones which have
not been included under connecting particles chiefly in the
context of interesting sentences and phrases, but a few,
considered alone, point to the author's intent to argue
against "random" art.

Examples are "unfortunately,"

"never," "conversely," "not always."

Some such as "equal

ly" and "clearly" are tied to stating, commending, and de
precating.

In paragraph 16 where the definition of art

begins with the concluding argument against "random" art,
"not" occurs six times.
Angus has chosen to use italics and quotation marks
as force indicators.

Beginning in paragraph 4, twenty-

three words are italicized.

They are "say," "show," "af

ter," "is," "can be," "any," "as art," "poor," "duty,"
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"art,” "we," "we," "not," "not," "includes," "not," "does,"
"is," "we experience," and "controlled."

In each case the

force of the utterance is intensified by the use of ital
ics.

Angus uses quotation marks, on the other hand, for

the same purpose for which Krutch used them— to show that
she questions something about the use of the words.

Eigh

teen words and phrases are placed in quotation marks for
this reason.

One example is "a happening."

The author

questions this term concerning its meaning and its suit
ability as a term to describe art.

Her use of quotation

marks becomes especially clear as she changes her placing
of quotation marks.
'random' arts."

In paragraph 4, she speaks of "the

Here she is bothered by the word random.

In paragraph 7, she talks of "random 'art.'"

In this case,

she is questioning whether or not it is suitable to call
that which is random, art.

Finally, in her definition of

art in paragraphs 16 and 17, she drops the quotation marks
around the word art■

Obviously, her use of these marks is

tied to commending and deprecating.

One notes too that in

the last paragraph Angus uses quotation marks in the most
conventional way when she encloses "controlled structuring"
to indicate that she is quoting her own words from the
preceding paragraph.
Angus also uses exclamation marks in an interesting
way.

She does not use them following utterances with the

form of an exclamation but following utterances having the
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form of statements.

They are used to show surprise at the

idea and in turn to place weight on one side of the argu
ment.

The first comes at the end of paragraph 5 where the

long example explaining random art ends.

The other one

comes in paragraph 10, again in the last sentence, where
again an argument is to be driven home:

"If all of these

can also be called 'art,' then clearly what we are doing is
simply melting our language down into one blob in which
differentiations can no longer be made— anti-intellectualism
with a vengeance!"
Angus employs certain words, phrases, and clauses to
direct the reader to the force of her utterance.

These are

not included in the lists of conventional indicators pre
pared by Searle and Austin, nor can they be taken out of
this essay and placed on such a list.

These expressions

will not function the same way in any two situations, but
their effectiveness still depends on the speaker and the
hearer sharing a repertoire of conventional meanings and
usages and they therefore deserve attention as force in
dicators.

For example, in paragraph 1, the author shows

the ridiculousness of the classicists' embarrassment when
they are confronted with "random" art when she says that
"they sneak home for a bit of Haydn on the hi-fi."

She

speaks of the way "willingness has completely overborne"
the critical ability of the listener.
"willingness" she makes it ridiculous.

By personifying
She calls the
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"critical faculty" "that philistine thing.”

Now, according

to The Random House Dictionary of the English Language,
"philistine" means "lacking in or hostile to culture."

No

educated reader could fail to see in the application of
"philistine" to "critical faculty" anything but irony.
Certainly the average reader of The Saturday Review of Lit
erature does not regard the critical faculty as the enemy
of culture.

In paragraph 2, Angus refers to the "bland,

slightly nervous acquiescence" of those who favor continued
interest in the new art.

In paragraph 4, Angus contrasts

the artists' success in saying "(which was not their main
intention)" with their lack of success in showing "(which
was)" in order to show that "curiously enough" the arts
were more successful in the first instance than in the
second.

She uses expressions from time to time like "as it

may seem to some" and "What I am against."

These uses can

all be interpreted for their rhetorical effect and there
fore their contribution to the perlocutionary effect of the
essay, but they also have the more objective function of
signaling the steps in the argument.
Then, certain complete sentences are interesting as
indicators of the force intent for whole paragraphs and
indeed the whole essay.
against "random" art:

These show the author's case
more important, in speech-act ter

minology, they show that the author is deprecating and
arguing against it.

In paragraph 4, one finds the follow-
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ing sentence:

"Films flickered simultaneously on screens,

walls, and ceilings; shrill and unrelated noises attacked
the eardrums in long, continuous squeals; artists wandered
about, coyly lighting matches when lights failed; a so
called panel discussion on the arts resolved itself into
several people making desultory remarks and joshing each
other like small boys; artists ambled about the stage like
actors on the first day of a rehearsal when they do not yet
know their lines or even their roles."

The underlined words

and phrases show the slant of the author.

They are intended

perhaps to persuade but certainly to hold up one side of
the argument.

One notices the personification of "panel

discussion," the use of similes, and the very real force of
the verbs.
In paragraph 5, three sentences which are rhetori
cally effective argue against "random" art.

In each sen

tence, the terms which especially point to the conflicting
sides of the argument are underlined.

The sentences follow:

Cogently, lucidly, in logical, sequential prose, they
explained that art should be a total, sensory exper
ience which should be allowed to flow over and through
one; that it should not be examined for logic, lucid
ity , or sequence. Clearly, rationally, they made the
reasonable point that art has too long concentrated on
intellectual perceptions, and that this, the age of ex
ploding mass media and new technology, should be a time
to seek sense experience in whatever random arrangement
of sight, smell, or sound might present itself at any
given moment.
With admirable intellectual coherence,
they made a most persuasive case for the nonintellec
tual , random art with which the audience had been bored
the evening before!
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These three sentences move from a beginning with an adverbadverb-prepositional phrase pattern to an adverb-adverb
pattern to a prepositional phrase beginning.

In each sen

tence, the opening words and phrases describe the good
aspects of the lectures.

The underlined words which follow

in each sentence point to the fact that the art does not
regard these characteristics as good.
In paragraph 6 and paragraph 14, rhetorical ques
tions are used to suggest the force which Angus intends.
In paragraph 6, she asks, "If randomness is a fundamental
truth of science, why is it not also applicable to art?"
The question is rhetorical because rather than requiring an
answer it is merely another way of asserting this relation
ship between science and art.

In fact, in the next sen

tence its assertive nature is pointed out:

"In a seeming

attempt to assert the unity of science and art, we have now
gone far along the path of asserting that the random is. or
can be art."

In paragraph 14, Angus asks, "If we select

the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress, the
experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the mer
chant a couturier?
materials 'art'?"

Is his randomly heaped assortment of
Angus obviously does not expect an an

swer from her reader.

She expects to call attention in a

persuasive way to her side of the argument.
Paragraph 9 begins with the very peculiar sentence,
"Which brings me, of course, to the positive, if heretical,
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point I am making:

that totally random or accidental art

is not art at all.’* Here the broad reference of the pro
noun which with which the sentence begins and the fact that
the group of words defies all attempts to make it a gram
matically complete sentence at all, that it remains a
rather elaborate adjective clause, call attention to the
point that the author is making and to the force of the
utterances which precede this one.

These utterances take

"random" art out of the definition of art.

In paragraph

10, one finds the succinctly effective, "Experience can be
had, and is had, at any time of the day or night."

In

paragraph 12, Angus uses the same structures in two sen
tences in order to emphasize her argument against "random"
art:

"Given a blank wall, man will form its cracks into a

design.

Set down in chaos, man will separate the whirling

from the stationary, for chaos and meaninglessness, as the
existentialists have discovered, are the hardest of all
things for man to endure."

The past participles "given"

and "set," each modifying the subject of its sentence "man"
which, in turn, has in both cases a future tense verb*
show man's pattern-making propensity.

Finally, in the

second sentence of paragraph 13, one finds this attempt to
reduce "random" art to absurdity:

"Today we are being

asked to watch our artists doodle in public and to cull
from their doodles whatever appeals to us."
Three paragraphs begin with master speech acts or
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''detached'1 indicators.

Paragraph 2 begins, "Unfortunately,

a great deal of current experiment in the arts is not in
teresting."

This is the kind of claim which an author

usually intends to argue, and it controls the next sen
tences.

Paragraph 7 begins with this sentence, almost the

wording of a model master speech act:

"If we allow, for

the moment, that the artists in the experiment above have a
rational theory for asserting that the random can produce
art, we are faced with a number of criticisms of random
'art' based on their own demonstrative performances, which
suffered from at least the following five problems, any one
of which is capable of destroying any art."

Obviously, the

writer is preparing to argue against random art by giving
problems which beset it.

The third example occurs in para

graph 17, the sentence already quoted:

"With more bravery

than good sense, I will climb well out on a limb and define
it [art] as follows."

This sentence utterance prepares for

the act of defining.
Sylvia Angus did not speak as an expert to readers
who would accept her authority if she merely praised and
condemned.

Her points could only be made by leading her

readers through a reasoning process to her definition.

A

definition, as Beardsley points out, is not a verifiable
statement, and the person proposing one would probably have
a perlocutionary intent— to convince— that could best be
furthered by arguing for the definition.

Hoping to
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persuade, Angus could not speak ex cathedra.

Instead, she

must speak to equals and argue in a reasonable way.

Again,

however, one does not need to worry about the perlocutions
performed.

The choice of illocutionary acts can be justi

fied by the simple desire of the writer to argue the ques
tion of the proper role of art and finally to define art.
She need not care at all whether anyone is persuaded by
her acts.

She need only know that the proper "uptake" will

be secured if the reader knows that she intends to present
rational arguments defending her definition and if her def
inition is understood,

in turn, as part of her argument.
Ill

Irving Kristol in "Pornography and Censorship" is
again performing a complex series of compound illocutionary
acts.

Again the context is the first clue to the nature of

these acts.

Then Kristol's use of the wide range of indi

cators studied in the other essays confirms the original
impression resulting from the context.
Kristol originally wrote the essay for The New York
Times Magazine , March 28, 1971.

The title of the essay in

this publication was "Pornography, Obscenity and the Case
12
for Censorship."
This title clearly indicates that Kris
tol planned to argue for censorship.

The title which Kris

tol has given to the essay in Design, which he rewrote for
this anthology,

is not so clear an indicator of the
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illocutionary act intent of the author.
Design, is reproduced in Appendix VI.)

(The essay from
It does, however,

provide some guidance to the author's attitude.

If the

author intended to argue against censorship, he would prob
ably not have paired censorship with pornography in the
title.

Almost no one ever argues for that which he calls

"pornography."

Defined in The Random House Dictionary,

pornography is "obscene literature, art, or photography,
esp. that having little or no artistic merit."

One might

argue for freedom as opposed to censorship, the freedom of
art or literature, but the material that one argues should
be allowed in circulation will not be called "pornography,"
since this word never carries a good meaning.

The reader

knows, then, that Kristol’s attitude is probably favorable
to censorship of pornography, but whether he is presenting
the case for censorship or merely explaining relationships
between censorship and pornography, the reader does not
know simply on the

evidence of the title.

The reader soon learns, however, that the article is
a defense of censorship.

Kristol points out that those who

through the years have opposed all censorship are at the
present time almost completely victorious but that they are
finding that the relaxation of censorship has resulted not
only in a world in which the reading and viewing of works
of better quality can take place but also, as he expresses
it, in "a world in which homosexual rape takes place on the
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stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hour to wit
ness varieties of professional fornication."

According to

Kristol if one believes that books can improve a person,
one must also believe that they can corrupt him.

If ciga

rette advertising can be banned because cigarettes are be
lieved to harm the body, then it is logical to censor the
books which will harm the mind.

Censorship will, on occa

sion, Kristol believes, cause a book of real value to be
restricted in its distribution.

It is necessary, however,

if the minds of the public are not to be swamped with
pornography.
The first paragraph should leave the reader with the
understanding that the essay is making a case against por
nography.

The first sentence opines:

"Being frustrated is

disagreeable, but the real disasters in life begin when you
get what you wa n t ."
to clarify:

The next sentences exemplify in order

someone got what he wanted— a relaxation of

censorship laws which the first sentence has already label
ed a "disaster."

Paragraphs 3-4 exemplify in statements

and opinions the reasons why the advocates of complete
freedom of the media are unhappy.

Then paragraph 5 asks

questions which Kristol answers in paragraphs 6-8.

In

paragraphs 9-10, Kristol picks up terms used in paragraph
8, and by exemplifying his use of these he argues against
the relaxing of all censorship, showing that, in addition,
he is advocating censorship.

Paragraphs 11-13 continue the
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argument by explaining the harm to society that may result
from pornography.

Kristol defines the terms pornography

and censorship in paragraphs 14-16.
Then in paragraphs 17-18, Kristol breaks the thought
of the previous paragraphs to speculate on the changes to
be expected in the mores of Western society and make pre
dictions, or opine about the future.

Paragraphs 19-24

argue the importance of the question of wide use of pornog
raphy to the future of civilization.

Paragraphs 25-28

state Kristol's beliefs concerning the relationship between
the defense against pornography and the defense of the
civilization.

In paragraph 29, Kristol opines that the

question is one which involves the future of this country's
democratic government.
opinion.

Paragraphs 30-33 exemplify his

In paragraphs 34-40, Kristol states, opines, and

argues for his own view of censorship.

Finally in the last

four paragraphs, Kristol states his view, which he clearly
advocates.
The original paragraph divisions of the essay are
probably better indicators of illocutionary force than the
present ones.

In fact, it is difficult to see why the

paragraphing was changed when the essay was printed in this
collection.

The fact that it was changed, however, gives

an opportunity for the reader to see the importance of
paragraph organization as an indicator of illocutionary
intent.

In every well-organized work, the organization of
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the individual paragraphs will show one or both of two
things:

the subject,

including the author's intent in

handling the subject, and the continuation of the same act
or complementary acts for the course of the paragraph.
When the original paragraphs in this essay are chopped into
pieces, they lose the power to show either thing.

In the

appendix, the original paragraphs are marked as are the
places where sentences, phrases, and paragraphs are de
leted.

The deletions are obviously justified by the space

requirements of the anthology, but the paragraph changes
actually make the essay longer because of the additional
space needed for paragraphing.
A study of paragraphs 3-4 in Design or paragraph 2
in The New York Times Magazine illustrates this importance
of paragraph divisions.

The paragraphs follow, divided as

they are in Design:
Is there a sense of triumphant exhilaration in the
land? Hardly.
There is, on the contrary, a rapidly
growing unease and disquiet.
Somehow, things have not
worked out as they were supposed to, and many notable
civil libertarians have gone on record as saying this
was not what they meant at all.
They wanted a world in which "Desire Under the Elms"
could be produced, or "Ulysses" published, without in
terference by philistine busybodies holding public of
fice.
They have got that, of course; but they have
also got a world in which homosexual rape takes place
on the stage, in which the public flocks during lunch
hours to witness varieties of professional fornication.
In the last sentence of the second paragraph, this clause
was omitted from the essay in Design:

"in which Times

Square has become little more than a hideous market for the
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sale and distribution of printed filth that panders to all
13
known (and some fanciful) sexual perversions."
This de
letion makes the reading of the essay by a person not
familiar with New York more meaningful in addition to
shortening the essay, but no such justification exists for
the paragraph division.

The first four sentences (includ

ing "Hardly.") report the author's opinion of the present
mood of those who have favored the removal of all censor
ship restrictions.

The rhetorical question followed by

"hardly" becomes a master speech act indicating that the
author intends to give his opinion on this mood of the
winning side.

The next two sentences exemplify this mood.

Since exemplifying requires the showing of relationships,
when the examples are placed in a paragraph apart from the
master speech act and the statement of the concept to be
exemplified, a heavy burden is placed on the other indica
tors to show this relationship.

Again, because Kristol is

exemplifying opinions which are part of an argument, making
these paragraphs also part of the act of arguing, relation
ships between sentences are extremely important, and the
connecting particles must function with no help from the
paragraph divisions.

It is interesting to note that five

of these particles which were originally used to connect
sentences within paragraphs now must connect paragraphs
which have been divided.
Adverbs and adverbial phrases support the idea of

204

the illocutionary force of arguing.

They are "on the con

trary" (3); "oddly enough," "incredibly enough" and "in all
sincerity" (6); "nevertheless," "merely" (8); "in this
crazy world of ours" (10); "to put it bluntly" (21); "mere
ly" (27); "rarely" (30); "as bluntly as possible" (34); and
"obviously" (41).

Even out of context, these words suggest

the giving of reasons and opposite reasons.
The verbs convey force in very much the same way
that they do in the other essays.

Thirty-four main verbs

are present-tense forms of the verb be and suggest stating
and opining.

Seven are conditional:

"Might (not) be,"

"might have added," "might find," "can be," "may be," "can
see," "might point out," "can be," and "may be."

In the

last three paragraphs, the subject-verb arrangement sug
gests the explicit formula:

"I subscribe" (43); "I think,"

"I believe," "I think" (44).

All of these support the

opinion force of the last three paragraphs.

Adding "I

opine that" to any one of these, the reader has a meaning
ful utterance and has identified the act which he is per
forming.
Punctuation is more interesting than it is in the
other essays.

Dashes are used to separate clauses and set

off phrases twenty-four times.
trated in paragraph 22:

The first use is illus

"In other words, infantile sex

uality is not only a permanent temptation for the adoles
cent or even the adult— it can quite easily become a
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permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis."

By using the dash

Kristol calls attention to the second clause which is the
stronger of the two points in supporting his argument.
dash is, then, a tool in arguing as it is used here.
paragraph 1, the reader finds the second use:

The
In

"For almost

a century now, a great many intelligent, well-meaning and
articulate people— of a kind generally called liberal or
intellectual, or both— have argued eloquently against any
kind of censorship of art and/or entertainment."

Or, in

paragraph 19, he reads, "But when sex is public, the viewer
does not see— cannot see— the sentiments and the ideals."
In the first of these two sentences, the author with the
use of dashes calls attention to the type of people whom he
is discussing and, in a subtle way, suggests that people
bearing the labels "liberal" and "intellectual" are somehow
suspect.

In the second sentence, Kristol makes his reader

take notice of the "cannot see" verb, thus emphasizing this
portion of his argument.
Colons and parentheses point to advocating, stating,
and exemplifying.

A typical use is found in paragraph 34:

"And lest there be any misunderstanding as to what I am
saying, I'll put it as bluntly as possible:

If you care

for the quality of life in our American democracy, then
you have to be for censorship."
substitute "I advocate that."

For "I'll put it," one can
The second part of the sen

tence is then used for advocating.

Parentheses are used
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to enclose short explanatory phrases.

For example, in

paragraph 18, one finds, "It is, however, highly improbable
(to put it mildly) that.

. ." and, in paragraph 36, one

finds, "We have no problem in contrasting repressive laws
governing alcohol and drugs and tobacco with laws regula
ting (i.e., discouraging the sale of) alcohol and drugs and
tobacco."

These short phrases add to the meaning of the

phrases which they follow, and they, also, emphasize points
in the argument.
The use of the question mark seven times in this
essay raises the problem of the rhetorical question.
Searle gives as the preparatory condition for a genuine act
of questioning that the speaker must not know the answer
which he is asking for.

In this essay, the speaker ob

viously knows the answer which the question demands, and
the reader is conscious that here is a use of the form of
a speech act "for something," a use which bothers Austin
tremendously.

The use here is "for" the purpose of calling

attention to the speaker's statements and opinions, espe
cially the opinions which he advocates.

As such a signal

it becomes another rhetorical device used as a conventional
indicator of the illocutionary act.

No reader of the so

phistication demanded by this essay will mistake these
questions for sincere requests for information.

He will

immediately know that they signal statements and opinions
which are to be advocated and argued for.
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This point leads to an assessment of the overall
effect of these four punctuation usages.

What they do is

secure for the author the kind of immediacy which the
spoken act has.

They do more to supply the stress and in

tonation patterns of stating and asserting than any other
device.

In addition, they seem to work almost like the

explicit formula:

they make clear the force which the

other indicators suggest.
As the Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values at New
York University and a coeditor of Public Interest, Irving
Kristol stands in relation to his audience in such a way
that he can opine, state, explain, and argue concerning the
effects of pornography on the public in order to advocate
censorship.

Because of his position, he can be expected to

have thought more deeply on the subject than the average
reader of The New York Times Magazine or of the undergrad
uate anthology Design.

Because he is speaking on a subject

which most people feel to some extent qualified to speak
on, he must, however,

"argue that" in some instances rather

than stating dogmatically.

From the beginning of the essay,

Kristol acknowledges that many people in his position will
not agree with him, at least before they read the essay.
For them, he must "argue that" in order to advocate.

His

essay then is a successful performance of a complex series
of compound illocutionary acts because Kristol understands
the controversial nature of the subject of his article,
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possesses the authority to speak on this subject, and em
ploys the illocutionary forces which will secure the only
effective "uptake" which he can expect— the "uptake" from
opining and arguing in order to advocate.

Kristol also

states, deprecates, and commends successfully, but the
chief acts are these others which the nature of the subject—
one on which agreement is difficult to reach— demands.

The

perlocutionary effect of persuasion which Kristol obviously
intends also seems furthered by these uses.
IV
At this stage in the study, I have completed the
attempt to analyze four essays by professional writers as
the performance of a complex series of usually compound
illocutionary acts.

In these essays, the authors appear

to perform successfully a variety of acts.

In all the

essays, the authors attempt to perform perlocutionary acts:
they all attempt to clarify and in three cases they ob
viously want to persuade.

The interesting results from

this analysis are to be found, however, not in the area of
perlocutionary acts, but in the area of illocutionary acts.
The illocutionary acts show certain characteristics
of such acts in successful essays.

First, the reputation

of the author determines the type of act which he can per
form successfully, and, at the same time, he will only be
successful when he performs the acts which he can clearly
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obligate himself to perform successfully.

For example, he

must not appear to state when he could not have the inform
ation to verify his statement, he must not ask his audience
to believe him to be sincere in a statement of beliefs if
he is a known liar, and he must not assert dogmatically
points which are susceptible to argument.

Second, the acts

in the successful essay will be complex in most cases.

The

simplest utterances in these essays occur in Krutch's essay.
Their simplicity fits the tone of his essay which is
thoughtful, meditative, not designed to be dramatically
persuasive.

In an essay like the last one, however, each

section contains more than one act intertwined with each
other.

For example,

in the paragraph already quoted,

Kristol opines, exemplifies, and argues, at the same time
that he is deprecating and commending.
In the next chapter, I shall report on the attempt
to analyze student essays as attempts to perform a complex
series of illocutionary acts.

CHAPTER VI
THE STUDENT ESSAY AND AUSTIN'S JUDGE
When an essay is regarded as the performance of a
complex series of compound illocutionary acts, the twin
problems for Austin's judge are to determine what acts are
performed in the essay and to evaluate them as successful
or unsuccessful.

In handling these problems, the procedure

of the judge is to ask how well each discernible act satis
fies the rules which constitute it.

As we have seen, these

rules, as formulated in general terms by Austin and Searle,
specify (1) the speaker's illocutionary intention,
assessment of the hearer's knowledge and desires,

(2) his
(3) the

position of the speaker as the proper person to perform the
act, and (4) the extent to which the speaker obligates him
self .
In the two preceding chapters I have studied the
work of four professional writers.

I have assumed that

these authors deserve their reputation as skillful writers
of expository prose and that an important aspect of this
skill is their ability to perform illocutionary acts felic
itously.

Thus my investigation was guided by the Austin-

Searle rules and served as a test of their validity.

On

the assumption that the illocutionary intentions of the
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effective writer of the professional essay can be ascer
tained with considerable precision,

I devoted most of my

analysis to a search for the linguistic indicators of illo
cutionary force by means of which these intentions are made
evident to the reader.

In addition,

I assumed that the

other components of the felicitous performance of illocu
tionary acts— the authority with which the writer speaks on
the subject of

his essay, his understanding of the limits

of his knowledge, and his reluctance to obligate himself in
areas in which he does not feel that he can fulfill his
obligation— should also be evident in the work of the
skillful professional.

Thus, a secondary purpose of my

analysis was to raise the question of the means by which
the authors of these essays hoped to insure that their
illocutionary acts would be felicitous.

This part of my

analysis was necessarily much more sketchy and tentative
than the first part, though it did result in a greater
particularization of the Austin-Searle general rules for
each of the illocutionary acts discovered.

The results of

this latter part of my investigation are summarized in the
charts in Appendix III.
Thus, my examination of the professional essays gave
me some confidence in the validity of the speech-act theory
as a guide in the analysis of the essay and aided me in the
development of a set of admittedly very rough instruments
to be used in further investigation.

I felt that these
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instruments were sufficiently refined to use in evaluating
a group of student papers as the successful or unsuccessful
use of language for the performance of certain assigned
illocutionary acts.
writing,

My assumption was that good student

like good professional writing, will reflect the

principles found in speech-act theory for the performance
of the successful speech act and that a piece of student
writing can be shown to be "poor” because it departs from
these principles.
It was easier to make a full evaluation of the
felicity of student writing because, for the student essays,
I made the assignment which specified the major intent
which the student was to pursue and I could examine each
essay to see to what extent that intent was carried out.
Then,

I knew the audience of the essay, I knew on what sub

jects the students were able to obligate themselves to acts
such as stating, and I knew the acts which they could
felicitously perform in a way which I could not possibly
know for the professional writer.
were supposed to be performed,

Thus, knowing what acts

I sought to determine why

some acts succeeded and others failed.
I concluded that the student essays examined here
fail when the writers do not fulfill the requirements for
the performance of successful illocutionary acts which pro
fessional writers have satisfied.

The student writers do

not always employ appropriate devices or any devices to
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signal the act to be performed.

The reader may speculate

that the writer intended to perform a certain act asked for
in the assignment, but unless the writer signals his inten
tions, the reader cannot be sure that he is performing the
act.

The failure to indicate the act in an appropriate

manner is, however, only the surface problem.

In addition

to a scanty use of indicating devices, the writers of these
essays fail, it seems to me, for three other reasons:
1. The writer does not perform the act required in the
assignment.
2. The writer slips back and forth between acts without
preparing his reader for changes or perhaps without
being aware of the changes himself.
3. The writer performs acts which he cannot properly
perform because of his relationship to the audience
for which he writes.
In other words, the acts are "unhappy" or "infelicitous"
because they are not performed according to the rules which
constitute successful speech acts.
The student essays to be studied were written at
Louisiana State University to satisfy the first two re
quirements in English 1002 in the spring semester of 1975.
Each was an assignment to be completed by the end of the
fifty-minute class period.

They contain grammatical and

mechanical errors which I have retained in my transcrip
tion, some of them even those once designated "gross" erros by the freshman English committee at the University.
My contention is that the main reason the first papers are
poor, indeed practically meaningless,

is the failure in
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communication which is a consequence of the authors' fail
ure to perform illocutionary acts successfully.

The suc

cessful paper is successful, on the other hand, primarily
because the act which the writer was asked to perform is
clearly signaled

and adhered to throughout the paper.
I

The first essay analyzed here was written on the
second day of class and is therefore Theme 1 or the diag
nostic theme for the second semester of the 1974-75 school
term.

The writer has some problems with grammar and me

chanics, but the paper fails because the writer does not
explain, as he is asked to do, but instead chooses to in
struct and exhort.
On this particular day, the students were given two
theme topics, each based upon a quotation from an essay of
the type studied in English 1001, a course which most of
them had completed the semester before.

I did not assume

that the students had read the essays, so I chose quota
tions which I believed they could understand out of context
with only a few remarks from me before they began to write.
On the second day of the semester, however, it is almost
impossible to know what assignments will make sense to stu
dents, and the teacher is testing the breath of background
knowledge of the class as much as the writing ability of
each member.

The two assignments, typed copies of which
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were given to each student, follow:
1. In the essay, "Farewell, My Lovely," E. B. White
summed up his generation's affection for the Model
T Ford in the following way:
"My own generation
identifies it with youth, with its gaudy, irre
trievable excitements." What does your generation
identify with youth? Explain your answer in your
essay.
2. Harold Taylor in the essay, "The Development of an
Identity," says, "The particular purpose of a college
education is to enable the young to establish a per
sonal identity from the materials of experience and
knowledge which lie at hand." Explain the ways in
which your first semester at college has helped you
"to establish a personal identity."
After handing out the assignment sheets, I briefly discuss
ed the possible problem spots of the assignment:

the mean

ing of "personal identity," "identifies," and the "Model T
Ford."

I asked for questions from any student who did not

understand the assignment, and I talked to several individ
ually as they began to write.

I reminded the students that

adequate development is one criterion for the good paper in
freshman English classes and that usually their papers
should be three hundred to five hundred words in length,
but I did not emphasize length because I did not want to
encourage random padding.
The first assignment, the subject of the essay ana
lyzed in this section, specifies the propositional content
for the essay and the chief illocutionary acts which the
student is expected to perform.

He is to opine when he

tells what his generation identifies with youth.

If he

were given this assignment by an advertising firm, for
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example, which desired statistically correct assessments
of those activities and products with which today's young
people identify, he would be expected to assert or state.
Since he will not be able to verify in any conceivable way
during the fifty-minute writing period that a majority of
his generation will agree with his choice, he cannot be
expected to state his answer to this question.

He is asked,

moreover, to spend most of his writing time performing the
act of explaining.

Now, in Chapter IV, I have shown that

"explaining" is an ambiguous term which encompasses several
different acts and that each of these acts is usually per
formed in a multiple-sentence speech act.

Explaining may

be accounting for, and it may be exemplifying or even de
fining, according to the definitions in this study.

The

assignment does not specify which act of explaining the
student is to perform; so he might be expected to give
reasons for his choice or to exemplify his choice with the
intent to clarify.

The writer will have a perlocutionary

intent in most cases:

he will want to convince his reader

that his choice is valid or reasonable.

He may, in addi

tion, perform other acts, but they must stay subordinate
to the intent to opine and explain.

My reason for wording

the assignment so that I asked only for these acts is the
result of my experience with student papers.

This experi

ence indicates that students are more inclined to argue and
attempt to persuade than they are to provide good exempli
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fication or good reasons.

I wanted them to focus complete

ly on explaining before they were asked to perform acts
which may require rexplaining as a "sub-act."

In explain

ing here, the student’s authority must rest on firsthand
knowledge of youth which he has as an eighteen-year-old at
the present time or in years past, if he should happen to
be very much older than the usual college freshman.

He

must supply his information in order to explain his opinion.
The essay follows:
I would say that my generation identifies smoking
cigarettes with today's youth.
It seems as though every
year I see a younger child with a cigarette in his hand.
Lately, I have seen children as young as twelve years
old smoking cigarettes.
They think it makes them look
older and grown-up.
The fact that so many youngsters are smoking at this
early age is a bad situation.
They are going to get in
to habits of smoking and not be able to quit later on.
This can cause problems with their lungs at an earlier
age than the previous lung diseases of smokers since
they are starting at least seven or eight years earlier
than the adult smokers.
This generation should do something to show these
children that this can cause difficulties or even death
of them later on in their life.
Programs should be
started in grammar schools showing these youngsters how
much cigarette smoking can harm them.
This would dis
courage a lot of this early beginning of smokers.
Show
films of what smoking has done to previous smoker's
lungs and tell of the bad effects that smoking can give
a person.
Stress the fact that starting to smoke so
young will become a habit and that they will be smoking
two or three packs a day later in their life.
The
coughing and agony that cigarette smoking causes after
several years will be a good point to bring up.
You can look outside and see this problem face to
face with the youngsters because nothing is being done
about it. No one is saying anything to them about why
it is wrong.
There should be an effort put forth to
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show these children the mistake they are making by
starting to smoke so young, but the city officials
and school board members are not doing much about it.
We know that it is wrong; we know that they are doing
it; but nothing is being done to prevent it. When a
child sees his parents smoking, he must figure it
cannot be too bad for himself. Mom and Dad do it.
This is what the children are faced with, and they
cannot very likely be told that it is wrong when the
person speaking is smoking.
This is a big problem with today's youth, but noth
ing seems to be getting done about it.
If programs
were started to prevent this, a lot of lives might be
saved.
With a little effort from this generation they
might be helped; but without it what do they have to
look forward to?
It is apparent in paragraph
ably will not be content

1 that the writer prob

merely to opine and explain.

first sentence opines in order to

The

answer the question— to

convey the basic propositional content of the essay.

When

the student tells his reader that his generation identifies
with smoking, his reader must decide how he will explain:
will he account for or exemplify?

Accounting for seems

the most obvious act, though he might exemplify with the
telling of experiences with the people of his generation in
which cigarettes are the single constant element, thus "ex
plaining" his opinion and probably trying to prove that it
is more than an opinion— in fact, a fairly accurate assess
ment of the habits of his friends and acquaintances.

The

next three sentences do indeed exemplify and account for
the author's opinion that cigarette smoking is character
istic of today's youth, but the writer also manages to
raise himself out of the class of youth to a vantage point
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from which he is observing "smoking youth."

This process

begins in sentence 2, and it is completed in sentence 4
where the writer says, "They think," not "we think."
Subtly, perhaps unconsciously, the writer shows that he is
preparing to condemn others rather than illustrate or ac
count for something of which he is a part.

Now, condemning

can legitimately occur as an author explains:

any or all

of his acts may be compound, and he has not been instructed
to praise the thing which he associates with youth.

Con

demning or deprecating is not, however, to be the chief
emphasis of the paper.

Since two sentences in the first

paragraph exemplify and the last sentence accounts for, the
writer still has a chance to keep explaining as his major
act until he launches a full-scale attack on smoking in
paragraph 2.

At this point he gives up all pretense of ex

plaining in favor of a discussion of the horrors of smoking
and ways to discourage it.
In paragraph 2, the writer shows in his first sen
tence that he is prepared to deprecate or condemn.

Then,

in paragraph 3, he signals with his verbs that he will ad
vise and exhort.

The repetition of the modal "should" in

dicates the nature of the act being performed.

Then the

change to imperative mood reenforces the idea that the
writer is giving instructions.

In paragraph 4, the writer

might be said to be accounting for the widespread practice
of cigarette-smoking among children, but then in his con-
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elusion one sees that his real interest is still in advis
ing and exhorting, even warning.
The writer, failing to perform the act that the as
signment requires, has instead unsuccessfully performed
acts which he lacks the authority to perform successfully,
cannot perform in a three-hundred-word paper written in
fifty minutes, and would need reference material to sub
stantiate.

In paragraph 2, one questions his authority to

state in sentences 2 and 3.

In paragraph 3, one wonders

how the writer can know that these measures will help.
problem runs through paragraph 4.

The

How much does the writer

know about campaigns to stop children from smoking, the
reader asks himself.

He would accept statements based on

the writer's own experience as a child or the experience of
his friends.

In the last paragraph, however, the writer is

omniscient in his pronouncements.

His reader will, there

fore, accord him the muddled "uptake" which his muddled
performance deserves.
Now, this paper was one of the poorer papers written
in response to the assignment, but the problem of directing
attention to the appropriate illocutionary act was apparent
in enough papers to tell me something about the assignment
and the class.

The quotations seemed clear enough to most

of the students, but the acts which they were asked to per
form did not seem clear.

The term explain, I assumed,

caused them as much trouble as it has caused really serious
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students of expository writing.

If I were to continue to

use the term, I knew that I had to limit its meaning for
the class.
II
The second assignment of the semester elicited a
paper from a student with far more potential as a writer
but with the same inability to perform the two acts request
ed in the assignment.

Because the student, after a confer

ence with the instructor, rewrote the paper, this paper
provides an interesting example, not only of the ways the
writer goes wrong in performing the required acts, but also
of the ways a writer can succeed.

The errors of various

kinds are, again, distracting, but not so distracting as
the fact that the reader is never completely sure that he
knows which illocutionary act the writer is performing at
a given moment.
In the class meetings before the second assignment,
I worked on the senses in which I would use the term
explain in their assignments.

We looked at examples of

accounting for, of exemplifying, and even of defining as we
discussed A1 Capp's "Young Van Schuyler's Greatest Ro1
2
mance" and Erik Erikson's "Adolescence," both found in
the anthology Design, a supplementary text in the class.
In Erikson's essay, actually a section from his book,
Identity:

Youth and Crisis, defining, accounting for, and
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exemplifying take place as Erikson discusses adolescence in
modern society,

A1 Capp's story defines terms such as

"Normies" and "Others," and we used it as a fictional exam
ple of the "out-grouper,"
ed in class extensively.

Erikson’s term which we discuss
I emphasized the necessity for

the student to read the assignment carefully and to show in
the first paragraph which acts he intended to perform in
his own essay.

I used traditional terminology reminding

the students as they had been taught in English 1001 to use
an introduction with a thesis statement and reviewing the
writing of introductions.
The assignment question which the girl who wrote the
next two papers as well as the students who wrote the last
two chose to write on follows:
Erik Erikson says, "Young people can become remarkably
clannish, intolerant, and cruel in their exclusion of
others who are 'different,' in skin color or cultural
background, in tastes and gifts, and often in entirely
petty aspects of dress and gesture arbitrarily selected
as the signs of an in-grouper or out-grouper." To
what extent is Erikson accurate in calling young people
in an "in-group" "clannish," "intolerant," and "cruel"?
Explain your answer using your own experience as an
"in-grouper," an "out-grouper,” or an observer of both
to illustrate your ideas.
In this assignment the writer is explicitly told to illus
trate or exemplify his opinion.

Thus, he is, first, to

give his opinion of the accuracy of Erikson's view.

The

writer is not asked to argue that another group is more
clannish or intolerant than adolescents, though he could
use comparison with another group to illustrate his view of
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adolescents, and arguing may figure in the complex series
of acts if it is not allowed to take over as the chief act.
Moreover, the writer may have a perlocutionary intent— in
this case, probably to convince or persuade.

However, he

has been guided to his best authority for his acts— his own
experience, and he has been instructed that his chief re
sponsibility is to opine and explain with illustrations.
The essay to be analyzed, this time the work of a
girl, follows:
The time in one's life roughly between twelve and
twenty is a very different time.
Very important things
happen, patterns are set up to affect the rest of your
life, a career is set up for launch, and a majority of
the most important lessons are learned.
This time in
your life is different mostly in that it is so much
more intense.
Even the smallest of matters can be up
setting and take on terrible importance.
Erikson
brought out that the opinions of one's peers is one of
the terribly important factors that affect decisions.
He is right.
It is rather obvious that youth is "clannish."
I
felt Erikson was being very condemning in his article
concerning the way youth form cliques. That is the
way he came across to me.
In the fact that youth are
often cruel to and intolerant of those who are not in
the "group," I guess he has a right to condemn.
How
ever, I should like to disagree with attributing this
to being young.
This trait is not a trait of adoles
cents, but one of humanity.
Most of the things he
brought out about that period of life are more readily
recognized only because they are more intense.
It is
apparent in circles of older people all over the world.
It is true that the young strive to please their
peers, and it often becomes an obsession.
We pick cer
tain friends who are like us and surround ourselves
with them.
I can't speak for the youths that Erikson
observed to make these statements but the extent of
cruelty and intolerance of cliques is not as great as
he has made it out to be. . ..
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Since the assignment requires that the student opine and
illustrate, she is in trouble when she makes "disagreeing"
the major act in paragraph 2, but her trouble began in
paragraph 1, and by the end of paragraph 3, her paper has
become incoherent to such a degree that analysis of the
next paragraph seems pointless.
In the first paragraph, the writer shows that the
complex series of compound illocutionary acts which she has
been asked to perform are not likely to be performed in a
clear way.

The writer who intends to opine and illustrate

in this essay needs to begin by showing the extent to which
he accepts Erikson's view of the adolescent as "clannish,
intolerant, and cruel."

In the first paragraph he must

indicate his own belief and show the direction his essay
will take in an attempt to clarify it.

In this essay, the

statement of the student's belief comes in the final sen
tence of the paragraph.

She begins the paragraph by

asserting, a proper act with which to lead up to the act
of opining or giving her belief.

The problem with her as

sertion is its propositional content.
little more than a truism:

Her assertion is

this different time of one's

life is a very different time.

The reader expects the next

sentence to rescue the sentence in some miraculous way from
the state of uselessness which the truism in most situa
tions succumbs to, and, for a time, it appears that it has
succeeded by illustrating the ways it is different.
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Sentence 2 states, however, in a way that shows that the
second sentence does not illustrate the first.

Sentence 3

defines "different" in sentence 1 in such a way as to make
the illustrations in sentence 2 irrelevant.

Sentence 4

does illustrate sentence 3, but then sentence 5 is dropped
into the reader's lap.

Various relationships between the

intensity of one's experiences and the effect of peers on
one's decisions may be obvious to the reader because of his
own experience, but what relationship the writer intends to
show, the reader has no way of knowing.
utterance of the writer's belief:

Then comes the

"He is right."

The

reader will probably assume that the writer means that "he
is right" in calling the young people of an "in-group"
"clannish,

intolerant, and cruel," but actually the reader

only assumes that this is the point because he has the
question before him.

In this first paragraph, the writer

has made a series of assertions and opinings, some of them
seemingly intended to clarify others, and the reader has no
way of deciding how the writer intends them to relate to
each other.

The author has used no master speech acts.

Therefore, the reader is confused concerning what illocu
tionary acts are to be performed and what the propositional
content will be of an essay introduced in this inadequate
way.
Now, sentence 1, paragraph 2, seems to be a master
speech act indicating that the writer is prepared to
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illustrate the last sentence of paragraph 1.

However,

sentence 2, paragraph 2, shows that the writer does not
really agree with Erikson at all, since "condemning" seems
to function as a value word denoting an attitude which the
author does not like.

Sentence 3 adds to the idea that

"condemning" is used in this way, though the sentence adds
too little else to justify its inclusion in the essay.

In

the fourth sentence, the writer moves into an act which has
nothing to do with the assignment but a lot to do with the
use of "condemning."

The writer disagrees and argues with

Erikson's attributing clannishness,
to adolescents and not to adults.

intolerance, and cruelty
She is only asked to de

cide on the extent to which adolescents are

"clannish, in

tolerant, and cruel" and illustrate her position from her
observations of "in-groupers" and "out-groupers" among her
own acquaintances.

Then, in sentence 5, the writer makes

an assertion to support a point which she was not asked to
make with assertions which she cannot make successfully.

A

college freshman will always trouble his reader when he
makes assertions about people "all over the world."

In

addition, the word intense in sentence 6 becomes more ap
parently a problem than it was in the first paragraph
where the reader worried about a "time in your life" which
is intense.

The word means "existing or occurring in a high

degree" or "acute, strong, or vehement, as sensations,
feelings, or emotions," according to The Random House
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Dictionary of the English Language,

If this word is used

accurately at all in the second paragraph, it confuses fur
ther the point the writer is making about the extent to
which she feels that "in-groupers” are "clannish" or
"cruel."

Acting intensely, young people in "in-groups"

would be tremendously crueler than people at other ages.
In the third paragraph, the writer proceeds to make
one assertion after another until the paper fades off into
an incoherent jumble.

By this time, the reader knows that

the paper does not opine and illustrate but makes assertions
that are not successful as components in an act of illus
trating because they are not tied together in a meaningful
way.

Many of them are not successful assertions if they

appear as single-sentence acts since they contradict each
other and express views which the reader will not be will
ing to accept from an eighteen-year-old student.
When the student rewrote the paper following a con
ference in my office, she indulged her love of jargon and
big words, but she controlled to a remarkable degree her
tendency to make infelicitous assertions and her desire to
perform a variety of acts instead of the ones called for
in the assignment.

In our conference,

I discussed the as

signment with her, and then I read over her paper with her
sentence by sentence in order to point out inconsistencies
and contradictions as well as the ways in which she had
failed to satisfy the assignment.

I did not use speech-act
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terminology such as illocutionary act because we had not
used it in the class.

Instead, I asked her in rewriting

the paper to answer the question as directly as she could
with her opinion of Erikson's view and then to illustrate
her view with examples from her own experience.
The essay follows:
To the young person the fixation of an accepted
identity and the clarification of one's ideas, ideals,
and behavior is very important.
Clarification is sought
in surrounding oneself with peers who either accept your
initial identity or allow you to copy theirs.
According
to Erikson, clarification can also be sought by destruc
tive means.
He states that young people can become re
markably cruel and clannish in the exclusion of others
selected as "out-groupers." I feel the measure of their
cruelty is only to the extent that the out-grouper al
lows it to disturb him.
One of the problems of identity formation is that
when a young person enters high school, which I shall
use as an influential adolescent environment, she has
the choice of accepting one of the already stamped out
identities or forming her own and taking the chance of
it being accepted by those whom she wishes to accept
her.
The mistake of far too many youths is that they
feel the first choice is their only one.
Rather than
molding their own identity by experience or carefully
weighing advice from trustworthy sources, the student
sees as practically her only choice the acceptance of
the preformed identity of a prominent clique.
A young person's second choice is what Erikson pre
fers to call the Democratic doctrine— to play one's own
role.
To be able to form an identity acceptable to me
was far more important than whether it was accepted by
others.
I would not always have a group of peers to
stand on or behind me.
If I were the one that tested
my ideas, ideals, and behavior and they passed as ac
ceptable, I would find that knowledge more comforting
than knowing I had the identity of someone else and had
to depend on their acceptance.
If I approached those
who were cruelly intolerant of my own role, I would
pass them off and not be bothered.
If I had let their
exclusion bother me, then the extent of their cruelty
would be greater.
I measure the intolerance and cruelty
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by the way it affects the student.
I had enough faith in humanity to believe that some
where a group of people would accept me and were the
type meant to be my friends.
Cliques who believed they
did not want me or need me or would shut me out because
they considered me "out" were blown off.
I found a
minority of people who accepted whether they approved
personally of the role I had chosen or not.
I did not
find the intolerance of other cliques very cruel, and
their approval was no longer important.
I was happy
that I myself was satisfied with my adolescent identity.
In conclusion, not only do I find young people less
cruel and intolerant than Erikson portrays, but also I
still believe they are inclined to be more open-minded
than in post-adolescence.
Only in the last paragraph does the writer give in to the
desire to argue against Erikson’s thesis by stating her be
lief that adults are more cruel than adolescents.

In this

last sentence, the change in act is bothersome, but in the
preceding paragraphs the acts introduced in the first para
graph have been at least partly performed.
The first paragraph of the essay still shows some
problems which the writer is having in refining the perform
ance of the assigned speech act.

Grammatical and diction

problems are obvious difficulties, but the still-present
difficulty in executing certain illocutionary acts is the
most serious one.

The first sentence asserts, as signalled

by the assertive link "is," as well as by the nature of the
content.

The second sentence asserts and illustrates the

method of "clarification."

One problem at this point is

the authority for the writer's assertions.
tence introduces another problem.

The third sen

The word also signals
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that this sentence is used to assert another means of
clarification besides the one described in sentence 2.
However,

it is actually only an aspect of the first method

as the writer could show by a clearer use of indicators to
signal the relationship between sentences in a multiplesentence utterance.

Sentences 3, 4, and 5 could be changed

to read in this way:
According to Erikson, however, the search for clarifica
tion which aids some adolescents in fixing an identity
results in harm to others.
In their association with
peers who share or accept the same identity traits,
adolescents form "in-groups" which often become remark
ably cruel and intolerant toward others.
I feel, never
theless, that these groups are only cruel to the extent
that the "out-grouper" allows them to disturb him.
In the revised paragraph, in illustrating "clarification,"
the writer prepares for the point which she wishes to make:
"out-groupers" are harmed only to the extent to which they
allow themselves to be, so they determine the extent to
which "in-groups" are "clannish,

intolerant, and cruel."

If the reader accepts the signal given by the use of the
word also as a true indication of meaning, this revision
will not work; but

the revision spares the reader the dif

ficulty of reconciling "surrounding oneself with peers who
either accept your initial identity or allow you to copy
theirs" and considering this practice as completely outside
the "in-group" system.
The next paragraphs fail in that they do not contain
illustrations which show the author's experiences but assert
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generalities, but the paragraphs do try to illustrate the
author's view of the cruelty of "in-groups."

The use of

the pronoun she in paragraph 2 confuses the reader concern
ing the identity of the speaker and "her" relationship to
the assertions which she is making.

If the reader knows

that the writer is a girl, he does not know it because of
any assistance from the writer.

In addition, the reader

misses the assistance from transition words which success
ful exemplifying requires.

The reader must discover for

himself the relationship between the "out-grouper1s" suf
fering and the choices.

The third paragraph is tied in by

the allusion to the paragraph before it.

By the end of

paragraph 4, however, the reader has difficulty remembering
the point of the paper.

The writer is asserting and opin

ing, but the content is now her own strong character, not
the extent to which adolescents can be called "clannish,
intolerant, and cruel."
This paper I consider to be a definite improvement
over the other paper.

It has problems such as those dis

covered in the first paragraph.
writer does give her opinion

On the

other hand, the

of the extent to which

adoles

cents are cruel in their treatment of "out-groupers" in the
first paragraph, and in paragraphs 3 and 4 she gives as ex
amples of her opinion her own experiences as an "outgrouper" by choice.

I would

concrete than they are, but,

prefer her

examples to be more

after this revision, I could

232

see that the young woman would probably finally display the
intelligence and background which had earned her ACT scores
that allowed her to skip most first-semester freshman sub
jects.
Ill
The second writer of a paper on the assignment des
cribed above shows a

different type of confusion of acts.

The writer seems to know what he is expected to do but to
be incapable of performing the acts in a straightforward
manner that will secure the proper "uptake" from his reader.
Finally, the writer changes from one act to another for no
apparent reason, and the reader is left with a decision
concerning the nature of the proper "uptake."
The essay begins with the title, "The Adolescent
Journey," which is provocative but not a clear indicator of
the act to be performed.

One expects from the title some

allusion in the essay to the journey mentioned in the title,
perhaps an extended metaphor which will be used in explain
ing the writer's view of Erikson's assessment of the ado
lescent's "in-group" behavior.

Actually, the expectations

set up in the title are never satisfied as one sees in the
essay which follows:
The Adolescent Journey
People experiencing adolescence should prepare them
selves for some good fortune and some disappointments
based on what groups they are classified in. Being
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classified in groups is an adjustment that is premedi
tated by the group and is not decided by the person
involved.
The fact is, the person who is being put in
a group must accept what he is until he reaches a stage
that will allow him to change or be independent.
Members of groups have characteristics that warn of
their disapproval of letting outsiders into their group.
One example is the "clannish’' effect they can give to
the outsider.
The group does this by classifying the
outsider with another group and telling him that he
should "get lost." This frequently occurs when a young
er boy wants to associate with an older group of boys.
I experienced this in my early group.
I wanted to give
my friends my own age the impression that I was at a
higher level of maturity than they could ever reach and
that they had to look up to me.
This was a cruel thing
to do to my friends when I look back on it, even though
it seemed very appropriate at the time.
In this case
people who were "different" were excluded from the
group.
Some of these groups were formed for the accomplish
ment of a common purpose.
The common purpose usually
was to eliminate people from our association who were
unable to fulfill the characteristic we wanted a member
to have.
These groups are called cliques.
I have been
in a clique in my adolescence.
For example, I have been
in cliques in which the outsider was excluded just for
the sake of argument.
This type of nonsense is typical
of the adolescent stages, especially in the early and
middle stages of adolescence.
The exclusion of others is not always an easy task.
If an outsider is persistent enough, he can adjust him
self so that he fits in with the image of the group.
For example, if I was ambitious enough to want to fight
in any way possible to join a group, I would concentrate
on perfecting ways to fit into it.
With a great desire,
I may eventually become an "in-grouper."
Being an "in-grouper" or "out-grouper" is based on
what type of person one is.
I mean whether you are a
"normie, a "poor kid," or an "other."
A normie is a normal kid.
Being normal is one step
toward being an "in-grouper." Normality may be based
on race, culture, or belief.
Race is the most difficult
obstacle to overcome because there is no way to overcome
it. Culture can sometimes be an obstacle because of
differences in languages and educational background.
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Belief is probably the easiest obstacle for one to over
come.
A "poor kid" has distinguishing features that
cannot be overcome.
For example, a racial difference.
In my case this is true and I am distinguishable.
These
distinguishing features are not always reasons for ex
clusions.
Sadly enough, in many cases they are.
Other
features are handicaps such as wooden legs or short arms.
"Others" are the most unfortunate group.
They are
unwelcome outcasts.
In a sense, they have no way to
redeem themselves or truthfully prove that they are
worthy of respect and acceptance.
The "Out-grouper" should be optimistic and realize
that he is in a group himself, that group being the out
siders.
In paragraphs 1-4, the writer, with no help from the title,
attempts to illustrate his answer, the propositional con
tent of which is not clear.
gins to classify and define.

Then, in paragraph 5, he be
In paragraph 7, he concludes

his essay by advising.
The reader senses in paragraph 1 that the writer is
agreeing with Erikson that adolescent "in-groups" can be
cruel.

The writer confuses his reader, however, by his in

direct way of expressing his belief.

"People experiencing

adolescence" might be parents, teachers, policemen, or any
other group working with young adults, though the reader,
partly because he knows the assignment, assumes that the
phrase refers to adolescents themselves.

In the first sen

tence, the writer leads his reader to expect that he is
going to discuss good and bad aspects of the "in-group"
relationship.

The reader is led to a blank wall, however,

in the next sentence by the assertion that "being classi
fied" equals "an adjustment" and that the "adjustment" is
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"premeditated" by the "in-group."

The last sentence where

the reader is expecting the writer's stand on Erikson's
ideas is again frustrating.

Obviously, the writer has not

enjoyed the effect of "in-groups," but he cannot bring him
self to execute a clear expression of this opinion that
they are bad.

One speculates that he does not understand

how to signal his acts directly and that a large portion of
this student's problem is his ignorance of the significance
of illocutionary force indicators.
Paragraphs 2-4 attempt to illustrate the writer’s
experiences as an "in-grouper" in order to show that "in
groupers" can be cruel.

The broad reference in paragraph

2 makes the propositional content unclear:

is the writer

a younger boy wanting membership in an older boys' "in
group" or is he a younger boy who made it into an older
boys' "in-group"?

Finally, the reader concludes that he is

the younger boy who was accepted by the older boys, but the
writer has not signaled that this is the direction which he
is taking.

The act of illustrating in these paragraphs

would be more effective if the writer had used statements
of specific happenings rather than general statements.
example,

For

in paragraph 4, the reader, by describing one way

in which he fought, could make his illustration far clearer
to his reader.

Illustrating, to be successful, requires

that the writer supply relationships between the illustra
tion and the thing to be illustrated, and, for a reader who
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is not familiar with the way this young man has fought to
secure his place, these relationships must be made very
clear.

They would be far clearer if the writer described

specific happenings.
In paragraph 8, the writer abruptly changes acts.
Paragraphs 8-10 are devoted to classifying and defining
"normie," "poor kid," and "other."

These terms were intro

duced in the Capp story mentioned above, and they could be
used effectively in this assignment as the writer explains
"out-groups" and "in-groups."

In the context of the as

signment, the writer would not even have to define the
terms, since his reader already knows the way in which he
is using them.

Here, they are stuck in without master

speech acts to show their relationship to the chief illocu
tionary intent of the paper.

The propositional acts of

these paragraphs are confused, but the reader can hardly
worry about that point when he sees no

reason for the act

of defining at all or the use of these terms unless they
are introduced earlier and used more effectively.

The

final paragraph of advice is equally confusing but welcome
as the end to a paper which ran out of material several
paragraphs earlier.

In fact, one wonders whether the

writer did not worry excessively about
paragraphs to stretch his work.

length and add these
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IV
The successful essay or complex series of compound
illocutionary acts performed by a third student demonstrates
the extent to which these other essays did fail.

The

writer, a young woman, tells her reader immediately in the
first paragraph that she agrees with Erikson and that she
can illustrate her understanding of Erikson's ideas with
her own experiences.

For me, at least, her illustrations

succeed in clarifying.
The reader notices immediately that the writer is
not prone to make statements and assertions which she can
not be responsible for.

The essay follows:

Adolescence is a wonderful and difficult period in
growing up, and that period of development between the
beginning of puberty and maturity holds cherished as
well as harrowing experiences for almost everyone who
has been through it.
For, as Erik Erikson stated in
his essay on adolescence, "Young people can become re
markably clannish, intolerant, and cruel." This cruel
ty is common in the world of the young adult, and cop
ing with situations like prejudice and ridicule some
times strengthens and sometimes weakens the tormented
individual.
I have experienced the anguish of being an
"out-grouper" as well as the "pleasure" of being an
"in-grouper," and it is because of this direct partici
pation in both events that I can comment on the absurd
ity of the two.
For I was the same person before I
encountered wealth, and here is where the absurdity
lies.
With the same face and ideals and a few green
backs in my wallet, I experienced a sudden transforma
tion that, at first, I was not aware of.
Being an "out-grouper," as I remember it, was a
trying and awkward experience.
I was one of those kids
who still wore white socks and loafers when all the
other girls had flamboyant, colorful fishnet stockings
and tiny-heeled pumps that none of them could walk in.
I also had a mop of auburn hair, that embarrassing
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color between red and brown that looks so awkward in the
midst of girls with blond hair.
But, worst of all, I
was poor.
That was the great burden in my life that
would surely make me eligible for sainthood after death.
It was poverty, I felt, that kept me from achieving the
fame that was rightfully mine.
My classmates would
laugh at my ancient clothes and medieval loafers, and,
at parties, new teenagers would mistake me for the maid
and throw their fur-collared coats at me for safekeep
ing.
It was humiliating, and I waited for the day when
I would be famous and plastered on billboards through
out the country.
And then my dream was fulfilled!
My widowed mother met and married a brilliant and
charming widower who just happened to have a small for
tune and an older daughter with a flair for fashion.
Slowly I became chic and fashionable.
Lime-green fish
net stockings made me the center of attraction.
My
built-in swimming pool also helped.
New friends flocked
around me, encircling me in the very groups that had
once cast me out.
At first, it was exciting and fun.
Then the hypocrisy of these "friends" finally shouted at
me.
These "in-groupers" wanted me to ridicule and shun
the members of the "out-group" that I was once a member
of.
I had that same, funny auburn hair and still wore
loafers when nobody was around.
(They were comfortable.)
So why was I different suddenly? The whole thing was
absurd, and I will never forget how unrealistic and
foolish it was of me to be an "in-grouper."
I had been
an "in-grouper" all along with the "out-groupers" who
were like me.
Adolescence is a wonderful and difficult period of
growing up, and this stage of growth can be painful as
well as joyful.
Young people can be prejudiced and
harsh in their encounters with others, and this harsh
ness can sometimes weaken or strengthen an individual.
But it is a period of growth that everyone experiences,
and, luckily, most survive.
And this survival brings
new insights to us about human behavior and life.
The reader soon notices phrases such as "almost everyone,"
"common," and "sometimes strengthens and sometimes weakens"
all of which show that the writer will not overgeneralize
or, in speech-act terminology, make assertions which she
cannot sincerely obligate herself to provide evidence to
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support.

The content of the last two statements in para

graph 3 is not completely clear though the reader suspects
that he knows the point that is being made, but at the end
of the essay, as the reader, I definitely knew the writer's
opinion of Erikson's view of adolescence and understood,
not only that the writer had intended to illustrate, but
also what the writer "means" by her answer, to the extent
to which that is possible.

In addition, the writer has

performed acts which were not required by the assignment
without destroying the focus of her paper.
In the first paragraph, the writer begins with an
assertion on adolescence that is also an evaluation of it.
In the second sentence, she quotes in order to opine.

The

connecting particle "for" in sentence 2 shows that the
writer is more concerned with the "difficult" and "harrow
ing" aspects of adolescence than with the "wonderful" and
"cherished" side:

in other words, the writer believes with

Erikson that adolescents can be "clannish, intolerant, and
cruel."

The next sentence opines further concerning the

view expressed in sentence 2 and adds dimension to the
paper's position on adolescent cruelty by opining concern
ing its effect on the adolescent.

In the next sentence,

the writer shows her source of information— her own exper
ience.

The sentence which begins "I have experienced"

functions as a master speech act to indicate exemplifying.
Throughout the paragraph, the writer is deprecating and
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commending.

By the end of the complex series of compound

illocutionary acts which is the first paragraph of this
essay, the writer has answered the question in the assign
ment, showed her understanding of the effect of the "in
group" on the individual, and suggested the direction the
essay will take as she illustrates the statement, "This
cruelty is common in the world of the young adult, and
coping with situations like prejudice and ridicule some
times strengthens and sometimes weakens the tormented in
dividual."

The phrase "situations like prejudice and rid

icule" is inaccurately formulated, but the reader knows the
young woman's opinion and also knows that she intends to
add the idea of the good effect of the "in-group/out-group"
situation to the total idea in the paper.
This essay can be analyzed for its use of illocu
tionary force indicators just as the professional essay can
be.

The expectations in the mind of the reader who knows

the assignment provide the first context indicators.

In

paragraph 2, "as I remember it" and "I felt" function like
the explicit formula by signaling

that the writer is ex

emplifying in terms of her own experience and that she is
opining.

Connecting particles such as "also," "worst of

all," and "and" assist in the performance of the illustrat
ing acts.

The third paragraph could be divided in order to

show the changes from the statements and opinions about her
mother's marriage and her new life to the opinions
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and statements that explain her reaction to the new life.
In paragraph 3, quotation marks,

"friends," signal depre

cating.
This essay exhibits the complexity of the profes
sional essay, to the extent that the author can handle com
plex acts successfully.

She deprecates her own attempt to

be stylish in order to deprecate the "in-group" mystique.
She fulfills the assignment, agreeing with Erikson that
"in-groups" can be cruel, but she shows throughout the pa
per that the effect of the cruelty has been to strengthen
at least one adolescent— herself.

In other words, this

student essay is judged successful because it displays the
same characteristics displayed by the professional essays.
It, like them, is a complex series of compound illocution
ary acts, each of these acts signalled by indicators known
to the writer and to any reader who finds the essay fully
intelligible.
V
The student essay viewed by Austin's judge is, then,
successful for the same reasons that a professional
writer's essay will be successful.

The writer in composing

the essay performs a complex series of compound illocution
ary acts, and he performs them in the manner specified by
the rules which constitute the individual acts, correctly
using the force indicators in his repertoire.

One realizes
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very soon that the acts which are successfully performed in
the student essays are never as complex as those found in
the professional essays.

One is reminded of Beardsley's

conclusion, "What makes a discourse a literary work (roughly
speaking) is its exploitation to a high degree of the
3
illocutionary-act potential of its verbal ingredients."
The successful student essay contains more compound acts
and manages to work in more acts with opining and exempli
fying without destroying the unity of intent in the paper,
but even this paper lacks the "richness and complexity of
meaning" which Beardsley finds in the great work.

The

second essay studied fails at least partly because the
writer tries for complexity and loses unity because she
cannot handle compound acts well.
The importance of the assignment becomes increasing
ly apparent.

The student writer uses as his first indica

tor the assignment for which he writes the essay, this
assignment functioning as the context of his utterance as
the collection of essays or a periodical functions for the
professional writer.

The terms used in the assignment must

be ones which the writer knows, and he must be asked to
perform acts which are possible.

The term explain will

probably always give difficulty.

It seems necessary, how

ever, when the instructor is trying to limit the acts which
the student performs to accounting for or exemplifying in
order to make sure that the student can perform these acts
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which are an integral part of more complicated acts such
as arguing.
It seems logical to conclude, therefore, that a
study of the essay as a complex series of compound illocutionary acts should give a student insight into the nature
of the composing process which results in an essay, the
restrictions on him when he intends to perform a certain
act, and the signals which he must use if he wants his
reader to understand his intent.
If the study of the formal essay as the performance
of a complex series of compound illocutiionary acts has the
possibilities for teaching composition which I believe it
to have, then one should be able to outline a program for
teaching the essay based on the conclusions to be drawn
from this study.

In the concluding chapter of this dis

sertation, after summarizing my conclusions,
pose such an outline.

I shall pro

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
I began this study to test the hypothesis that a
formal essay can be analyzed as the performance of a com
plex series of compound illocutionary acts and that the
insights gained from such an analysis can be applied to
the teaching of the reading and the writing of the formal
essay.

My study proceeded from a study of the works of

J. L. Austin and John Searle to an analysis of professional
and student essays using speech-act theory.

From this

study I have concluded that such an approach may provide a
valuable fresh approach to teaching composition as well as
the careful reading of expository prose.
In the second and third chapters of this study, I
discussed the parts of the speech-act theory of Austin and
Searle which are relevant in the study of the essay.

The

relevant ideas from their theories are the following:

(1)

virtually every utterance in a meaningful speech situation
consists of a locutionary or a propositional act, an illo
cutionary act, and sometimes a perlocutionary act; (2) the
propositional and illocutionary acts are rule-governed and
conventional;

(3) conventional force indicators convey the

illocutionary intent of the speaker; and (4) the rules,
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conventions, and indicating devices are accessible to the
native speaker of the language as a result of his knowledge
as a

native speaker.
In Chapter IV, I analyzed 'The Iron String" by How

ard Mumford Jones as the performance of a complex series of
compound illocutionary acts.

In the process I discovered

that the author performed acts of stating, opining, arguing,
exemplifying, accounting for, comparing, quoting, evaluat
ing, urging, deprecating, and commending, and I formulated
the rules for these, which I have listed in Appendix II.

I

concluded that some of these— exemplifying, arguing, and
accounting for— are seldom performed using a one-sentence
utterance and that they usually consist of a statement or
opinion to be argued for or exemplified plus the evidence
to be used in arguing or exemplifying.

I discovered indi

cating devices which Austin and Searle did not discuss, and
I concluded that in certain contexts almost any word may
function to indicate force and that the author's use of
indicating devices may finally be tied to his style, thus
providing a new approach to the study of the relationship
of form and content.
In Chapter V, I studied three additional essays—
Joseph Wood Krutch's "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Sylvia
Angus's "It’s Pretty, but Is It Art?", and Irving Kristol's
"Censorship and Pornography."

In analyzing these I found

it necessary to discuss three additional acts— believing,

246

defining, and interpreting— and to formulate the rules for
these, which are also listed in Appendix II.

I found more

and more evidence to support the idea that the illocution
ary acts in most essays by professional writers are dis
tinguished by their complexity and that the ways to indi
cate force are as numerous as the verbal resources of the
writer and his audience.

I concluded, too, that these

essays were felicitous performances of illocutionary acts
because the authors possessed the necessary authority to
perform the acts in them and understood the obligations
which they undertook in performing them.

Finally, in

Chapter VI, I analyzed five student essays, four unsuccess
ful ones and one successful one, for their felicity as
illocutionary acts.

I must now consider to what extent I

have proved the hypothesis with which the study began to be
a correct one.

Is it valid, in other words, to regard the

formal essay as a performance of a complex series of usual
ly compound illocutionary acts?

Can this theory be used in

the composition class?
The first question elicits a somewhat hesitant af
firmation of the first part of the hypothesis.

Given the

theory of the illocutionary act and given certain profes
sional essays,

I have been able to manipulate the elements

in the essays to fit the elements of the theory.
might add, they fit rather neatly.

And, I

On the other hand, I

suspect that '’manipulate" may be a more apt term to
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describe the process which I have used than I had hoped it
would be— that, in other words, I have merely superimposed
one more pattern on the structure of the essay instead of
discovering relationships inherent in its structure in a
good ordinary language philosopher way.

Rather than new

insights which will make the intrinsic structure of the
essay clearer,

I may have simply put old wine into new

bottles which add nothing to the flavor of the wine though
they embellish its appearance on the shelves.

For example,

does an examination of connecting particles as force indi
cators make their use clearer than the examination of the
same words as transition devices?

Is it more helpful to

consider organization in terms of the focus on the desired
illocutionary acts and the importance of their relationship
to each other?

I believe that speech-act theory does offer

a constructive new approach to the analysis of the formal
essay because I believe that the theory is an accurate
description of speech acts.

I do not believe that it has

passed the theory stage, however; and the final study, if
such a study is possible, is probably some years away.
One direction for study at this time is an examina
tion of the second part of the hypothesis, which I have
explored only in evaluating the five student essays.

Actu

al use of the theory in composition classes should show
more about the intrinsic value of the theory as a descrip
tion of the essay as well as its value as a teaching aid.
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Basing my ideas on the analysis in Chapters IV, V, and VI,
I believe that the following procedures will work.
In the first place, the student must be introduced
to spoken English as the performance of speech acts.

In

this introduction, the age of the student and his maturity
in the use of English should dictate the instructor's use
of terminology to explain speech acts.

The term illocution

ary , for example, has no intrinsic value, but it is a con
venient term once the student has mastered his language to
the extent that the word will not hide the concept.

The

rules which constitute each act are far more important in
the study than the ability to use the word illocutionary in
an appropriate slot.
discovered.

These rules should not be taught but

Until a student can consider a certain speech

act which he can perform with ease and formulate the rules
for it, he is unlikely to use the act successfully in an
essay.

As his knowledge of speech acts grows, then the

acts for which he can verbalize rules should grow.

Indica

tors, on the other hand, can be taught more directly.
The writing of the professional can be used in three
ways as the student moves from the spoken to the written
act.

In the first place, the student should be able to see

in the essay a series of illocutionary acts constituted by
the same rules which constitute these acts in a conversa
tion.

Especially important is that he sees the commitments

which the writer makes to his audience— the sort of know
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ledge he claims to have, the future actions which he expects
to perform, and the beliefs which he is expressing.

In

order to make these commitments, he must know his audience
or, at least, know that his audience is too vague to know
well.

In the second place, the student studying the pro

fessional essay should increase his ability to perform
additional illocutionary acts by seeing them performed in
the writing of the professional.

Assuming that this abili

ty to perform speech acts can be taught, the instructor can
hope to increase the student's ability to perform these
acts by showing him the acts as they are performed in the
essay.

In the third place, the student can see the way

professional writers use indicators.

Memorizing a list of

Indicators is of dubious value, partly because one must
learn them in context.

Discovering them in the sentences

of an essay should be far more helpful.
Next the student should be taught that, before he
writes, he must analyze the illocutionary acts which he
intends to perform.

He must know his audience, and he must

know what acts are required by the assignment.

And he must

know the importance of truly intending to perform a certain
act, the act demanded by the assignment.

One suspects,

especially after seeing the ending which she wrote on the
assignment, that the writer of the second and third essays
analyzed in Chapter VI did not intend to explain, that she
still intended to argue and finally prove Erikson wrong
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about adolescents but right if he applied his theory to
adults.
Finally, the student can be taught to criticize his
completed paper as a complex series of compound illocution
ary acts.

Conscious of the rules which govern his acts and

of the importance of his use of indicators, he should be
able to check his writing in two ways.

First, he should be

able to decide whether he has felicitously performed the
acts which he intended to perform by judging whether the
acts which he has performed were duly constituted by the
rules.

He should discover statements which he cannot suc

cessfully make to his particular audience, attempted acts
of explaining which fail to show relationships, violations
of his commitment in the act.

Second, he should discover

indicators which signal the wrong act and sentences which
need indicators if they are to signal any act.
essay has been completed,

Once the

it becomes a speech act as sep

arate from the writer as the spoken act is from Austin's
judge and as accessible to his methods of analysis.

A

student should be able to analyze his own essay from a
position near that of Austin's judge.
In other words, studying the essay as the perform
ance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary
acts may replace steps in teaching composition which are
time-honored but dubiously successful.

The teaching of

organization may be swallowed up in the emphasis on the
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focus on the appropriate illocutionary acts.

Problems with

clarity may be absorbed in the separation of the problem
into problems of content and problems of force, and the
last kind of problem may disappear as the student considers
his acts as rule-governed.

Force indicators may become far

more meaningful terms to students than the traditional
terms.

Finally, as I suggested earlier, the old problem of

style may be partially solved or even completely solved as
the illocutionary force potential of each word and word
arrangement becomes clearer.

In other words, ancient rhet

oric's arrangement, invention, and style may be well on
their way to expression in a new vocabulary and support by
a new rationale.
As a result of my study, I believe that this theory
has this kind of practical application.
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APPENDIX I

AUSTIN'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCES
OF UTTERANCES WITH HIS EXAMPLES OF EACH OF THE MAIN TYPES
1. Verdictives
Austin says that verdictives "are typified by the giving of a
verdict. . . by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be
final; they may be, for example, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal.
It is essentially a finding as to something--fact, or value— which is
for different reasons hard to be certain about" (How to Do Things
with Words, p. 150).
acquit
hold (as a matter of law)
read it as
reckon
place
put it at
grade
assess
characterize

convict
interpret as
rule
estimate
date
make it
rank
value
diagnose

find (as a matter of fact)
understand
calculate
locate
measure
take it
rate
describe
analyse

2. Exercitives
Austin defines an exercitive as "the giving of a decision in
favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It
is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement
that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to an
estimate that it is so; it is an award as opposed to an assessment" (How
to Do Things with Words, p. 154).
appoint
dismiss
order
sentence
levy
choose
bequeath
warn
pray
urge

degrade
excommunicate
conmand
fine
vote for
claim
pardon
advise
entreat
press
268

demote
name
direct
grant
nominate
give
resign
plead
beg
recommend
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proclaim
countermand
enact
dedicate

announce
annul
reprieve
declare closed

quash
repeal
veto
declare open

3. Commissives
Austin says of commissives that they "are typified by promis
ing or otherwise undertaking; they commit you to doing something, but
include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not
promises, and also rather vague things which we may call espousals, as
for example, siding with" (How to Do Things with Words, pp. 150-151).
promise
undertake
am determined to
mean to
propose to
envisage
guarantee
vow
dedicate myself to
adopt
espouse

covenant
bind myself
intend
plan
shall
engage
pledge myself
agree
declare for
champion
oppose

contract
give my word
declare my intention
purpose
contemplate
swear
bet
consent
side with
embrace
favour

4. Behabitives
Austin says of this group, "behabitives include the notion of
reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and
expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent
conduct. There are obvious connexions with both stating or describing
what our feelings are and expressing, in the sense of venting our feel
ings, though behabitives are distinct from both of these" (How to Do
Things with Words, p. 159).
1. For apologies we have 'apologize'.
2. For thanks we have 'thank'.
3. For sympathy we have ’deplore’, 'commiserate', 'compliment',
'condole', 'congratulate1, 'felicitate', 'sympathize'.
4. For attitudes we have 'resent', 'don't mind', 'pay tribute',
'criticize', 'grumble about', 'complain o f ', 'applaud', 'over
look', 'commend', 'deprecate', and the non-exercitive uses of
'blame', 'approve', and 'favour'.
5. For greetings we have 'welcome', 'bid you farewell'.
6. For wishes we have 'bless', 'curse', 'toast',
'drink to', and
'wish' (in its strict performative use).
7. For challenges we have 'dare', 'defy', 'protest', 'challenge'.
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5, Expositives

About this class, Austin says, "Expositives are used in acts
of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of
arguments, and the classifying of usages and of references" (How to
Do Things with Words, p. 160). Austin presents expositives groupetT
TrTto the following subclasses:
1.

affirm
deny
state
describe
class
identify

2.

remark
mention
?interpose

3.

inform
apprise
tell
answer
rejoin
3a. ask
4.

testi fy
report
swear
conjecture
?doubt
?know
?believe

5.

accept
concede
wi thdraw
agree
demur to
object to
adhere to
recognize
repudiate
5a. correct
revise
6.

7.

postulate
deduce
argue
neglect
?emphasize

begin by
turn to
conclude by
7a. interpret
distinguish
analyse
define
7b. illustrate
explain
formulate
7c. mean
refer
cal 1
understand
regard as

APPENDIX II

THE CONSTITUTIVE RULES FOR SPEECH ACTS
This appendix is divided into two parts.

The first part is

simply a reproduction of the constitutive rules that Searle provides
for the illocutionary acts of requesting, stating, questioning, thank
ing, advising, warning, greeting, and congratulating.

These are re

produced as they are found on pp. 66-67 of Speech Acts. The second
part of the appendix provides my own formulation of the rules for
thirteen additional acts discovered in the four professional essays.
Stating is a basic act in the four essays, but, since the rules for it
are included in Searle's summary, I will not include any discussion of
it in my summary except as a reminder that it is closely related to
several other acts but differs in important respects from them.
To understand Searle's summary, one must understand the abbre
viations which he uses.

These abbreviations are used in the summary:

"A"— act; "H"— hearer; "S"— Speaker; "jp"— proposition; and "E"— an
event, state, etc.

I have used the same abbreviations in my rule sum

maries.
The thirteen acts whose constitutive rules are presented in the
second part are arranged in accordance with Austin's classification of
illocutionary acts.
found in Appendix I.

The definition of each of these major types is
In the essays, no examples were found of the type

of act which Austin calls the "commissive," so the numbering of these
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groups of rules will skip the number "3" in order to retain the number
ing of Austin's classifications.

My formulation of the rules for each

of these acts follows the pattern used by Searle in Speech Acts.
My formulations are usually preceded by citations from the
synonymies found in Merriam-Webster dictionaries.

These citations

provide only a preliminary characterization of each act, which is then
amplified by the rules themselves.

The citation chosen is the one

which fits the act as it is performed in these essays.

The choice of

meaning will seem arbitrary in some cases where the term has a number
of other meanings.

For example, "interpret" and "define" are names

for two or more acts which are not clearly distinguished in the
Merriam-Webster synonymies.

"Explain," as shown in Chapter IV, is

discussed here as several acts— accounting for, exemplifying, and de
fining.

These rules with the discussion in the appropriate sections

of Chapters IV and V should make clear the sense in which each term
is being used to describe an act.

Part I
From John R. Searle, Speech Acts (London:
Press, 1969), pp. 66-67.

Cambridge Univ.
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Tjpts of illocutionary act
A tttr t , ils tt ifbai), ctftrm

StfKt1

Omttia.i1

P ropositions]
content

Future set A c f H .

A n y p ro p c titio n p .

A n y proposition o r propositions!
function.

Preparatory

i . H i t able to do A . S believes H
is able to do A .
i . I t i t not obvious to both S and H
that H w ill do A in the normal
course o f events o f h it ow n accord.

i . S has evidence (reasons, etc.) fo r
the tru th o f p .
a. I t is not obvious to both S and H
that H knows (does not need '.o be
reminded of, etc.) p .

1. S does not know ‘ the answer’, i.e.,
does not know i f the propovitioi. it
true, or, in the case o t the pro posi
tional function,docs not know t i«
infotm atiun needed to complete the
roposition tru ly (but see c o w c n i
slow).
2 . I t is not obvious to both S and H
that H s till provide the inform ation
at that time w ith ou t being asked.

sype*
of

P

tule

Sincerity

S wants H :o dp A .

J b c lie v e * p .

5 wants this in fcrm rtie n .

Essential

Counts at, an attem pt to set H to
do A .

Counts at an undertaking to the
effect that p represents an actual
suce o f affairs.

Counts as an attempt to el*cit tb it
irifonnation from H .

Comment:

Order and eemmatid Sure the addi
tional preparatoryrulc that S must

U nlike arput these do n o t seem to be
essentially tied to attem pting tc
convince. Thus “ I x n simply
stating that p and not attem pting to
convince y o u " is acceptable, but
"1 am arguing that p and not
attem pting to convince y o u ” sounds
inconsistent.

There are tw o kinds o! questions,
(u) real questions, (fr) exam ques
tions. In real questions S w antr to
know (find out) the m tw e r; in exam
questions, S wants to k r.o v i f H
knows.

be in a position o f authority over H .
Command probably docs not have
rhe ‘ pragm atic’ con dition requiring
non-obviousness. Furthermore in
both, the authority relationship
infects the essential condition
because the utterance counts as aa
attempt to get H to do A in tirtu t

e j tin authority oJS over H .

Thank ( ftt)

IFan

A d ritt

rPxoposit tonal
content
Preparatory

Past act A done b y K

Sincerity

S feels grateful o r appreciative fo r s i.

S believe* A w ill benefit H .

S believes E is n o t in FT* brat interest.

Essential

C ount* as an expression o f gratitude
o r appreciation.

Counts as an undertaking to the effect
that A is in H ’s best interest.

Counts as an undertaking to the effect
that £ is not in H ’s best interest.

Comment:

Sincerity and essential rule* overlap.
T han kin g is just expressing grati
tude in a way that, e.g., prom ising
it n o t just expressing an intention.

Contrary to w hat one m ight suppose
advice is not a species o f requesting.
I t is interesting to compare "a d vise ”
w ith “ u rg e ", advocate" and
"re co m m e n d ".
A d visin g you is not try in g to get you
to do something in the sense mat
requesting is. A dvising is more like
te llin g you what is best fo r you.

W arning is like advising, rather t r * n
requesting. I t is no t, I thin k,
necessarily an attempt to get you to
take evasive action. Notice ih r t the
above account is o f categorical n o t
hypothetical warnings. M o tt w arning*
are probably hypothetical; " I f you
do not do X then T w ill occur,”

Future a a A o f IL

Future ev *nt o r state, etc., TL

i . S ha* some reason to believe A
w ill benefit H.
a. I t is n o t obvious to both S ar.d H
' that H w ill do A in the normal
course o f events.

A benefits S and 5 believe* A
benefit* S .

Types
of
rule

Gfwrt

i . H has reason to believe E w ill
occur ar.d is not in H 'i interest,
a. I t is not obvious to both S and H
that £ w iil occur.

Cengraftilalt

’Propositions!

None.

Some event, a a , etc., £ related to H .

content
Preparatory

S has just encountered (o r

£ is in H ’s im -rest and S believe* E i*
in H ’s im e ie it.

Type*

been introduced to , etc.) H .

of
rule

Sineeriry

None.

S is pleased a: E .

E n e n tk l

C ount* a* courteous recog
n itio n o f H by J .

Counts as an expression o f pleasure at £ .

Com m ent:

’‘ Congratulate” is sim ilar to " th a n k " in th a t it L '
an expression o f its sincerity condition.

* In the aease o f * * « k a q u e stio n " n o t in the tense o f “ d o u b t" .

Part 2

1. Verdictives

Evaluate
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "evaluate" with
"estimate," "appraise," "value," "rate," "assess," and "assay." Ac
cording to Webster1s , they "are comparable when meaning to judge a
thing with respect to its worth." "Evaluate" differs in that it
"suggests an intent to arrive at a mathematically correct judgment;
it seldom suggests, however, an attempt to determine a thing's mone
tary worth, but rather to find its equivalent in other and more
familiar terms."
The Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms says of
evaluate, ^Evaluate suggests an intent to determine ei trier the rela
tive or intrinsic worth of something in terms other than monetary."
Rules:
Propositional content

Any thing, event, idea, etc.

Preparatory

S has a view of the relative or in
trinsic worth of a thing, event,
idea, etc., based on his judgment
and capable of translation into
terms that are not monetary.
H does not know S's view.

Sincerity

S believes his view of the thing to
be justified.

Essential

The utterance counts as an under
taking to indicate the worth of
the thing, event, idea, etc.
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2. Exerclfives

Urge
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says, "Urge, egg, ex
hort, goad, spur, prod, prick, sic mean to press or impel to action,
effort, or speed. Urge implies the exertion of influence or pressure
either from something or someone external or from something within (as
the conscience or the heart); specifically it suggests an inciting or
stimulating to or toward a definite end (as greater speed or a pre
scribed course or objective) often against the inclinations or habits
of the one urged."
Rules:
Propositional content

Future act A of H.

Preparatory

S wishes A to be carried out and
knows that it is possible for H
to do A.
It is not obvious that H will do A
or that H wants to do A,

Sincerity

S desires H to do A.

Essential

The utterance counts as an under
taking to cause H to do A.

(The action urged may be merely a change of viewpoint. Urge seems
close to Searle's advise, but it is stronger in its attempt and has
no implication that H will benefit from A. "Advocating" is used
interchangeably with "urging" in this study.)
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4. Behabitives

a. Commend
Webster1s New Dictionary of Synonyms says, "Commend, recom
mend, applaud, compliment are comparable wnen they mean to voice or
otherwise manifest to others one's warm approval. Commend usually
implies judicious or restrained praise, but it suggests as its motive
a desire to call attention to the merits of a person or a thing."
Rules:
Propositional content

Some action, person, thing, etc.

Preparatory

A sees the merits of the action,
person, thing, etc.
S does not have reason to believe
that H already admires the person,
place, or thing, admires it in the
same way S does, or knows that S
admires it.

Sincerity

S believes that the person, place,
thing, etc. has certain merits.

Essential

The utterance counts as an undertaking
to the effect that S admires the
action, person, thing, etc.
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b. Deprecate
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "disapprove"
and "deprecate" mean *'to feel or to express an objection to or con
demnation of a person or thing. . . . Deprecate stresses the implica
tion of regret, frequently profound, occasionally diffident or apolon A f 4

.

it

Rules:
Propositional content

Some event, action, thing, etc., E.

Preparatory

S objects to E and regrets its occur
rence, existence, or condition.
It is not obvious that H holds the
same view, holds it as strongly, or
knows that S holds this view.

Sincerity

S believes the event, action, thing
etc., to deserve condemnation.

Essential

The utterance counts as the undertak
ing by S to show his objection to or
condemnation of E.
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5. Expositives

a. Opine
According to Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, "Opinion,
view, belief, conviction, persuasion, sentiment are comparable when
they mean a more or less clearly formulated idea or judgment which
one holds as true or valid." Speaking of "opinion," Webster's adds
that "the term more consistently suggests a personal element in the
judgment, the possibility of its being in error, and the strong
probability that it will be disputed."
Rules:
Propositional content

Any proposition

£

Preparatory

S does not have hard evidence for the
truth of £, recognizes that his form
ulation of £ is based on a personal
judgment, and realizes that its truth
may be disputed.
It is not obvious to S that H believes
£ or knows that S believes £.

Sincerity

S believes £.

Essential

The utterance of £ counts asthe un
dertaking to the effect that S be
lieves that £ represents an actual
state of affairs, but S does not and
cannot provide hard facts to support
£•

(Opining differs from stating and asserting in the degree of verifi
ability of the proposition. When the speaker opines, he does not
expect his hearer to require evidence for the truth of his opinion but
to accept it as his personal judgment.)
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b. Argue
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "argue" with "dis
cuss," "debate," "dispute," and " a g i t a t e a n d gives their shared mean
ing as "to discourse about something in order to arrive at the truth
or to convince others." Webster's adds, "Argue usually Implies con
viction and the adducing of evidence or reasons in support of one's
cause or position."
Rules:
Propositional content

Any proposition (or series of propo
sitions) £

Preparatory

S can supply £ or any series of prop
ositions as part of a reasoning
process which will support an idea
held up in discussion in opposition
to another idea.
It is not obvious either that H ac
cepts the idea or that H knows the
reasoning process being used to
support it,

Sincerity

S believes in the idea and the valid
ity of his argument.

Essential

The utterance counts as an undertak
ing by S to demonstrate to H the
superiority of the view which S
holds.

(Implicit in the definition is the idea that the act of arguing will
seldom be performed in single-sentence utterances. One sentence will
express the idea, and the remaining sentences are used to present the
reasons in support of it.)

280

c. Account for
This term is not defined in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms. I am using it as a term to name Kaplan's "scientific explana
tion" discussed in Chapter IV.
Rules:
Propositional content:

Any proposition (or series of propo
sitions) £

Preparatory

S knows for what reasons a phenomenon
exists or occurred.
It is not obvious that H knows the
same reasons.

Sincerity

5 believes that he can supply the
reasons for the phenomenon.

Essential

The utterance of £ counts as the
undertaking by S to tell why or for
what reasons the phenomenon exists
or occurred.
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d. Exemplify
Another form of explaining, "exemplify" is placed with "illus
trate" in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, which says they
"are comparable when they mean to use in speaking or writing concrete
instances or cases to make clear something which is difficult, ab
stract, general, or remote from experience or to serve as an instance,
case, or demonstration of a point or matter under examination." Web
ster's adds, "Exemplify implies the use of examples for clarification
of a general or abstract statement or as aid in revealing the truth
of a proposition or assertion."
Rules:
Propositional content

An action, instance, case, etc.,
usually expressed in more than one
sentence.

Preparatory

S sees a relationship between an
action, instance, case, etc., and a
difficult, abstract, or general
statement.
It is not obvious that H sees this
relationship.

Sincerity

S believes that the relationship
which he is proposing exists.

Essential

The utterance counts as an undertak
ing to provide examples to illustrate
a difficult, abstract, or general
statement.

(Note that the very nature of the act calls for a perlocutionary in
tent on the part of the speaker— to clarify.)
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e. Define
Another kind of explaining, defining is analyzed here without
the help of Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, since the defini
tions which I have used in defining tKTs act come from Monroe Beards
ley's Thinking Straight. I have arbitrarily restricted the term to
the kind of^efTn Tng which Beardsley says produces the "definition
proposal
Rules:
Propositional content

A term to be defined and a defining
term

Preparatory

S possesses a defining term which is
a more familiar expression for a
term which S wishes to be understood
in a particular way.
It is not obvious that H already be
lieves or accepts this definition.

Sincerity

S believes that the defining term
which he offers is a valid one in the
context.

Essential

The utterance counts as the undertak
ing to provide a more familiar term
which represents a decision to use a
word one way rather than another.
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f. Interpret
Another variation of explaining, ’’interpret" is listed in
Webster’s New Dictionary of Synonyms with "explain," "expound," "ex
plicate," 1TeTucidate," ancP'construe." They "are comparable when they
mean to make oneself or another understand the meaning of something."
In addition, interpret "implies the making clear to oneself or to an
other the meaning of something (as a poem, a dream, an abstraction,
or a work in a foreign language) which presents more than intellectual
difficulties and requires special knowledge, imagination, or sympathy
in the person who would understand it or make it understood."
Rules:
Propositional content

Any term and explanation of the term

Preparatory

S has knowledge or insight which he
uses to formulate a sentence in
tended to help H to understand the
term.
It is not obvious that H understands
the term.

Sincerity

S believes that he has special know
ledge or insight needed to under
stand the term.

Essential

The utterance of the sentence counts
as the undertaking to provide S's
understanding of the term.
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9*

Compare

Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms groups "compare," "con
trast," and "collate" when they "mean to set two or more things side
by side in order to show likenesses and differences." Webster's says
of "compare," "Compare implies as an aim the showing of relative
values or excellences or a bringing out of characteristic qualities,
whether they are similar or divergent."
Rules:
Propositional content

Two or more events, objects, people,
ideas, etc.

Preparatory

S sees likeness and/or differences
between two or more things, often
ones which show relative values or
excellences.
It is not obvious that H sees these
likenesses and/or differences.

Sincerity

S believes that the likenesses and
differences exist.

Essential

The utterance counts as an undertak
ing to show likenesses and/or dif
ferences of two or more events,
objects, people, ideas, etc.
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h. Quote
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "quote, cite,
repeat are not close synonyms, though all mean to speak or write again
something already said or written by another." Webster's adds, "Quote
usually implies a use of another's words, commonly with faithful
exactness or an attempt at it, for some special effect like adornment,
illustration, close examination."
Rules:
Propositional content

Any sentence or series of sentences,
any word or phrase

Preparatory

S is capable of reading or recalling
the exact words of a portion of
spoken or written discourse, usually
discourse not composed of his own
original utterances, in all cases
not uttered for the first time on
the occasion of the quoting.
It is not obvious that H is familiar
with the quotation or does not need
to be reminded of it.

Sincerity

S believes that he is quoting exactly.

Essential

The utterance counts as an undertak
ing by S to repeat the exact words
of another speaker or his own exact
words uttered originally on another
occasion.
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i* Believe
After defining "believe" with "know" and "think," MerriamWebster' s Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms says that "believe. . .
stresses assurance but implies trust and faith (as in a higher power)
rather than evidence as its basis." In addition, here the word is
used in the way "affirm" is used in church ritual when members are
asked to affirm their faith. "Affirm" here means not "state" or
"assert" as in Searle's summary, but "implies conviction of truth and
willingness to stand by one's statement because it is supported by
evidence or one's experience or faith."
Rules:
Propositional content

Any propositon £

Preparatory

S possesses experience, knowledge, or
faith to support the truth of £.
It is not obvious that H believes £,
or H needs to be reminded that S
believes £.

Sincerity

S believes £.

Essential

The utterance of £ counts as the
undertaking to affirm the belief of
S that £.

APPENDIX III

THE IRON STRING
By Howard Mumford Jones
[1] I have lately been reading a Harvard author who is just now out of
favor here. He has been unpopular before. He once made a speech1 at
this college, a speech so disliked that he was persona non grata2 in
Cambridge for thirty years. However, the alumni and the Faculty final
ly decided he was a solid citizen— this was after the Civil War— and so
they made him an Overseer, they gave him an honorary degree, and they
asked him to deliver a course of lectures. In view of this history I
take some pleasure in remembering that the title of these lectures was:
"The Natural History of the Intellect." Another thirty years or so
drifted by, and they erected a building in his honor. On any class day
in winter you can enter it and see Frank Duveneck's statue of him
buried under the coats and hats. Somehow, this symbolizes what has
happened to Emerson.
[2] The reasons for Emerson's current lack of favor are understandable.
He was a transcendentalist, and any beginner in philosophy can tell you
what is wrong with transcendentalism.3 As a philosophy it is incon
sistent, illogical, and indefensible. Its epistemology is contrary to
fact, its ethical system is unscientific, its language is confused, and
its frame of reference is romantic America. It is not, as we owlishly
say, for our time. All it has is imagination and insight.
[3] Another reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he did not have
a vision of evil. To count in criticism nowadays you must have a vision
of evil. It seems that Herman Melville had a vision of evil in Moby
Dick, that Nathaniel Hawthorne had a vision of evil in The Scarlet Let
ter , and that Henry James had a vision of evil in The Turn of the Screw.
Precisely what the evil was in each case is in dispute, but it is there,
Emerson had no vision of evil. His life was threatened by tuberculosis,
he abandoned his pulpit, his first wife died young, his brothers were
sick men, and his son perished—
That hyacinthine boy, for whom
Morn well might break and April bloom"
he was ostracized by the conservative, he took the unpopular side in
politics, he was accused of advocating atheism, he was said to be a
radical, but he had no vision of evil. All he had was a vision of good.
Reprinted by permission of Harvard Alumni Bulletin.
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Good, he said, is something so tough, resilient, and timeless, it is in
destructible. Our culture is supposed to have this vision of good as
its ideal, yet Emerson is unpopular. I am not a philosopher, but merely
a literary historian, and I do not pretend to explain the contradiction.
[4] A third reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he was a liberal.
A liberal, says the Oxford Dictionary, is favorable to changes and re
forms tending in the direction of democracy. Emerson favored these
changes. However, liberalism is dead. It is not merely dead, it was
mistaken. Mr. Wallace's5 failure to create a liberal party in this
country is proof. The latest British election, which again buried the
liberal party, is proof. The liberal point of view in economics is
wrong. The liberal point of view in history, or rather the point of
view of liberal historians, is wrong. These historians denounced
Talleyrand,6 but Talleyrand was a force for stability. They attacked
Metternich,7 but Metternich was a force for order. I am afraid Emerson
was a liberal; that is, he assumed that man might amount to something by
and by if he would but consult his better self, and that men, taken in
dividually, might improve themselves, so to speak, into a democratic
state. This is the American dream which, through the Voice of America,
we are broadcasting round the world, particularly into darkest Russia.
I am not a politician, merely a literary man, and I cannot explain this
contradiction.
[5] That somewhat frightened conservative, Matthew Arnold,8 came here
in the eighties to lecture us about culture. He began the habit of de
preciating Emerson. His lecture brings me to the fourth reason for
Emerson's unpopularity. Arnold hinted that Emerson did not quite under
stand human weakness. Ours is the aspirin age, and we understand human
weakness. Mr. T. S. Eliot9 has told us a number of times that man is
full of sin. Mr. Reinhold Niebuhr10 has told us that man is full of
sin. Monsignor Sheen11 has told us that man is full
of sin. The bright faith in man characteristic of the eighteenth cen
tury, the bright trust in spiritual development characteristic of much
of the nineteenth century, were fallacies.
[6] Arnold allowed Emerson a single virtue. Emerson, he said, is the
friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit. But we are in
formed that our profoundest failure, individual and political, is a
failure of the spirit. For example, we are not truly successful in
democratizing Germany because there is lacking a spiritual content to
our democracy. Through the Marshall Plan and through military aid to
Western Europe, there must glow, we are told, a radiancy of the spirit,
or Communism will rush in. I do not understand how, if all men are
weak, if all men are sinful, we can hope to maintain, much less improve,
democratic society, I do not see how universal wickedness can be re
strained except by an authoritarian church and state, I do not see how
free men can be held together by mere unanimity of evil hearts. Nothing,
of course, is more flattering than to think of one's self as a great
sinner, irreparably lost. Byron is a case in point. A new Byronism12
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now appears in poetry and theology, but I still suggest that some tinc
ture of virtue is necessary for citizens of a republic. However, I am
not a theologian.
[7] By now you have rightly inferred that I find something important
in Emerson. I am speaking of Emerson h propoa of our time in order to
revalidate an old Harvard custom— the custom of dissent. The protection
of dissent is old at Harvard. Emerson's Divinity School Address wae de
livered, whatever happened afterwards— an early example. President
Lowell's13 refusal to discharge Mffnsterberg11* and Harold LaskiJ5, when
mob feeling demanded it, is a second example. The refusal of the Presi
dent and Fellows to silence Harlow Shapley16 at the demand of an influ
ential alumnus is a third. If Oxford's proudest products are its
rebels, the proudest tradition of Harvard is the protection of dissent.
Long may it be so. I sometimes think dissent may have no other place
to go if the drives for conformity continue. For a slow, irresistible
drive against dissent does go forward. That is why Emerson is impor
tant. Let me briefly discuss four examples of the drive for conform
i t y - t w o from politics, two from education.
[8] The British election shows what a genuine two-party system is— a
system in which there is a fundamental philosophic issue. In Great
Britain that issue lies between the Socialist state and the Tory state.
No such issue divides the Republican state from the Democratic state.
There is with us a set of persons called Democrats, some of them in
office, and another set of persons calling themselves Republicans, not
so many of whom are in office, but neither you nor I nor more competent
observers can define the philosophic difference between these sets of
persons in terms that will really make sense. Almost nothing could be
more comic, if it were not so tragic, than to watch the Republicans
hunting for somebody who will tell them what to do— a party in search of
a platform. The only thing just as comic and just as tragic is the
Democrats hunting for somebody who will tell them what they have done—
a platform in search of a party. We are afraid of political dissent.
We are so afraid of it that we use every means we can to prevent the
creation or continuation of a dissenting party, Communist, Progressive,
or what have you. I wonder what Emerson would say to this spectacle—
he who interested himself in man rather than in mass.
[9] This example of our distrust of dissent is from the national scene.
My next example is from the international scene. There is a country
called Russia. There is something called the cold war. There is some
thing called the atom bomb, and there may be something called the hydro
gen bomb. Now I do not care whether you think Mr. Wallace is politically
naive or whether you think Mr. Wallace is an instrument of Satan, but I
find nothing more characteristic of the pressure of conformity upon
opinion than to compare what happened to Mr. Wallace and what happened
to Senator McMahon. A few years ago Mr. Wallace was roundly smeared for
urging that on the whole it would be more sensible patiently to continue
to seek some accommodation with the Kremlin than to continue to slide
down the terrifying spiral along which we are descending. Now that the
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situation has worsened, Senator McMahon--I mean no disrespect when I say
he is safely ensconced in office--was a few weeks ago roundly applauded
for saying very much the same thing. Mr. Wallace is on the political
left and must therefore be intrinsically wrong; Senator McMahon is an
administration Democrat, and must therefore be intrinsically right. We
applaud the Christian sentiment of the one and denounce the identical
Christian sentiment of the other. It is now, of course, clear that
sensible persons were right in saying that no important military weapon
and no important scientific discovery can be long kept secret, but as
our emotions of conformity are always predictable when this question
comes up, the Russians must be very pleased. It makes me think of what
General Lee said when he learned that General McClellan had been called
back to command the Army of the Potomac. "I am very happy that General
McClellan is again opposed to me,'1 he remarked, "because I always know
what he is going to do." I wonder what Emerson would tell us here about
a foolish consistency, that hobgoblin of little minds.17
[10] I take my third example from the world of learning. I received a
week or two ago an airmail letter asking me to protest against the
action of twelve regents of the University of California who, in the
teeth of faculty opinion, of administrative opinion, of gubernatorial
opinion, of the opinion of six members of the board, and of the opinion
of many outside the university, are determined to require a new oath
from a faculty which has already taken an oath, and which has declined
to take the new oath by a vote of 900 to O.10 It is apparently supposed
not only that some member of the faculty may be a Communist, but that
members of the faculty may, or might, or could, or would belong to mys
terious organizations not named, mysteriously threatening the peace and
dignity of California. The exact language of the proposed oath is:
"That I am not a member of the Communist party, or under any oath, or a
party to any agreement, or under any commitment that is in conflict with
my obligation under this oath." No one knows what this language means
except that it is insulting. It is not proved that any member of the
California faculty has perjured himself or committed treason or acted as
a spy. It is provable that the faculty of no university served the
country more patriotically during the war. Now a majority of the re
gents has discovered that this same faculty are potential liars. They
infer that the faculty might take oaths only to violate the oaths they
take. They therefore set up this second oath, although if the oathtaker is not bound by oath number one, he is not going to be any more
bound by oath number two. The effect is simply to penalize dissent. On
the other hand, a friend of Emerson's preached active disloyalty to this
government, an aunt of Emerson's helped that friend to violate the laws,
and when this friend eulogized a rebel named John Brown, Emerson applaud
ed him. Now, as we quaintly say, we "teach" Thoreau's Essay on Civil
Disobedience, even in California. I cite these familiar facts only that
you measure from what Massachusetts permitted in 1850 what California
demands in 1950.
[11] Let me turn to nqy last example. Passing over such obvious dangers
to higher education as the military control of research, the extra
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ordinary oath proposed to be attached to the National Science Founda
tion, the stool-pigeon clause demanded by the Navy Department of offi
cers in training and happily modified because of student dissent, let
me briefly contrast two patterns of collegiate training.
[12] I suppose the greatest president Harvard had in the nineteenth
century was Charles W. Eliot. 9 Like Emerson he is now undervalued.
He believed in the individual. His great work was to break up the cake
of custom which then bound this college. He argued that if a man was
old enough to go to college, he was old enough to know what he was go
ing to college for. Mr. Eliot therefore instituted the elective system.
He restored dignity both to learning and to the scholar. He knew very
well that many men would not profit under his system, and that many men
would abuse his system, but he also knew very well that for men worth
educating, this was education worthy of men. He had got tired of edu
cating boys. He guessed that the social gains would outweigh the
social losses, and the brilliant roll call of distinguished Harvard men
graduating in Mr. Eliot's time proves that he was right.
[13] I suppose the greatest president of the University of Chicago in
the twentieth century is Mr. Hutchins.20 I honor Mr. Hutchins. He
speaks his mind. He is a remarkable individual. But I am always puz
zled to know why Mr. Hutchins, who speaks his mind, infers that singlemindedness is therefore the principal virtue in liberal education. Mr.
Hutchins has abandoned the pattern of Mr. Eliot and gone back to the
pattern of Aquinas.21 I do not fully understand the Chicago system, but
the part I do understand is the dogma that a selected list of great
books is sufficient for, or synonymous with, a liberal education. These
the teacher is to expound. The student is there to be taught. He may
argue, he may debate, but he is there to master this library.
[14] But why a library? The people who wrote these books had no such
library, for the most part. As Emerson said, librarians are not wiser
than other men. Why is bookishness a virtue? What is a great book?
Who determines when it is great enough to get in, or, what is more im
portant, small enough to be left out? Some books in some moments for
some people have great beauty, and some books for some people at some
moments have great wisdom, but I submit that one gains as much pleasure
and wisdom and instruction from little books as one does from big ones.
Are there great books, indeed? May not one truly say there are only
great readers of books, and that the great reader seldom confines him
self to any restricted list? Yet it is seriously maintained at Chicago
that only by bookish authority can democracy be maintained and culture
be enriched.
[15] It is regrettable that Abraham Lincoln's library was meager. He
never read Aquinas. He merely wrote the Gettysburg Address, which is
shorter than Pericles'22 and just as good. Meek young men, said Emerson,
grow up in libraries believing it their duty to accept the views which
Cicero,23 which Locke,2<f which Bacon25 have given, forgetful that Cicero,
Locke, and Bacon were only young men in libraries when they wrote these
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books.
It is true that Mr. Eliot put together the Harvard classics,
but he did not do it to end a library; he merely thought it might be an
economical way to begin one.
[16] I do not remember who first made popular the phrase: "failure of
nerve." But in these several instances of a drive
to conformity, I de
tect a failure of nerve, a failure of belief in the individual.
[17] In each case, of course, there is something to be said for con
formity. There is always something to be said for conformity. I think,
for example, something is to be said for the theory that whether the
party in power is Democratic or Republican, we have in fact a coalition
government; but a coalition government so insecure that it treats dis
sent as unpatriotic is not a government which Emerson, at any rate,
could approve. The doctrine that "Papa knows best" troubles the presi
dency and the office of the secretary of state, but it is not the doc
trine of Emerson. The demand for patriotic oaths contrasts with the
sentiment of a president26 in Emerson's time who once said of a rival
that he would gladly hold General McClellan's stirrup, if by so doing he
could get the country through its danger.
[18] Honor is not manufactured by printed forms to be taken before a
notary public; it is a function of manly self-respect— and it is a mark
of the time that I feel almost apologetic for using so old-fashioned a
phrase. The notion of standardized wisdom— so many parts of Plato,27 so
many parts of Newton,26 so many parts of Milton;29 do not shake before
taking— is a product of this same loss of nerve. It reveals hurry and
distrust— hurry, because, when you have invented the formula, you can
push the product through to its shaping, faster; distrust, because when
you substitute uniformity of pattern for equality of individuals, you
transfer your belief from the individuals to the pattern.
A belated
Emersonian, I am still, in things of the spirit, for the individual.
Robert Frost30 reminds us that a one-man revolution is the only revolu
tion that is coming.
[19] By this circuitous route I come back to Emerson and education. We
have found out in two wars that if all we want to do is to train the
young, we can do it cleverly. If all you want to do is to train the
young, establish your pattern— Great Books, General Education, call it
what you will— and the training may be admirable. But it will be only
training. We set up these teaching patterns and then look around for
somebody to make them operate instead of assuring ourselves that we
first have men to teach.
[20] Like everybody else I have tinkered with the curriculum, but be
yond rudimentary common sense and the baser parts of diplomacy, it does
not matter what the pattern is, provided you have good scholars and
students who really want to learn. The pattern seems wonderful only for
a time. Ask any Harvard graduate ten years out what the catalogue out
lined as proper education when he was a junior, and you will probably
draw a blank; ask him who taught him, and he will instantly recur in
memory to this or that powerful personality.
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[21] Education is a private affair. It is as private as falling in
love. There is no such thing as general education, there are only
specific individual educations. How often in the biographies of Harvard
men do you find the phrase: "He studied with Agassiz, or Kittredge, or
Royce, or Shaler!"31 How seldom does the curriculum appear except in a
negative and crippling connotation!
[22] Education, I repeat, is a private affair. It is essentially a
lonely business, which neither deans nor advisers nor proctors nor tu
tors nor professors can substitute for. Like religion and marriage, it
is personal, the result of the impact of character upon character. My
objection to some things we are trying to do here is that we have
strayed away from the spirit of Emerson.
[23] When Emerson uttered his famous phrase: "Trust thyself— every
heart vibrates to that iron string,"32 he makes, if I may say so, the
whole iron curtain vibrate. He did not speak to the sentimental, the
lazy, the superficial men, the men who are content to get by with the
aid of a tutor and skilful appeals to the dean's office. What he had in
mind is the stark truth that we brought nothing into this world and it
is certain we can carry nothing out, and that therefore between these
poles of time lies our only opportunity to develop character. And when
he said that books are for the scholar's idle time, he did not mean that
nobody should enter the Lamont Library.
[24] In a democracy we count by ones and not by masses, though there
are those who would define democracy by another pattern— the hatred of
those who count by masses. Hate, however, is neither salvation nor
statesmanship. The great contribution of Emerson is not only that he
agreed to count by ones, but he also believed that one— anyone— had in
finity behind him. I cannot defend this belief logically, though it
looks suspiciously like Christianity, and is no more absurd than exis
tentialism. But in education, as in the national life, how are we to
fortify the individual unless we rally infinity behind him? This will,
I know, be incomprehensible to many and impractical to some, and I can
only point to the historic truth that this doctrine, incomprehensible
and impractical, is the child of Harvard— of the great, traditional Har
vard, the Harvard that I, who am merely Harvard by adoption, think we
must not lose. When Lowell33 recited his ode for the Harvard dead in
1865, he did not celebrate the curriculum:
Those love her best who to themselves are true,
And what they dare to dream of, dare to do;
They followed her and found her
Where all may hope to find,
Not in the ashes of the burnt-out mind,
But beautiful with danger's sweetness round her.
[25] Perhaps if we looked more often, both faculty and
the face of the statue in Emerson Hall, we might detect
about its lips. Perhaps, if we looked at it oftener, a
Emerson would say, might suggest itself about our faith
pattern, in crutches, in conformity.

students, upon
a smiling irony
noble doubt, as
in advice, in
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[26] Emerson's faith was not in machinery but in man thinking, whereas
we today are proud of machines that think, and suspicious of any man
who tries to. I see no reason for being as apologetic as we are about
the protest of protestantism and the dissidence of dissent34 in a col
lege which was founded by dissenters; and difficult though it is to
make my point, I for one dissent from current notions in college and
country that democracy will survive only after you have imposed a pat
tern and made as many persons as possible conform to it.
[27] The educational problem is not conformity to any pattern, however
lofty in intent; it is how to remove obstacles from the lonely path by
which education sometimes results in man thinking. As for public life,
I quote Mrs. Roosevelt: "Have we really reached the point where we
must fear to join any group because at some time or other a person of
Communist leanings, or supposed Communist leanings, might also join it?
That is a terrible thing and we should be ashamed of it." I, too, am
ashamed of this pressure of conformity. I do not think it is too late
in the history of the republic, whether in education or in politics, to
believe that Emerson is still the most excellent spiritual catalyst we
have in a democracy. It is in that spirit I have tried to speak.
NOTES
1 speech: Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882; American poet, essayist,
and philosopher), "The Divinity School Address," July 15, 1838.
2 persona non grata:

unacceptable person.

3 transcendentalism: philosophy that there is a spiritual reality
(usually apprehensible by intuition, not reason) that transcends, is
superior to, or is a priori to experience, to the material or empirical.
4 That. . .bloom:

Emerson, "Threnody," 16-17.

5 Wallace's: Henry Agard Wallace (1888-1965; secretary of agricul
ture, 1933-1940; vice-president, 1941-1945; unsuccessful Progressive
Party candidate for president, 1948).
6 Talleyrand: Charles Maurice de Tallerand-Perigord, Prince de
B£n£vent (1754-1838; French statesman).
7 Metternich: Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich
(1773-1859; Austrian statesman).
8 Matthew Arnold:

(1822-1888; English poet and critic).

9 T. S. Eliot: Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888-1965; British, though
American-born, poet and critic). See the introduction to Arnold's
"The Grand Style."
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10

Reinhold Niebuhr:

(1892-

; American Protestant theologian).

11 Monsignor Sheen: Monsignor (now Bishop) Fulton John Sheen
(1895; American Roman Catholic cleric and apologist).
12 Byronism: affected or romantic consciousness of being irrevo
cably given to mysterious or unspeakable sins— after George Gordon,
sixth Baron Byron (1788-1824; English poet).
13 President Lowell's:
of Harvard, 1909-1933).

Abbott Lawrence Lowell (1856-1943; president

^ Miinsterberg: Hugo Miinsterberg (1863-1916; German psychologist
who taught at Harvard).
15 Harold Laski: Harold Joseph Laski (1893-1950; English political
scientist of liberal views who taught at Harvard from 1916 to 1920).
16 Harlow Shapley: (1885; Paine Professor of Astronomy at Har
vard, vocal advocate of liberal causes).
17 a foolish. . .minds: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of
little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines"
(Emerson, "Self-Reliance," Essays: First Series3 1841).
18 Subsequent votes on related issues should not be confused with
this one as reported in the newspapers. At the time of going to press,
the author's summary of the situation was believed to be reasonably
correct [Jones's note].
19 Charles W. Eliot:
Harvard, 1869-1909).

Charles William Eliot (1834-1926; president of

20 Hutchins: Robert Maynard Hutchins (1899University of Chicago, 1929-1945).
21 Aquinas:
philosopher).
22

; president of the

Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274; Italian theologian and

Pericles': (a. 495-429 B. C.; Athenian statesman).

23 Cicero: Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B. C.; Roman statesman,
orator, rhetorician, philosopher, and poet).
21* Locke:

John Locke (1632-1704; English philosopher).

25 Bacon: Francis Bacon, first Baron Verulam and Viscount St.
Albans (1561-1626; English philosopher, essayist, and jurist).
26

president:

Lincoln.

27

Plato: (a. 427-347 B. C.; Greek philosopher).
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28 Newton: Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727; English physicist and
mathematician).
29

Milton: John Milton (1608-1674; English poet).

30

Robert Frost:

(1874-1963; American poet).

31 Agassiz. . .Shaler: all teachers at Harvard: Jean Louis
Rodolphe Agassiz (1807-1873; Swiss naturalist); George Lyman Kittredge
(1860-1941; American philologist); Josiah Royce (1855-1916; American
philosopher); Nathaniel Southgate Shaler (1841-1906; American geolo
gist).
32 "Trust. . .iron string":
Reliance" (see note 17).

opening sentence of Emerson's "Self-

33 Lowell: James Russell Lowell (1819-1891; American poet,
ist, and diplomat).

essay

3lf protest. . .dissent:
"the Dissidence of Dissent and the Prot
estantism of the Protestant religion" is a famous phrase from Matthew
Arnold (see note 8), Culture and Anarchy (1869).

APPENDIX IV

We Were N ot Skeptical Enough
"W e W ere Not Skeptical Enough" was written for This I
Believe, a collection of philosophic observations from
famous people. This necessarily short essay is a convenient
beginning illustration of the use of examples as a basic pat
tern of exposition.

I was bom in what was called "An Age of Unbelief." When I was
young t took that description seriously, and I thought that I was
an intellectual because of the number of things I did not believe.
Only very slowly did i come to realize that what was really
characteristic of myself and my age was not that we did not believe
anything but that we believed very firmly in a number of things
which are not really so.
W e believed, for example, in the exclusive importance of the
material, the measurable, and tire controllable. W e had no doubts
about "what science proves" and we took it for granted that what
ever science did not prove was certainly false.
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When, for example, "science proved" that man had risen from
the lower animals, we believed, as I still do. that this is a fact. But
when science found it difficult to define, or measure, or deal with
the ways in which a man’s mind, and character and motives differ
from those of the lower animals, we believed that there was no
important difference between them. The trouble was not that we
were skeptical but that we were not skeptical enough.
We studied man by the methods which had proved fruitful for
the study of animals and machines. We learned a great deal about
his reflexes, animal drives, the ways in which he could be condi*
tioned to behave. And then, because our methods did not permit
us to learn anything else about him, we came to the conclusion
that there was nothing else to be learned.
W e came to believe, to take the most familiar example, that
love was “nothing but" the biological impulses connected with
sex. What is even more important, we came also to believe that
his thinking was "nothing but” his power of rationalization and
that his ideals and values were “nothing but" the results of his
early conditioning. We began to assume that what he believed to
be his free choices were not really anything of the sort; that he
was not the captain of his soul but only what the dialectic of
society or perhaps his infantile fixations had made him. He was,'
we tended to believe, not a cause but an effect
Seldom before in the history of civilization has the world been
in so parlous a state and not often before have men seemed to
believe less in a God who would save them. Yet it is at this mo
ment that we have lost faith in man himself as a prime mover
of events.
W hat I believe in most firmly is man himself. And by that I
mean something quite specific. I believe that he descended from
the animals but that he has powers which animals share but little,
if at all. I believe that he is something in himself. I believe that
he can will, and choose and prefer.
That means, for example, that society is what he makes it, not
that he is what society makes him. It means that he can be per
mitted to think, not merely conditioned by good or bad propa
ganda. I believe, therefore, that he can be freed, and that means
a good deal more than given the vote or permitted civil liberties.
The difference between a totalitarian and a democratic society Is
the difference between those who believe the individual man

v

*

s

8

7

*

9

W e Were Not Skeptical Enough

5

capable of being the captain of his soul and those who believe that
he is merely the creature of the society in which he lives.
I believe that we cannot set the world free until we believe that
the individual himself is free.

APPENDIX V

“It's Pretty, but Is It Art?”
Sylvia Angus

CO

In art, this is not the age of anxiety, the pill, or the-bomb.
It is the age of "willingness." Even the most conservative classicists feel,
as they sneali home for a bit of Haydn on the hi-fi, that they should give
the avant-garde “ a chance.” T o those genuinely interested in the great
variety of artistic experiment now going on, curiosity has reached a fever
pitch in which willingness has completely overborne that philistine thing,
the critical faculty. Everything is grist for the m ill; everything is, at the
very least, "interesting."
(2 )
Unfortunately, a great deal of current experiment in the
arts is not interesting. A rt has always been experimental, but never before
Frcm Saturday Review’, September 2, 1967. C o pyrig ht 1967 Saturday Review, Inc
Reprinted by permission o f the publisher and the author.
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has the audience for art been called upon to find all the trials and errors
"interesting," and it does art a disservice to accept everything offered w ith
the same bland, slightly nervous acquiescence.
(3 )
There is, for example, the recent case o f the touring
group called “ Contemporary Voices in the Arts,” sponsored by the New
York Council on the Arts, which visited a number of college campuses
all over the state. The idea was interesting. The artists were well-known,
avant-garde people with a significant body of work behind them in film,
sculpture, painting, music, poetry, and dance. One could expect that an
artistic galaxy which included Merce Cunningham, Jack Tworkov, John
Cage, Len Lye, Robert Creeley, Stanley Vanderbeek, and B illy Kluver
would have something significant to say and to show about the arts they
are engaged in.
(4 )
Curiously enough, their largely student and faculty au
diences found that they had a great deal of value to say (w h ich was not
their main intention) and very little to show (w hich was). Audiences
were treated to a kind of traveling circus, but a circus manque, a tedious
circus. Films flickered simultaneously on screens, walls, and ceilings;
shrill and unrelated noises attacked the eardrums in long, continuous
squeals; artists wandered about, coyly lighting matches when lights failed;
a so called panel discussion on the arts resolved itself into several people
making desultory remarks and joshing each other like small boys; artists
amblca about the stage like actors on the first day of a rehearsal when
they do not yet know their lines or even their roles. I t was a “ happen
ing," and, for most of the audiences, a bore. The point of all this is that
the performance was not billed as a "happening" but purported to be an
experience in the new art forms, the “ random” arts.
(5 )
The most curious and significant thing about this per
formance, and one of the most telling criticisms of current experiments
in “ the random” as 3n art technique, came on the day after the perform
ance, when the arusts in small groupings spoke to students about the
purposes and met >:>ds of their arts. Cogently, lucidly, in logical, sequen-'
tial prose, they e>: lined that art should be a total, sensory experience
which should be ail; wed to flow over and through one; that it should not
be examined for logic, lucidity, or sequence. Clearly, rationally, they
made the reasonable point that art has too long concentrated on intellec
tual perceptions, and that this, the age of exploding mass media and new
technology, should be a time to seek sense experience in whatever ran
dom arrangement of sight, smell, or sound m ight present itself at any
given moment. W ith admirable intellectual coherence, they made a most
persuasive case for the nonintellectual, random art w ith which the audi
ence had been bored the evening before!
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A rt today, like science, is in the grip c f the uncertainty
principle. Einstein began it w ith relativity, and now Heisenberg has
shown that the smallest particles of matter are indeterminate in their mo
tion. The sense of this relativity and indeterminateness has filtered into
all our consciousnesses. I f randomness is a fundamental truth of science,
why is it not also applicable to art? In a seeming attempt to assert the
unity of science and art, we have now gone far along the path of asserting
that the random is or can be art.
(7 )
I f we allow, for the moment, that the artists in the ex
periment above have a rational theory for asserting that the random can
produce art, we are faced w ith a number of criticisms of random “art”
based on their own demonstrative performances, which suffered from at
least the following five problems, any one of which is capable of destroy
ing any art:
*

1. Overkill—the expenditure of too much effort or attention for .insufficient
sensory or emotional reward.
2. Pretentiousness—the declaration of significance when the significance of
fered is minor or cliche.
3. Inarticulateness—the inadequate communication which comes from lack of
understanding by the artist of what might happen during his experiments.
4. Lack of Direction—not quite the same as lack of goal. There need not be a
final goal in sight, hut the lack of any sense of direction produces circular
art, and circular art ceases to be interesting after two or three revolutions.
5. Tedium—the open-ended tiresomeness of material so shapeless and unstruc
tured that it doesn’t know when to stop.
(8 )
The above criticisms are criticisms of random art as art.
I f it is art, then it is too often poor art, and it is the audience's duty
to point this out and not to generalize feebly that all of it is interesting.
There is no more justification for uncritical acceptance of any and all
assaults upon the senses in the name of art than there is justification for
accepting passively the drilling of experimental dentists. Experiment is
always valuable, but experiment is only “ art” when it succeeds. Robert
Frost once remarked that he did not require that a potato be covered w ith
earth for him to accept it as a potato. It is perhaps equally unnecessary
that we be w illin g ly on deck for an artist’s trials and errors. These trial
runs are best confined to the artist’s studio until he works the bugs out of
what he is doing.
'9 )
W hich brings me, of course, to the positive, i f heretical,
point I am making: that totally random or accidental art is not art at all.
It is "a happening,” and "a happening” is a form of social interaction, a

303
THE ARTS

1M

kind of group dynamics. Happenings can be great fun; they can turn one
on; they can stimulate and entertain; they can even provoke spiritual or
sensory awakenings. That, however, doesn’t make them art any more
than a motorcycle trip, or a trip to a supermarket, or a fall down a well is
art, though any one of them may also stimulate, entertain, or awaken us.
I f any and all experience can be labeled art and demand our attention as
art, then clearly the word has lost all meaning and turned into mush.
(1 0 )
This is not, as it may seem to some, a mere semantic
quibble. It is an attempt to gain some perspective in an area where per
spective itself has become suspect. There is a not-so-underground effort
being made these days to turn the word "experience" into an all-purpose
shrine before which we must keep an eternal flame burning. W e are
supposed to seek experience at all costs, and, what is more, we are being
conned into dignifying all experience w ith the title of "art.” But all ex
perience is not art, which has always been a rather special area o f experi
ence, Experience can be had, and is had, at any time of the day or night.
T o ride the New York subway on an August day is an experience. I t is
equally an experience to hoe a row of carrots, to swim across a lake, to go ,
to the toilet, to spank one's child, or to be converted to Mohammedanism.
I f all of these can also be called “art,” then clearly what we are doing is
simply melting our language down into one blob in which differentia
tions can no longer be made—anti-intellectualism w ith a vengeance!
(1 1 )
"Experience” is the most important "in ” word we have
at the moment; everyone from Tim othy Leary to Marshall M cLuhan, the
Fugs, and 3,000,000 students are for it. So am I. W hat I am against is
being told to recognize as art any random group of chance and often tire
some irrelevancies which may give me a reaction, an “ experience," no
matter of what kind of quality. For if there is one thing about which I
am perfectly clear, it is that art implies control. It is the precise opposite
of randomness.
(1 2 )
Here, precisely, is where scientific truth and artistic truth
part company. T he atomic particle mav be indeterminate, but man is not.
The random, the formless, is basically impossible and uninteresting to
man, who is, w illy-nilly, a pattern-making animal. Given a blank wall,
man w ill form its cracks into a design. Set down in chaos, man w ill sep
arate the w hirling from the stationary, for chaos and meaninglessness, as
the existentialists have discovered, are the hardest of all things for man
to endure. T o expect that he can, without drugs, turn off his brain and
float on a sensory sea is as illogical as to expect, conversely, that he can
react on a purely intellectual plane, untainted by the perceptions of his
senses. That the over-intellectualizing of art has caused rms violent pen
dulum swing in the opposite direction is a reason, but nc: an excuse, for
the excesses of die present position. The idea of a random “ art” may
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seem a corrective to rigidified, overformalized art forms, but it is a funda
mentally useless correction. Man is a sensing animal all right, but he is
also a thinking reed, and it is futile to attempt to lim it his art to the
narrow compass of his senses.
(1 3 )
In the long artistic past of humanity an accidental, ran
dom stroke has often produced significant art, but it took the artist’s eye
to recognize what the random stroke had done. Today we are being asked
to watch our artists doodle in public and to cull from their doodles what
ever appeals to us. T his may be fun, but it gives the performers no cachet
to be known as artists, since we are asked to do our own discriminating
and make our own selections on purely subjective grounds. The artists
who do this are rapidly putting themselves out of work, since the end
point to this method must be "every man his own artist."
(1 4 )
T he artist who tosses a pot of paint at a wall, or hangs
a wrecked car from the ceiling, or holds the microphone up to record his
gargling and then tells us to look and to "experience” is doing no more
than the merchant who displays before us an assortment of textiles,
thread, buttons, and braid, and suggests we choose what we like and
make ourselves a dress. I f we select the materials, and i f we plan and exe
cute the dress, the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the
merchant a couturier? Is his randomly heaped assortment of materials
"art'?
(1 5 )
M y criticism of these experiments in the random, then,
is not that they may not produce interesting, beautiful, or moving things,
but that they are simply not art. They may produce excitement, gaiety,
tedium, or a headache, but so can a day on the beach. I f there is no focus
ing, organizing intelligence behind it, there is no art in any meaningful
sense of the word.
(1 6 )
W hat is needed, it seems, is to redefine yet again, and
for a new generation, what we mean by art—a hazardous but a peren
nially necessary job. T o start w ith the easier end, let us clarify what art is
not. I t is not, as the current definition would have us believe, the com
munication of experience, not even of moving or emotional experience—
though it includes this function. Too many moving and emotionally
communicated experiences occur every day which are not art—for exam
ple, a man telling, us how his dog was run over, or a girl describing hex
hatred of her mother. A rt is not any accidental pattern of color, shape, or
sound which delights us. N ature is fu ll of such delightful accidents, but
nature is not art. A rt, in short, cannot be defined by what it does to us,
because we can be moved, stimulated, angered, made ecstatic by a vast
number of personal experiences which are not artistic in nature.
(1 7 )
W hat is left, then, i f we cannot define art by what it
does, is to define it by what it is. W ith more bravery than good sense, I
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w ill clim b well out on a lim b and define it as follows: A n is the controlled structuring of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly
and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of experience.
(1 8 )
T his definition, be it noted, allows for weak art or for
great art, depending on the skill or stature of the artist. I t does not allow
any place for the random or totally unstructured. T h e key words are
"controlled structuring." Experience, emotion, communication are all in 
gredients, but all are insufficient without the controlling mind, which,
alone, is capable of producing art. A rt is not what we experience-, it is the
controlled product of the artist’s experience. O ur reaction to it is our own
affair, but art comes from the artist—purposefully. I f we give back to the
word art a rational meaning, we can then go happily on to enjoy or to
abominate random happenings w ithout destroying the intellectual basis
for language, which is the power to make distinctions.

APPENDIX VI

Pornography and Censorship
IrvingK ristol
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Being frustrated is disagreeable, but the real disasters in
life begin when you get what you want. For almost a century now, a
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great many intelligent, well-meaning and articulate people—o f a kind
generally called liberal or intellectual, or both—have argued eloquently
against any kind of censorship of art and/or entertainment.
(2 )
And w ith in tnc past 10 years, the courts and the legisla
tures of most Western nations have found these arguments persuasive—
so persuasive that hardly a man is now alive who clearly remembers what
the answers to these arguments were. Today, in the United States and
other democracies, censorship has to all intents and purposes ceased to
exist.
(3 )
Is there a sense of triumphant exhilaration in the land?
Hardly. There is, on the contrary, a rapidly growing unease and disquiet.
Somehow, things have not worked out as they were supposed to, and
many notable civil libertarians have gone on record as saying this was not
what they meant at all.
(4 )
They wanted a world in which “Desire Under the Elms"
could be produced, or “ Ulysses’' published, w ithout interference by
philistine busybodies holding public office. They have got that, of course;
hut they have also got a world in which homosexual rape takes place on
the stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hours to witness vari
eties of professional fornication.
(5 )
But disagreeable as this may be, does it really matter?
M ight not our unease and disquiet be merely a cultural hangover—a
"hangup,’' as they say? W hat reason is there, to think that anyone was
ever corrupted by a book?
(6 )
T his last question, oddly enough, is asked by the very
same people who seem convinced that advertisements in magazines or
displays of violence on television do indeed have the power to corrupt. It
is also asked, incredibly enough and in all sincerity, by people—e.g., uni
versity professors and school teachers—whose very lives provide all the
answers one could want.
(7 )
A fter all, if you believe that no one was ever corrupted
by a book, you have also to believe that no one was ever improved by a
book (or a play or a movie). You have to believe, in other words, that all
art is morally trivial and that, consequently, all education is morally
irrelevant No one, not even a university professor, really believes that.
(8 )
T o be sure, it is extremely difficult, as social scientists tell
us, to 'race the effects of any single book (o r play or movie) on an indi
vidual reader or any class of readers. But we all know, and social scien
tists know it too, that the ways in which we use our minds and imagina
tions shape our characters and help define us 3s persons. T ha t those who
certainly know this are nevertheless moved to deny it merely indicates
how a dogmatic resistance to the idea of censorship can—like most dogmatism—result in a mindless insistence on the absurd.
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(9 )
I have used these harsh terms—"dogmatism” and "m ind
less” —advisedly. I m ight also have added “ hypocritical.” For the plain
fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. W e all believe that
there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to
lim it the "sell expression" of an individual or a group, even where this
might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even
where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults.
(1 0 )
A playwright or theatrical director might, in dtis crazy
world of ours, find someone w illing to commit suicide on the stage, as
called for by the script. W e would not allow that—any more than we
would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a w illin g masocnist.
(1 1 )
The basic point that emerges is one that W alter Berns
has powerfully argued in his superb essay, "Pornography vs. Democracy” :.
N o society can be utterly indifferent to the ways its citizens publicly
entertain themselves.
(1 2 )
Bcarbaiting and coclcfighting are prohibited only in part
out o f compassion for the suffering animals; the main reason they were
abolished was that it was fe lt they debased and brutalized the citizenry
who flocked to witness such spectacles. And the question we face w ith
regard to pornography and obscenity is whether, now that they have such
strong legal protection from the Supreme Court, they can or w ill brutalize
and debase our citizenry.
(1 3 )
W e are, after all, not dealing w ith one passing incident—
one book, or one play, or one movie. W e are dealing w ith a general
tendency th at is suffusing our entire culture.
(1 4 )
I say pornography and obscenity because, though they
have different dictionary definitions and are frequently distinguishable as
"artistic" genres, they are nevertheless in the end identical in effect. Por
nography is not objectionable simply because it arouses sexual desire or
lust or prurience in the m ind of the reader or spectator; this is a silly
Victorian notion.
(1 5 )
A great many nonpornographic words—including some
parts of the Bible—excite sexual desire very successfully. W hat is distinc
tive about pornography is that, in the words of D. H . Lawrence, it at
tempts "to do dirt on (sex) . . . ( I t is an) insult to a vital human rela
tionship.”
(1 6 )
In other words, pornography differs from erotic art in that
its whole purpose is to treat human beings obscenely, to deprive human
beings of their specifically human dimension. T hat is what obscenity is
all about. I t is lig h t years removed from any kind of carefree sensuality—
there is no continuum between Fielding’s "T om Jones” and the M arcuis
de Sade's" j ustinft.”

309

LANGUAGE ArJO tCC.'O

30)

(1 7 )
It may well he that Western society, in the latter h a lf of
the 20th century, is experiencing a drastic change in sexual mores and
sexual relationships. W e have had many such "sexual revolutions" in the
past—and the bourgeois family and bourgeois ideas of sexual propriety
were themselves established in the course of a revolution against 18th
century "licentiousness”—and we shall doubtless have others in the future.
(1 8 )
It is, however, highly improbable (to put it m ild ly ) th a t,
what wc are witnessing is the final revolution which w ill make sexual
relations utterly unproblematic, permit us to dispense w ith any kind of
ordered relationships between the.sexes, and allow us freely to redefine
the human condition. And so long as humanity has not reached that
utopia, obscenity w ill remain a problem.
(1 9 )
Sex—like death—is an activity that is both animal and
human. There are human sentiments and human ideals involved in this
animal activity. But when sex is public, the viewer does not see—cannot
see—the sentiments and the ideals. He can only see the animal coupling.
(2 0 )
And that is why, when men and women make love, as we
say, they prefer to be alone—because it is only when you are alone that
you can make love, as distinct from merely copulating in an animal and
casual way. And that, too, is why those who are voyeurs, iE they are not .
irredeemably sick, also feel ashamed at what they are witnessing. W hen
sex is a public spectacle, a human relationship has been debased into a
mere animal connection.
;
(2 1 )
The basic psychological fact about pornography and ob
scenity is that it appeals to and provokes a kind of sexual regression. The
sexual pleasure one gets from pornography and obscenity is autoerotic and
infantile; to put it bluntly, it is a masturbatory exercise of the imagina
tion, when -it is not masturbation pure and simple. Now, people who
masturbate do not get bored w ith masturbation, just as sadists don’t get
bored w ith sadism, ar.d voyeurs don’t get bored w ith voyeurism,
(2 2 )
In other words, infantile sexuality is not only a perma
nent temptation for the adolescent or even the adult—it can quite easily
become a permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis.
(2 3 )
W hat is at stake is civilization and humanity, nothing
less. The idea that "everything is permitted," as Nietzsche put it, rests on
the premise of nihilism and his nihilistic implications. I w ill not pretend
that the case against nihilism and for civilization is an easy one to make.
W e are here confronting the most fundamental of philosophical ques
tions, on the deepest levels.
(2 4 )
But that is precisely my point—that the matter of por
nography and obscenity is not a trivial one, anu that only superficial
jjjjgd^ggn^take a bland and untroubled view of it.
(2 5 )
In this connection, I might also point out that those who
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are prim arily against censorship on liberal grounds tell us not to take
pornography or obscenity seriously, while those who are for pornography
and obscenity on radical grounds, take it very seriously indeed.
(2 6 )
I believe the radicals—writers like Susan Sontag, Herbert
Marcuse, Norman O. Erown, and even Jerry Rubin—are right, and the
liberals are wrong. I also believe that those young radicals at Berkeley,
some five years ago, who provoked a major confrontation over the public
. use of obscene words, showed a brilliant political instinct.
(2 7 )
Once the faculty and administration had capitulated on
this issue saying: "O h, for God's sake, let's be adult: W hat difference
does it make anyway?"—once they said that, they were bound to lose on
every other issue. And once M ark Rudd could publicly ascribe to the
president of Columbia a notoriously obscene relationship to his mother,
w ithout provoking any kind of reaction, the SDS had already won the
day. The occupation of Columbia’s buildings merely ratified their victory.
(2 8 )
Men who show themselves unw illing to defend civiliza
tion against nihilism are not going to be either resolute or effective in
defending the university against anything.
(2 9 )
1 am already touching upon a political aspect of pornog
raphy when I suggest that it is inherently and purposefully subversive
of civilization and its institutions. But there is another and more specific-'
ally political aspect, which has to do w ith the relationship of pornography
and/or obscenity to democracy, and especially to the quality of public
life on which democratic government ultimately rests.
(3 0 )
Though the phrase, "the quality of life," trips easily from
so many lips these days it tends to be one of those cliches w ith many
trivial meanings and no large, serious one. Rarely does it have anything to
ido w ith the way the citizen in a democracy views himself—his obligaItions. his in tentions, his ultimate self-definition.
( 3 iX
There is an old idea of democracy—one which was fairly
common u n til about the beginning of this century—for which the con
ception of the quality of public life is absolutely crucial. This idea starts
from the proposition that democracy is a form of self-government, and
that if you want it to be a meritorious polity, vou have to care about
what kind of people govern it. Indeed, it puts the matter more strongly
and declares that, if you want self-government, you are only entitled to
it if that "self” is worthy of governing.
(5 2 )
And because the desirability of seJf-govemment depends
Ion the character of the people who govern, the older idea of democracy
was very solicitous of the condition of this character. I t was solicitous of
jthat collective self which we call public opinion and which, in a democ
racy. governs us collectively.
(3 3 )
And because it cared, this older idea o f democracy had
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no problem in principle w ith pornography and/or obscenity. It censored
them—and it did so with a perfect clarity of mind and a perfectly clear
conscience. It was not about to permit people capriciously to corrupt
ihcmselves,
(3 4 )
I have, it may be noticed, uttered that dreadful word,
"censorship." And I am not about to back away from it. IF you think
pornography and/or obscenity is a serious problem, you have to be for
censorship. I 'll go even further and say that if you want to prevent por
nography and/or obscenity from becoming a problem, you have to be for
censorship. And lest there be any misunderstanding as to what I am say
ing, I ’ll put it as bluntly as possible: I f you care for the quality of life in
our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship.
(3 5 )
But can a liberal be for censorship? Unless one assumes
that being a liberal must mean being indifferent to the quality of Ameri
can life, then the answer has to be: yes, a liberal can be for censorship—
but he ought to favor a liberal fcrrn of censorship.
(3 6 )
Is that a contradiction in terms? I don’t think so. We.
have no problem in contrasting repressive laws governing alcohol and
drugs ana tobacco w ith laws regulating (i.e., discouraging the sale o f)
alcohol and drugs and tobacco. Laws encouraging temperance are not the
same thing as laws that have as their goal prohibition or abolition.
(3 7 )
W e have not made the smoking of cigarets a criminal ’
offense. W e have, however, and w ith good liberal conscience, prohibited
cigaret advertising on television, and may yet, again with good liberal con
science, prohibit it in newspapers and magazines. The idea of restricting
!individual freedom, in a liberal way, is not at all unfam iliar to us.
(3 8 )
I therefore see no reason whv we should not be able to
distinguish repressive censorship from liberal censorship o f the written
and spoken word.
(3 9 )
T his possibility, of course, occasions much distress among
artists and academics. It is a fact, one that cannot and should not be
denied, that any system of censorship is bound, upon occasion, to treat
unjustly a particular work of art—to find pornography where there is only
gentle eroticism, to find obscenity where none really exists, or to find both
where its existence ought to be tolerated because it serves a larger moral
purpose.
(4 0 )
It is such works of art that are likely to suffer at the hands
| of the censor. T hat is the price one has to be prepared to pay for censorI ship—even liberal censorship.
(4 1 )
But just how high is this price? I f you believe, as so many
artists seem to believe today, that art is the only sacrosanct activity in our
profane and vulgar world—that any man who designates himself an artist
thereby acquires a sacred office—then obviously censorship is an intoler-
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able form of sacrilege. But For those of us who do not subscribe to this
religion of art, the costs of censorship do not seem so high at all.
(4 2 )
But I must repeat and emphasize: W hat kind of laws we
pass governing pornography and obscenity, what kind of censorship or
—since we are still a federal nation—what kinds of censorship we insti
tute in our various localities may indeed be difficult matters to cope w ith;
nevertheless the real issue is one of principle.
(4 3 )
I myself subscribe to a liberal view of the enforcement
problem: I think that pornography should be illegal and available to any
one who wants it so badly as to make a pretty strenuous effort to get i t
W e have lived w ith under-the-counter pornography for centuries now in
a fairly comfortable way. But the issue of principle, of whether it should
be over or under the counter, has to be settled before we can reflect on
the advantages of alternative modes of censorship.
(4 4 )
I think the settlement we are livin g under now, in which
obscenity and democracy are regarded as equals, is wrong; I believe it is
inherently unstable: I think it w ill, in the long run, be incompatible w ith
anv authentic concern for the quality of life in our democracy.
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